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Abstract
The dissertation examines the formation and operation of opposing (Greek and 
Turkish) underground armed movements on the island of Cyprus in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, between 1955-1963, and analyzes their cataiytic contribution to 
the violent inter-communal strife during the last colonial years (1955-1958) and 
their ambiguous, manipulative role in the first years of the newly established 
Republic of Cyprus (1959-1963).
The first chapter, as a prelude to the main argument, presents the 
ideological background of the Cypriot Greek aspiration for Enosis and the 
factors that gravely predetermined the outcome of the anti-colonial armed 
struggle. The following chapter analyzes the operational conception, the 
underground structure and the internal politics of EOKA, as well as the reasons 
that led to the strategic failure of its anti-colonial campaign despite its tactical 
triumph. The third chapter presents the revival of Pan-Turkism, the covert 
colonial incitement of the Turkish factor (Turkish Government and minority), as 
well as the desperate Cypriot Turk underground efforts (KITEMB, VOLKAN, 9 
Eyiul Cephesi, Kara Cete) against the underground domination of EOKA. The 
following chapter focuses on the important underground action of TMT 
(November 1957-August 1958) and the four phases of its militant development, 
and examines how its violent Taksim offensive contributed towards the 
derailment of Enosis. The fifth chapter analyzes the ideological chasm between 
former EOKA members, after the termination of the anti-coionial struggle, and 
the antagonistic operation of Greek Cypriot underground paramilitary 
movements (KEM, PSA, OPEK, EOK, Lyssarldes Groups) for the acquisition of 
political power during their reputed preparation against Turkish underground 
ambitions. The last chapter presents the military infiltration of Turkey into the 
island, the re-establishment of TMT on a paramilitary structure under the 
control of Ankara and the clandestine operations for the importation of arms 
and ammunition, and investigates the internal jntrigues within the organization 
for domination over the community between 1958-1963.
Ill
Introduction
The last years of colonial rule and the first years of the newly established 
Republic of Cyprus are deeply interconnected, both in their visible political 
maneuvers and their invisible underground armed manipulations. The eruption 
of the explosive inter-communai strife of December 1963-August 1964, that 
almost brought the decline of the young Republic, is not the exclusive outcome 
of post-colonial constitutional friction, sociopolitical suspicion, and the 
deterioration of the inter-communai environment. Its roots lie in the last colonial 
years when the two communities -  the Greek seduced by the idealist aspiration 
for Enosis under the immature guidance of its political leadership and the 
incompetent diplomatic maneuvers of motherland Greece, and the Turkish by 
the Pan-Turklst objective of Taksim under the aggressive strategic ambitions of 
motherland Turkey -  skillfully manipulated by the colonial ruler and its divide et 
impera doctrine, were frivolously led into a violent confrontation, the deep 
wounds of which were hastily veiled under the imposed Zurich and London 
Agreements. The purpose of this research is to study the operation of the 
underground armed organizations of the two communities, and interpret their 
influence on the destiny of the island during the critical transformation of the 
Crown colony into an independent Republic.
While the existing bibliography had examined, quite extensively, the 
political aspects and diplomatic developments of the 1955-1963 period,^ the
’ Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for 
Union with Greece (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978); Francois Crouzet, Le Conflict de 
Chypre 1946-1959[The Cyprus conflict 1946-1959], 2 vols (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 1973); 
Charles Foley, island in Revolt {London: Longmans, 1963); John Reddaway, Burdened with 
Cyprus: The British Connection (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986); Stephen Xydis, 
Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 7554-7555 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967); 
Diane Weston Markides, Cyprus 1957-1963, From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis: 
The Key Role o f the Municipal Issue, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European 
Monographs, No. 11 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001); Stanley Kyriakides, Cyprus:
IV
underground armed movements, the leaders of which, ironlcaliy, were the 
political leaders of the two communities, for a variety of reasons -  extremely 
limited secondary bibliography, almost complete absence of archival material, 
the controversial activities of the underground organizations are still considered 
today a taboo -  were left almost untouched. Beyond the scarcity of secondary 
bibliography,^ the extreme secrecy behind the operation of the underground
Constitutionalism and Crisis Government {PhWadie\ph\a\ University of Pennsylvania Press,
1968); Robert Stephen, Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the 
Eastern Mediterranean (London; Pall Mail Press, 1966); Thomas Ehrllch, Cyprus, 1958-1967 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
 ^While there are tens of books and articles describing the patriotic activities of EOKA (from 
former members, journalists, school teachers, and others), the main bibliographical sources for 
the operational conception, the unorthodox tactics, the underground structure, the armory, and 
the operations of EOKA, are the published works of its leader Digenis, which are considered 
reliable on their military content but less objective on their political/national views: Georgios 
Grivas-Digenis, Apomnemonevmata Agonos EOKA 1955-1959 [Memoirs of the EOKA struggle 
1955-1959] (Athens: [n. pub.], 1961); Georgios Grivas-Digenis, Agon EOKA kai 
Antartopoiemos: Poiitikostratiotiki Meieti[EOKk struggle and guerilla warfare: A political-military 
study] (Athens: [n. pub.], 1962); Georgios Grivas-Digenis, Chronikon Agonos EOKA 1955-1959 
[Chronicle of the EOKA struggle 1955-1959] (Athens: [n. pub.], 1971); Georgios Grivas, The 
Memoirs of General Grivas, ed. by Charles Foley (London: Longmans, 1964); Georgios Grivas, 
Guerilla Warfare and EOKA’s Struggle, ed. by Charles Foley (London: Longmans, 1964). Other 
useful works on EOKA are: Spyros Papageorgiou, Kypriaki Thiella 1955-1959 [Cypnot storm 
1955-1959] (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1977); Giannis Spanos, EOKA, Etsi Polemoun oi Ellines 
[EOKA, that’s how the Greeks fight], 3 vols (Nicosia: Andreas Spanos, 1996-2001); Archeion 
ton Paranomon Egrafon tou Kypriakou Agonos 1955-1959 [Archive of Illegal documents of the 
Cyprus struggle 1955-1959], ed. by Spyros Papageorgiou, 2nd edn (Nicosia: Epiphaniou,
1984).
The underground operation of TMT during its invisible period, between 1957-1963, was 
considered, for many years, a well-preserved secret among the Turkish community in Cyprus. 
Researcher Dr Ahmet An, in his book Kibrls Nereye G/cZ/yo/'? [Where is Cyprus heading to?], 
2nd edn (Istanbul: Everest Yayinlari, 2003), pp. 141-171, traces the first important disclosures 
about TMT in 1993, when part of the personal diary of Lieutenant Colonel Riza Vuruskan was 
presented in Dervis Manizade, 65 Yil Boyunca Kibris, Yazdikiarin Soylediklerim [Cyprus during 
65 years, what I have written and what I have said] (Istanbul: [n. pub.], 1993). On 4 February 
1995, the first public discussion entitled The position of the Turkish Resistance Organization
Vorganizations and the criminal involvement of some of their members did not 
permit the keeping of formal records.^ Both limitations posed an important
and the Cyprus Problem’ initiated a series of apocalyptic articles in the Turkish -  Milliyet {6-12 
February) and Turkish Cypriot press -  Yeni Cag (13 February, 20 February-30 March), Ortam 
(6 February, 22 May-7 June, 19 September-4 October), Kibris (8 March). During the following 
year more revelations appeared in Ortam (6-12- February), while the Ankara periodical Kibris 
Mektubu (June 1996-July 1997) began a series of articles presenting the testimony of former 
Major Ismail Tansu who revealed, for the first time, the clandestine preparations of TMT in 
Ankara and Cyprus. 1997 brought more publicity on TMT and the other Turkish underground 
organizations -  Haikin Sesi{26 May-26 September) and Ortam (26 May-17 June), which 
continued in the following years. Major bibliographical sources about the Turkish underground 
movements between 1955-1963 are: Aydin Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskiiati: 1957-1958 
/Wt/cacZe/es/[Turkish resistance organization: The 1957-1958 struggle] (Istanbul: [n. pub.],
1999): Ismail Tansu, Asiinda Hie Kimse Uyumuyordu: Yaraitinda Siiahli Bir Gizii Orgut, Hem de 
Devlet Eiiyle ... TMT[\n reality no one was sleeping: An underground armed secret organization 
with the support of the state ... TMT] (Ankara: Minpa Matbaacilik, 2001); Mehmet All Tremeseli, 
Ayios Sipiridon Canlari [The bells of Agios Spyridon] (Nicosia: Galerl Kultur, 2007). The 
expected publication of Hasan Demirag, Kibris, Oniar ve Biz [Cyprus, us and them], vol. 5 
(Nicosia: Kibris TMT Dernegi Yayinlari, [n. avail.]) will undoubtedly offer important inside 
information about TMT operations from a former cadre. Criticism about TMT - th e  same applies 
for Greek Cypriot underground organizations -  is very rare and may be found in Dr Ahmet An, 
Kibris’Ta Firtinali Yiiiar 7545-7555[Troubled water years in Cyprus 1942-1962] (Nicosia: Galeri 
Kultur, 1996), and in Arif Hasan Tahsin, E Anodes tou Denktash stin Koryphi [The rise of 
Denktash to the top], trans. by Thanasis Haranas (Nicosia: Archeio, 2001). Important 
disclosures from TMT leader Rauf R. Denktash appear in Erten Kasimoglu, Eski Gunler, Eski 
Defterier[0\6 days, old notes] 3rd edn (Nicosia: Novemberson, 2006), and in Nezire Gurkan, 
Zirvedeki Yainiziik Kulesi: Rauf Rauf Denktash [The castle of loneliness on the top: Rauf Raif 
Denktash] (Famagusta: Cumbez, 2005).
 ^The secret correspondence of EOKA, between Digenis and the sector commanders and 
group leaders, does not exist today since Grivas (for security reasons) gave strict orders for the 
immediate destruction of all EOKA messages, reports or orders, after their acknowledgement 
by their recipient. An exception to this directive was his own diaries and notes, part of which 
were unearthed by the colonial authorities and were published in Government of Cyprus, 
Tromokratia en Kypro: To Emeroiogion tou Griva [Terrorism in Cyprus: The diary of Grivas] 
(Nicosia: Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1957). After the termination of the struggle, a 
number of documents of Grivas’ orders appeared in publications, when some cadres avoided 
destroying them for sentimental reasons. Almost all proclamations of EOKA, PEKA and ANE
VI
methodological obstacle that was overcome through private interviews with 
cadres of the underground movements of both communities, and the study of 
documents from private collections/ The utilization of oral sources became an 
important research tool that offered, on one hand, inside (eyewitness) 
information about controversial incidents and their background stories, which 
are revealed publicly for the very first time. But, on the other hand, the reliability 
and objectivity of the interviews -  in the absence of documentary evidence -  
became a critical element that had to be investigated with caution and 
precision. Two methods were used for the verification of the accuracy and 
reliability of the interviewees. Whenever it was possible, incidents, and the 
stories behind them, were indirectly verified by other interviewees and by the 
study of newspaper reports of the period. Due to the controversial and illegal 
nature of many incidents (murders, bomb explosions, provocations, etc), such 
verification was not always possible, since the interviewee might have been the 
only eyewitness alive. In such occasions the reliability of the source was 
investigated by the accuracy of the interviewee’s descriptions to known 
(verifiable) events, as well as by the consistency of the interviewee’s answers 
when specific issues (questions) were raised in repeated meetings.^ It appears
were saved and may be found at the Museio Agonos EOKA 1955-1959 (MAE) and the private 
collection of Michalakis Christophi Nikoiaou (MCNC) in Nicosia. Examples of the secret 
correspondence between Grivas, Makarlos and Averof are saved at the Idrima Konstantinos G. 
Karamanlis (IKK) in Athens.
Trasnlations of important TMT proclamations (1958) may be found at The National Archives in 
London (CO 926/952 and GO 926/941); Ismail Tansu disclosed that all archives regarding the 
formation and operation of TMT in Ankara and Nicosia are still considered highly sensitive and 
are secretly kept in Ankara.
Private collections played, in some occasions, an extremely important role for the 
documentation of the ideology, paramilitary structure, and operation of some Greek Cypriot 
underground movements, particularly of OPEK and EOK, the documents of which -  due to the 
controversial nature of their activities -  vanished, and today are not available in any public 
collection.
 ^The testimony of Turkish Cypriot A.A. regarding the underground activities of TMT proved 
extremely important; the absence of other eyewitnesses and documentary evidence required
vil
that there were no attempts towards misleading descriptions or unreal 
incidents, since, in some cases, the interviewees of both communities preferred 
to keep silent for events, which -  for various reasons -  they wanted to avoid.
The contribution of this dissertation to historical research is twofold. 
Firstly, in spite of the existing scarce bibliography, it simultaneously 
investigates the growth and studies the interaction among the opposing 
underground organizations in both communities. Secondly, it attempts to fill the 
bibliographical gap regarding the armed underground movements in Cypriot 
historiography. Hopefully -  in spite of the time limitations regarding the life of 
the remaining eyewitnesses -  it will form a foundation upon which other 
researchers will be able to build their research work and expand, in quality and 
volume, the depth of this work.
repeated (nine) meetings: 18 March 2006, 23 March 2006, 9 June 2006, 28 April 2007, 16 May 
2007, 1 July 2007, 2July 2007, 5 July 2007, 25 September 2007.
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Chapter I 
The birth of a national aspiration 
and the political campaign for Enosis
The gradual emergence of a national aspiration in a strategic iand
Since antiquity, the pivotal position of the island of Cyprus in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, at the crossroads of three continents, and its importance for 
geopolitical domination in the region of the Middle East, had a catalytic 
influence In transforming this strategic land  ^ into a nucleus of rivalry among 
foreign powers. Its people had suffered, through the centuries, the oppressive 
rule of consecutive foreign conquerors, the national interests and geopolitical 
ambitions of which, most often, dictated the destiny of the island. Even today, 
the Cypriots still pay the bitter debts arising from the island’s geo-strategic 
position that initiated foreign intervention amid dramatic domestic mistakes. 
The de facto military division of Cyprus, after the Turkish invasion of 1974, 
remains an open wound in united Europe, forcefully segregating its people in 
the north and the south.
Today’s perplexing political situation emerged at the end of British 
colonial rule and the first years of the newly established Republic of Cyprus, 
between 1955 and 1963; one of the most critical periods in the history of the 
island, that irreversibly determined the fate of its people. The bitter and
 ^ strategic Colonies and their Future {London: Fabian Publications and Victor Gollancz, 1945), 
pp. 3-5, 27-36; George Hill, A History of Cyprus, 4 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1940-1952), vol. IV (1952) ed. by Harry Luke, pp. 613-618; Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, 
pp. 8-11 ; Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and 
the Turkish Invasion (London: Taurus, 1999), pp. 1-7, 77-86.
hazardous roots of inter-communal fear and hatred, grown during the iast years 
of British rule, were not foreshadowing a prosperous and peaceful future for the 
Cypriots. This dissertation concentrates on the formation and operation of 
underground armed movements on the island during the anti-colonial struggle 
and the first independence years, and investigates the contribution of these 
organizations in the deterioration of the political situation and their role in the 
incitement of violence between the two communities. Before analyzing the main 
subject, a brief description of the historical environment that led to the outbreak 
of the anti-colonial struggle, will provide the foundation for the understanding of 
the ideological roots of the Cyprus question.
The 1821 Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire and 
the establishment of an independent Greek state, as well as the appearance of 
a revived Greek national identity under Megali Idea [Great Idea] -  ‘the reborn 
Greece, united in one state, for one purpose, into one force, one religion, and 
finally one constitution'^- brought inspiration to the Greek population of Cyprus. 
The concept of Enosis^ -  the union of an occupied Hellenic land with the newly 
established Greek state -  firstly appeared at the revolutionary movements of 
Kephalonia (Ionian Islands) in 1848-1849 and the Cretan Revolution of 1866- 
1869. The accession of the Ionian Islands from Britain in 1864 and of Thessaly 
from the Ottoman Empire in 1881, supported by the indisputable belief of the 
Cypriots for their Hellenic descent,"^ gradually nourished the hope that one day 
the island would be united with motherland Greece.
 ^Historic speech of I, Kolletis at the First National Assembly on 14 January 1844, quoted in 
Georgios Anastasiades, ‘H Proti Ethniki Synelephsi’ [The first national assembly], in Istoria ton 
E//e/7o/7 [History of the Hellenes], 15 vols (Athens: Domi, [n.d.]), vol. X, pp. 138-167 (151-153).
 ^Georgios Moschopoulos, To lonio Kratos kai oi Agones ton Eptanesion gia tin Anexartesia’ 
[The Ionian state and the struggle of the Eptanesians for independence], in Istoria ton Eiienon, 
vol. X, pp. 324-363 (337-363); lakovos Methioudlakis, ‘E Prolmi Kretiki Epanastasi pou 
Proanaggeli tin Enosl’ [The early Cretan revolution pre-announces Enosis], in Istoria ton 
Eiienon, vol. X, pp. 484-519.
Vasos Karageorgis, Oi Protoi Eliines stin Kypro: Oi Archaioiogikes Martyries [The first Greeks 
in Cyprus: The archaeological evidence] (Athens: Papademas, 1991), pp. 9, 37-42; Maria 
lacovou, ‘The late Bronze Age origins of Cypriot Hellenism and the Establishment of the Iron
The signing of the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great 
Britain and Turkey' in Constantinople, on 4 June 1878, was erroneously 
perceived, as was proven later, by the local Greeks, who thought that the 
freedom-loving and democratic British would be the ‘golden bridge’® leading to 
EnosisJ In the following decades the Cypriot Greek leadership -  the Christian 
Orthodox bishops and the members of the Legislative Council -  never ceased 
raising the issue of Enosis to the British High Commissioners in Nicosia and the 
British Governments in London. ‘Hardly a year has passed since the 
occupation without the Hellenic idea finding expression in some form or other.’® 
There were plenty of motions in the Legislative Council, resolutions, petitions, 
and deputations to London,® and despite the fact that important political 
personalities, such as Gladstone and Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies 
Winston Churchill, theoretically acknowledged the logic of E n o s is , the British 
projected the argument that Cyprus, although occupied and administered by
Age Kingdoms’, in From Ishtar to Aphrodite: 3200 years of Cypriot Heiienism, ed. by Sophocles 
Hadjisavvas (New York; Alexander 8. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation, 2003), pp. 79-85;
Hill, A History o f Cyprus, vol. I (1940), pp. 82-94.
 ^Correspondence Respecting the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey of June 4 
1878, C. 2057 (London: Harrison, 1878), pp. 3-5.
® Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 5.
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Britain, technically was still Ottoman soilJ^ Despite the aggravation of the 
political situation after the unilateral annexation of the island on 5 November 
1914, the Cypriot Greeks, nevertheless, did not hesitate to contribute to the war 
effort with almost 15,400 volunteers that joined the British Army/^ The following 
year was rather prophetic for future Greek-Cypriot Greek relations; the formal 
British proposal offering Cyprus to Greece -  on the condition of entering the 
war in support of Serbia -  was rejected by the Greek Government J® The
more telegrams, petitions, motions, and resignations from the Legislative 
Council, as well as two pan-Cyprian Resolutions -  on 25 March 1921 and 25 
March 1930. '^  ^ Robert Holland and Diane Markides remark that the Cypriot 
Greeks developed, at the time, a ‘Cyprus alone’ awareness where ‘if necessary 
to seek their national redemption independently of Athens’.^ ®
On 21 October 1931 the outbreak of spontaneous and violent 
demonstrations against the British refusal to consider the Cypriot claims, led to 
the burning of the Government House, the death of nine Greeks, and the arrest 
of hundreds;^® the Cypriot Greek disobedience was punished with the 
imposition of strict and repressive measures. Despite the heavy feelings and
Prime Minister Gladstone’s response (19 April 1881) and Secretary of State for the Colonies 
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Cypriot disappointment did not affect their effort for Enosis that continued with
disappointment of the Cypriots, the outbreak of World War II and the British call 
to contribute to the war -  offering also an opportunity to strengthen the 
struggling local economy -  was met with enthusiasm/^ More than thirty 
thousand Cypriots -  Greeks and Turks -  volunteered and served under the 
Cyprus Regiment^® and other local military units, and 338 of them gave their 
lives -  buried in 47 cemeteries in 15 different countries -  for the ideal of 
liberty/®
Strategic burdens
The end of the war was met with high expectations; that Britain, appreciating 
the vital contribution of Greece -  the high cost she inflicted against the invading 
Italian and German forces and its occupation by the Axis -  and the Cypriot 
dedication towards the allied war effort, would fulfill the theoretical promises 
she offered when in need. Three factors were destined to play a vital role in 
transforming the aspiration for Enosis, into a national ideology and into a 
dynamic political campaign: The consistent British refusal to acknowledge the 
Cypriot claims, the decisively high percentage -  95.7% -  of the 15 January 
1950 Plebiscite in favor of Enosis, a n d  the emergence of Michael Mouskos as
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Archbishop Makarlos ill on 16 October 1950. The disappointment and 
emotional fatigue had exhausted the seventy-year Cypriot patience, and 
indignation and emotional excitement turned Cypriot Greek hope towards the 
national ideology of Enosis kai Monon Enosi^^ [Union and only union]. From 
that moment, a series of mishandlings and misconceptions set the clock of 
Cyprus into a hazardous countdown.
On the political frontier the Ethnarchy (the leadership of the Cypriot 
Greek Orthodox Church) under the insistent, inflexible leadership of 
Archibishop Makarlos, entered a dynamic diplomatic campaign pursuing the 
internationalization of the Cyprus issue. The Cypriot political conception, 
dictated by emotional impulsiveness rather than a deep understanding of the 
emerging post-war geopolitical environment, revolved around two raw -  
'ethical' -  factors. Firstly, the acknowledgement of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples as fundamental principles in post-World War II 
international affairs, safeguarded by Paragraph III of the Atlantic Charter, 
Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 16 December 1952 
Resolution 637 (VII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.^® 
Secondly, the confidence of the Cypriots for the soundness and legitimacy of 
their claim for Enosis and for their right to decide their future, arising from their 
three thousand-year old Hellenic background and their 82% majority status on 
the island.
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7Eventually, four burdens -  with strategic implications -  critically 
undermined the dynamic Cypriot planning and the chances for its successful 
implementation. The first burden arose from the fact that the Ethnarchy -  that 
is, Makarlos -  neither had the knowledge nor was willing to take into 
consideration, in its political campaign for Enosis, the post-World War II 
geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East; the 
emotional excitement for the national aspiration blinded every logical thought. 
To the microcosmic^"^ world of Cypriot Greeks, the Cold War, the decline of the 
geopolitical situation in the Middle East, the rise of Arab nationalism, Soviet 
infiltration to the Middle East, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and British 
strategic interests in the region, were issues of secondary importance.^® It was 
In this spirit that Archbishop Makarlos made, on 10 August 1953, a unilateral 
appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations, raising the issue of self- 
determination for Cyprus; the effort of course failed since the subject had to be 
raised by a member state.
The second burden related to the almost de facto imposition (by 
Makarlos) of Cypriot demands -  for Enosis and for the internationalization of 
the issue through the United Nations -  on the Greek Government. The post-war 
Greek internal realities were harsh.®  ^ Greece, suffering the results of German 
occupation and the consequences of a civil war, was almost in ruins. The 
Greek economy was dependent on foreign support, internal politics were 
fragile, Greek foreign diplomacy was prescribed by Washington and London,
Evanthls Hadjivasiliou, Strategikes tou Kypriakou: Dekaetia tou 1950 [Strategies of the 
Cyprus issue; The 1950’s decade] (Athens: Pataki, 2005), pp. 283-284.
Wiiliam Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, 
the United States, and Postwar imperiaiism {Oxtord: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 205- 
225; Hadjivasiliou, Strategikes, pp. 286-291.
Cyprus Demands Self-determination (Washington: Royal Greek Embassy Information 
Service, [1954]), pp. 21-22 (Appendix A).
Vlachos, Deka Chronia, pp. 9, 20, 43-44; Elias Nikolakopoulos, E Kahektiki Demokratia: 
Kommata kai Ekioges 1946-1967 [The iii republic: Political parties and elections 1946-1967] 
(Athens: Pataki, 2001), pp. 97-101, 154-158, 179-195.
and the wounds between the rightists and the communists were too fresh to be 
forgotten. At the same time the opposition, influenced by the rise of nationalist 
feelings and party interests, took advantage and exercised heavy pressure on 
the unstable Greek Governments in favor of Enosis. Archbishop Makarlos 
realizing Greek vulnerability, not only manipulated Greek national feelings, but 
did not hesitate to threaten the Greek Government, that if Greece was not 
willing to support the Cypriot demands in the United Nations, then he would 
turn to a third country for support.®®
Greek efforts to discuss the issue and find a solution with its ally and 
friend Britain found no response. The first coup de grace was given in the 
House of Commons, by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Henry 
Hopkinson, on 28 July 1954, who, when talking about Cyprus, stated that ‘there 
are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular 
circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent'.®® The cold-blooded 
‘never’, closed every door for a friendly settlement and forced the Greek 
Government of Field-Marshal Alexandros Papagos to appeal to the United 
Nations, for the very first time, by inscribing on 22 August 1954 the item 
‘Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of people in the case of the population of the 
island of Cyprus’.®® The responsibility for the third strategic burden belongs to 
the Greek Government, which failed to oppose to Cypriot pressures and fell into 
the trap she set for herself, without taking into serious consideration the 
geopolitical interests in the region, and particularly British reaction and possible 
Turkish involvement. The failure of Greek diplomacy in the United Nations, in 
1954, had two extremely severe implications. It attracted, with British
Savvas Loizldes, 4Zyc/7//<ypros [Unfortunate Cyprus] (Athens: Bergadi, 1980), p. 86;
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House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates {Ransaxd), Vol. 531 (London: HMSO, 1954), cot. 
508.
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Agenda of the Ninth Session of the Générai Assembiy of the United Nations heid at New York 
on September23/24 1954, Cmd. 9300 (London: HMSO, 1954).
encouragement, the attention of the Turkish Government, initiating its dynamic 
involvement in Cyprus, and provided the excuse for the outbreak of the anti­
colonial armed struggle for Enosis. The doors of conflict were now wide open; 
the dynamic but politically immature Cypriot Greek leadership and the seduced 
Greek Government of Papagos, had entered a dark tunnel, without realizing the 
severe implications of their action, without ever safeguarding an emergency 
exit and a safe way out.
The prophetic connotations of the underground preparations
The preparatory period for the underground campaign opened in December 
1950, when retired Greek Army Colonel George Grivas, in an informal visit to 
General Georgios Kosmas, Chief of the Greek Army, expressed the necessity 
for the organization of a liberation movement in Cyprus.Cypriot-born Grivas, 
former leader of the anti-communist organization X' during the Greek civil 
war,^^ was a strong-minded, military man of decisive action, who enforced his 
military decisions without hesitation, but was vulnerable and easily manipulated 
by his close associates on many other matters. He was the man who conceived 
and pushed hard for an armed liberation movement in Cyprus, and for this 
reason he made two reconnaissance tours to the island, in July-August 1951 
and October 1952-February 1953, where he had private discussions with 
Makarios, made contacts, studied different locations on the mountains and the 
coasts, and recruited the first combat nuclei.^^
On 2 July 1952, an important secret meeting took place in Athens under 
the chairmanship of Archbishop Makarios, in the presence of Colonel Grivas 
and a few Greek and Cypriot patriots. The Struggle Committee^"^ born on that
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 15.
Hadjlvasiliou, Strategikes, pp. 47-55; Spyros Papageorgiou, O Grivas kai ‘X ’: To Hameno 
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day became the core of underground preparation in Athens, despite the fact 
that Makarios faced -  for almost four years (1951-1954) -  Grivas’ proposals, 
with scepticism and severe hesitation.^® In the first meeting, he was very 
pessimistic about the prospects of an armed struggle and told Grivas that ‘not 
even fifty men would be willing to follow you’.®® The first serious disagreement 
between Makarios and Grivas appeared on the type of the armed struggle. 
Grivas, as a military man, proposed a combination of sabotage acts and 
guerilla warfare, while Makarios, without any military knowledge, insisted solely 
on sabotage. He had the misconception that after three or six months of 
sabotage ‘the British Government would surrender to our demands’.®^ It was 
only in the Autumn of 1954 -  when Makarios started to realize the limited 
chances of achieving a favorable resolution in the United Nations -  that he 
begun supporting dynamic action, although he never understood how the 
benefits of an armed movement might have been used in favor of a political 
campaign. Under those ambiguous conditions Archbishop Makarios, code- 
named S. Haris, undertook the political leadership of the underground 
campaign and Colonel Grivas, code-named Digenis, became its military leader.
These personal and rather amateurish Greek Cypriot moves, faced 
initially the immediate opposition of the Greek Government. Greek Prime 
Minister Alexandres Papagos sent a clear message to Grivas that a liberation 
movement in Cyprus was premature, and on 14 March 1953 General Kosmas 
informed Grivas that the Prime Minister ‘was not interested to get involved, and 
did not even want to be known that he was informed about’ the intentions of the 
Colonel.®® Thus Grivas’ request for arms and explosives from the Greek military 
was not only refused but he was placed himself under surveillance;®® a Greek 
Minister even threatened to arrest him if he did not abandon his underground
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 16-17, 23.
Grivas, Memoirs, p. 18.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 20.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 17.
Andreas Azinas, 50 Chronia Siopis: E Ora tisAieithias [50 years of silence: The moment of 
truth], 2 vols (Nicosia: Airwaves, 2001), vol. A, p. 249.
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moves. Grivas, realizing the reaction of the Greek Government and the 
hesitation of the Archbishop, continued pressing hard for the underground 
movement and managed to collect the first shipment of arms and ammunitions 
-  from the armory of former organization ‘X’ -  that was covertly smuggled to 
Cyprus in March 1954.'^°
‘A new Makarios’ appeared in October 1954, when he unexpectedly 
changed his mind and started pushing hard for an immediate second shipment 
of arms; for this reason he even authorized the release of money for the 
expenses of the boat. Makarios and Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos 
were desperate for Grivas’ immediate departure for Cyprus, since ‘it was now 
considered that action was required “before” the debate at the United Nations, 
so as to persuade the Americans, that an adverse attitude would start trouble in 
Cyprus, and thus the Middle East’."^  ^ The desperate and poorly improvised 
Greek and Cypriot maneuvers, to exercise pressure on the Americans, failed 
even before they had been applied. Grivas believed that action was determined 
by the completion of the underground preparations and not by the ‘hasty and 
unrealistic decisions of Makarios’.'^ ® Eventually, after the Greek diplomatic 
disaster in the United Nations, Papagos had given his theoretical consent for 
the armed movement; an act without any practical meaning any more.
The dynamic liberation movement -  inspired by Grivas, indirectly 
imposed on the undecided Makarios, against the controversial neutrality of the 
Greek Government that did not have the courage to clarify its position -  broke 
out on 1 April 1955, after four years of spasmodic Cypriot moves. The fourth 
strategic burden derived solely from to Grivas who erroneously perceived the 
oncoming conflict as a local confrontation between the Cypriot guerillas and the 
colonial administration. While his preliminary tactical planning for armed action
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 17-18; Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 20-22.
Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 23-24. 
ibid., p. 24.
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Griva [Terrorism in Cyprus: The diary of Grivas] (Nicosia: Cyprus Government Printing Office, 
1957), pp. 7-8.
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was detailed and imaginative, it completely failed to assess the strategic 
consequences of the underground campaign. Grivas had neither predicted nor 
taken into consideration, the possibility of a Cypriot Turk reaction or the 
strategic interference of Turkey, both of which caused at the end, with British 
blessings, the derailment of the anti-colonial struggle.
Chapter II 
The underground guerilla campaign of EOKA 
against colonialism
Initial operational concept
The anti-colonial struggle of Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) 
[National organization of cypriot combatants] against the British colonial 
administration of Cyprus, its security forces, and the British Army that 
undertook emergency security tasks, was a dynamic underground guerilla 
campaign defined by courageous and daring acts of self-sacrifice, that earned 
the exasperation and vengeance of the colonial authorities. It is not coincidental 
that -  in spite of the severe blows it suffered and the arrest of many of its 
members -  EOKA managed to survive, and remained lethal and extremely 
difficult to suppress, for the whole duration of its operation, between 1 April 
1955 and 9 March 1959.^ Its proscription on 14 September 1955® and later the 
imposition of a State of Emergency,® as well as the introduction of strict military 
counter-measures by Governor Fieid-Marshal John Harding, did not succeed in 
crushing the outlawed organization and admittedly caused his resignation in 
October 1957. The revealing titles of British newspapers -  ‘EOKA is impossible 
to beat' and ‘A Field Marshal, Three Generals, and 40,000 British soldiers were 
not capable of beating EOKA"^ -  are indicative of the hard and intricate
 ^ ‘Prokirixis’ [Proclamation], EOKA proclamation, 1 April 1955, in Parageorgiou, Kypriaki 
Thyeila, p. 120; ‘Pros ton Ellenikon Kypriakon Laon’ [To the Cypriot Greek people], and ‘Pros 
tous Agonistas tis EOKA’ [To the EOKA fighters], EOKA proclamations, 9 March 1959, in 
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 403-405.
 ^Order in Council No. 2785, The Cyprus Gazette, No. 3859, 15 September 1955, p. 523.
 ^A Proclamation by the Governor, The Cyprus Gazette, No. 3891, 26 November 1955, p. 715. 
Parageorgiou, Kypriaki Thyeila, p. 169.
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character of the confrontation between the Cypriot guerillas and the imperial 
forces.
The Preliminary Genera! Rian of Insurrectionary Action in Cypru^ was 
conceived and prepared by Grivas after his second reconnaissance visit to the 
island (February 1953). The three main objectives of the plan were ‘to attract 
the attention of International public opinion by acts of heroism and self- 
sacrifice’, to declare, through the continual harassment of the colonial regime, 
the indisputable determination and terminal commitment of the Cypriot Greeks 
towards the achievement of their purpose, and to force ‘the international 
diplomacy -  United Nations -  and the British, to examine the Cyprus issue and 
provide an immediate solution according to the aspirations of the Cypriot 
people’.® The Action Plan consisted of five main elements:^ a) sabotage acts 
against government and army installations in towns (primary action task); b) 
surprise attacks against the British forces by combat-guerilla groups 
(secondary action task); c) passive resistance measures to strengthen the 
morale and the resistance capacity of the Cypriot population; d) elimination of 
any opposition (especially communists) and neutralization (execution) of 
Cypriot collaborators of the British; e) dynamic demonstrations in Greece in 
favor of the anti-colonial struggle and propaganda to enlighten world public 
opinion. Peculiarly Enosis, the main strategic objective of the EOKA campaign, 
was not mentioned, even once, in this plan; an accidental coincidence from a 
military man dedicated to detail and precision or the prophetic instinct of an 
underground leader devoted to war?
 ^Grivas, Agon EOKA kai Antartopolemos, Appendix, pp. 3-8; Grivas, Guerilla Warfare, 
Appendix I, pp. 91-95.
® Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, Appendix, p. 3.
 ^ Ibid., Appendix, p. 3.
;
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The men, women, and youth of EOKA
The selection and training of the first members commenced immediately after 
the secret arrival of Grivas on the island, on 9 November 1954. The men were 
recruited from two youth organizations, Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon 
(OHEN) [Christian Orthrodox youth union] and Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis 
Neoiaias (PEON) [Pancyprian national youth organization], as well as other 
organizations such as Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou (PEK) [Panagrarian union of 
Cyprus]; every member was sworn to the bible, but extraordinarily the main 
objective of the struggle, Enosis, was again not included in the oath.® On the 
outbreak of the underground campaign -  ‘liberation struggle’ for the Greeks, 
‘terrorism’ for the colonial administration -  EOKA consisted of no ‘more than 
eighty men’.® The daring operations of the guerilla movement, the clumsy 
reaction and vindictive behavior of the colonial forces towards the local 
population, and the patriotic character of the struggle under the strict but 
charismatic leadership of Digenis, immediately attracted the attention of the 
Greek population. Realizing the importance of earning the support and trust of 
the people, Grivas ‘began the battle for the minds of the population’.^ ®
Young men between sixteen and forty -  average age twenty-four^^ -  
became the core of EOKA combat groups, and great many of them were 
distinguished during the underground operations for their ethos, courage and 
self-sacrifice. The leadership of sector commands and combat groups was 
assigned to the most competent and dedicated cadres, who played a very 
important role in the hierarchy of the organization, in implementing the strict 
orders of Digenis as well as planning and carrying out the underground combat 
missions, many of them falling loyal to their oath, such as Markos Drakos-
® Grivas, Chronikon, p. 3.
® Grivas, Memoirs, p. 31.
Ibid.. p. 34.
The avarage age of the sixty-eight men of EOKA killed in action was 24.3 years. For details 
about their Identity and age see Ch. Papachrysostomou, Aroheion Pesondon [Archive of men 
who fell in action] (Nicosia: [n. pub.], 1969), pp. 10-30.
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Lykourgos or Mavilis, Gregoris Afxendiou-Zec/ros, Kyriakos MaXs\s-Miltiades, 
and Photis Pittas-Gyf/?os.^®
Many young women became members of the organization and 
undertook a variety of important tasks, as couriers of the secret EOKA 
correspondence, escorts during the movement of wanted men, carriers of 
handguns for the execution teams, or companions of British senior officers for 
the extraction of valuable information, such as Nitsa HadjigeorgiouJ® Two of the 
most reliable couriers of the secret correspondence of Grivas were Elli 
Christodoulides and Maroulla Panagides, while Elenitsa Serailm-Philaretos or 
Gerasimos became the sector commander of LarnacaJ'* Digenis was very 
proud of the courage and dedication of EOKA women, and considered them 
more trustworthy and less talkative than men; they never ‘let me down or gave 
way under interrogation’ he wrote in his memoirs
As early as May 1955, Grivas issued orders for the engagement of 
secondary school students in various tasks such as the distribution of leaflets, 
the collection of information, and the surveillance of suspects opposing 
EOKA;^® the students were particularly distinguished for their participation in 
mass demonstrations, which kept the morale of the population high and caused
. .1great harassment to the security forces. By January 1956 he invited the primary 
school students into the struggle;^^ the children were involved in the distribution 
of proclamations, and ‘the battle of the flags’^ ® in their schools, that turned out
Papageorgiou, Kypriaki Thyelia, pp. 183-206; Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 153-154, 161- 
164, 325-327.
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as a war of nerves against the colonial forces. The youth movement, said 
Grivas, became ‘one of the most important weapons in my hands’.^ ®
The patriotic conception of the underground movement, founded on the 
Enosis ideology and the courage of EOKA men, became a powerful driving 
force within Cypriot Greek perception. The massive participation of the 
popuiation -  with the exception of leftist Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou 
Laou (AKEL) [Reform party of the working people] -  was an unparalleled 
phenomenon in guerilla warfare, and British efforts to scare the people away 
from EOKA, achieved precisely the opposite effect. Chemists, electricians, 
metal-workers and other scientists offered their valuable services voluntary for 
the production of explosive mixtures, and the construction of devices such as 
different types of mines, hand-made grenades and bombs.®® Lawyers, such as 
Tassos Papadopoulos and Giafkos C\en6es-!perides, became members of the 
organization, whiie the Christian Orthodox clergy contributed significantly to the 
underground effort. The Bishop of Citium Anthlmos-Protep/7s, undertook 
important political responsibilities substituting Makarios during his exile, deacon 
Anthimos Kyriakides became the chief liaison officer of the organization, and 
deacon Papastavros Papagathangelou was its chief recruiter.®^
The growth of EOKA -  according to Grivas -  was impressive. By 
February 1956, its strength rose to almost 1000 men. On the mountains there 
were 7 groups of 53 men, 47 groups of 220 men in the six towns, 2 groups in 
the British Bases, and 75 groups with approximately 750 men in the villages. 
From the 131 combat groups -  each one consisting of three to ten men, 
depending on their mission -  the front-line elements were those in the 
mountains and the towns, forming 54 groups of 273 men, sharing about 100 
military rifles and handguns.®® The other 77 groups in the countryside and the 
villages were armed with shotguns and undertook secondary missions. EOKA,
Grivas, Memoirs, p. 62.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 243-245, 321 ; Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 26, 43, 53-58. 
Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 40-45.
Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 66-67.
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during the four years of its underground operation, in spite of the severe blows 
it suffered -  68 of its members died in action, 9 were hanged,®® 345 were 
wanted, 886 were imprisoned, while 3363 others were enclosed in detention 
camps without a trial®^  ^-  never faced a ‘shortage of good men'.®®
The colonial forces, unable to break the cohesive and well-organized 
underground structure of EOKA, ‘had resorted to judicial murder’®® -  the 
hanging of young members aged between 19-24 -  and invented two hideous 
methods to penetrate the organization. The first, was the extraction of 
information through horrific torturing during the interrogation®^ of arrested EOKA 
members, nine of whom died during the heavy punishment;®® among the 
victims of this method were guerilla leader Kyriakos Mats’is-Ml/tiades who fell in 
his secret hideout refusing to surrender, and the Liopetri group, the hideout of 
which was revealed by EOKA member Elias Samaras, who was forced to 
provide information for his brother Xanthos Sam aras-A/fo/os and the other 
three members of the group, causing their death after a three-hour battle.®® The 
second method was betrayal by paid informers,®® mostly Cypriot Greeks, who 
revealed the secret guerilla hideouts, the couriers, the habits of combat groups,
Papachrysostomou, Archeion Pesonton, pp. 10-35.
Ch. Papachrysostomou, Archeion Agoniston [CombaXanXs’ archive] (Nicosia; Epiphaniou, 
1977), pp. 125-183.
Grivas, Memoirs, p. 34.
Ibid., p. 71.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 146-147, 186-188, Appendix p. 52; Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 
106-107; Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 92-105. See also the files atTNA: ‘Alleged maltreatment of 
Greek Cypriots in Cyprus’, 1955, PC 371/117632; ‘Appeals by Greece to European Commision 
of Human Rights in respect of Cyprus’, 1956, FO 371/123952; ‘Greek appeal to the Commision 
on Human Rights’, 1956-1957, CO 936/294-C0936/297; ‘Appeal by Greece for Commision on 
allegations of torture of detainees in Cyprus’, 1957-1959, CO 936/495-00 936/503; ‘Allegations 
of torture of detainees in Cyprus’, (Cases 2-48), 1958, CO 936/504-00 936/530.
Papachrysostomou, Aroheion Pesonton, pp. 36-38.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 297-301, Appendix pp. 60-62; Grivas, Memoirs, pp. 156- 
157, 177; Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 339-343.
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and other sensitive aspects of the underground organization. This practice 
caused extreme damage to EOKA, and became the main reason for the 
discovery of the secret hideouts of many groups, among them, that of sector 
commander Gregoris Afxendiou-Zec/ros, who was burned alive after an eight- 
hour battle on 3 March 1957.®^
Digenis was irreconcilable regarding the fate of paid informers and 
collaborators; approximately eighty Cypriot Greeks of all political backgrounds 
-  rightists and leftists, even a woman, a priest, and members of the 
organization -  were executed by EOKA.®® A number of others who survived the 
lethal bullets of the organization were protected by the colonial regime and sent 
to Britain, Australia, and Africa in self-exile. Among the less severe measures 
against collaborators was, advising, written warning, threatening, haircut 
ridicule for women, and heavy beating.®® These measures naturally were not 
limited to traitors; Digenis and the organization were cruel and merciless 
regarding the implementation of EOKA directives, and did not hesitate to 
impose their will by force on the population, when there was deviation from the 
prescribed policy of the organization. Such Instances, although limited, 
included, among other things, the passive resistance campaign, the complaints 
of affluent merchants about the restrictions on importations from Britain, and
. •3the unauthorized use of the EOKA name for personal gains. It is important to 
clarify that participation in EOKA was completely voluntary, and there was not a 
single recorded case where the organization forced the participation or 
collaboration of any member.
Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 44-45, 561-564.
Prodotes kai Ekteiesthendes ston Apeieftherotiko Agona 1955-1959 kai AKEL [Traitors and 
executed in the 1955-1959 liberation struggle and AKEL], ed. by Syndesmos Agoniston EOKA, 
(Nicosia: [n. pub], 2002), p.4.
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Underground structure
The operational structure of EOKA imposed by Digenis, who did not tolerate 
any questioning of his command, was cohesive and airtight; the absolute 
control of all sector commands and other sections converged to Archegos [the 
leader] Digenis who avoided a complicated, pluralistic command system in 
favor of a simple centralized hierarchy; he believed that a multi-person 
committee would be inflexible and susceptible to disputes and rivalries.®'  ^ His 
dedication to discipline, led quite often to the issue of strict warnings, clearly 
stating that disobedience would immediately be punished by death.®® It was 
precisely those strong qualities of Digenis that contributed to the tactical 
success of EOKA; no other military leader would have been able to manage 
such a difficult underground campaign so successfully, and even Grivas himself 
acknowledged that ‘my death would mean the end of the campaign, for there 
was no one to take my place’.®®
Grivas, in his underground hideouts, did not have the luxury to have any 
staff, other than a personal aid, and did not encourage the idea of a deputy 
leader. He considered, out of courtesy, S. Haris (Archbishop Makarios) as his 
superior,®  ^ responsible for the political exploitation of the military results in the 
international arena. His relation with the Greek Government, through the Greek 
General Consulate in Nicosia which acted as a liaison, and specifically with 
Foreign Minister Evangelos Averof-/saa/f/os®® -  who was handling the Cyprus 
issue for Prime Minister Karamanlis -  was only consultative, and never had the 
military struggle come under the control of the Greek Government. EOKA 
reached the apex of its underground capabilities in 1958, when the combat 
experience and tactical maturity earned during the previous years, along with
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 34.
Grivas, Memoirs, p. 28.
Ibid., p. 40.
Tromokratia en Kypro, pp. 11, 16-17, 19, 28, 32.
Evangelos Averof-Tositsas, Istoria Chamenon Efkairion: Kypriako 1950-1963 [History of lost 
opportunities: Cyprus issue 1950-1963], 2 vols, 2nd edn (Athens: Estia: 1982).
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the sophisticated unorthodox warfare tactics developed, led to a quite extensive 
underground operational structure (Diagram 1).®® Immediately under his 
command, were twenty-three combat sector commands, the Politiki EpitropI 
Kyprlakou Agonos (PEKA) [Political committee for the Cyprus struggle], the 
Dioikesis Alkimou Neoiaias EOKA (DANE) [Valiant youth of EOKA command], 
the critical liaison echelon, and the propaganda, intelligence, and supplies 
sections.
The political organization of the population was in Grivas’ mind from the 
very start, but it took a more concrete form in August 1956 -  after the exile of 
Archbishop Makarios -  with the establishment of PEKA, which was assigned 
the coordination between the military and civil aspects of the struggle, the 
preservation of a cohesive internal front, the uplift of public morale and the 
counter-action against enemy propaganda."*® PEKA was proscribed on 20 
September 1956"** but continued successfully its underground operation until 
the end of the struggle; in 1958, a new organization was formed, Eniaion 
Arrages Ethnikon Metoporf^ (EAEM) [United solid national front], under PEKA, 
with the purpose of organizing and coordinating Pathitiki Antistasls^^ (PA) 
[Passive resistance] and confronting the Turkish threat.
Aikimos Neoiaia EOKA (ANE) [Valiant youth of EOKA] was established 
in the middle of 1957 and its sections in towns and the villages were 
subordinate to the sector commanders, while the directions of policy were 
taken from DANE, which was under the immediate control of Digenis. ANE, 
proscribed on 6 March 1958,"*"* was based on a well-developed youth network, 
the elements of which spread in every school under a school leader and in out-
Diagram 1 was prepared after taking into consideration three relevant diagrams in Grivas, 
Antartopolemos, pp. 39-41.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 129; Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 25-30; Grivas, Guerilla Warfare, 
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of-school groups."*® Digenis, describing the character of the Cypriot youth 
remarked: ‘Prevailing was an unthinkable spiritual strength and an 
unprecedented determination. I knew that I was commanding souls and not 
human flesh.’"*® DANE published two monthly patriotic magazines, Egerterion 
Salpisma for secondary school students and Agogi ton Neon for the primary 
school students.
The liaison system"*  ^ of EOKA played an extremely important role and 
contributed significantly to the tactical success of the underground movement, 
since Grivas did not trust and never used wireless or telephone 
communications; Digenis never revealed full details of the system. There was a 
main center where all secret correspondence of EOKA was forwarded. To 
safeguard the security of the system and the main center, he created an 
elaborate communications network, where the secret correspondence passed 
from various other intermediate centers or persons before arriving to the main 
center. He also developed and maintained, two independent and unknown to 
each other, courier networks; the main operational network and a reserve one, 
which were sometimes interchanged in their operation in order to confuse the 
opponent. ‘A tough battle unfolded between the British and us for the liaison ;network; them, trying to destroy it, and us, to safeguard its operation’ Digenis 
stated emphatically."*®
The intelligence"*® section of EOKA offered valuable services to the 
underground campaign, and quite often the ingenuity of its men and the 
unorthodox methods used for the collection of information, led to the avoidance 
of many catastrophic blows against the organization. The three main sources 
for the collection of information were selected Cypriot Greek officers in the 
police force who passed important information about the movements and
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operations of the police force and the army, garrulous British agents and 
personnel talking with Cypriot Greeks (women) about British plans, and the 
youth network of ANE that accumulated and reported any kind of information 
from surveillance, contacts, or observations. ®®
The operation of EOKA was financed by the Archbishopric of Cyprus 
and by the Greek Government through the Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averof 
who was code-named for this purpose Evergetis [Benefactor].®* The financial 
matters®® of the organization were handled by a treasurer under an extremely 
strict system of control imposed by Digenis, while the collection of money and 
their distribution, was always accompanied by signed invoices. Grivas had 
given strict orders to all sector commanders and informed the population 
through leaflets, that EOKA did not collect money or donations by anyone. It 
was estimated that the total amount of money spent for the operation of combat 
groups, the purchases of arms, ammunitions and other materials, and the 
support of the families of wanted EOKA members, rose, between 1955 and 
1959, to 140,000 Sterling Pounds.®®
Sector Commands in 1958
The combat experience and consequent growth of EOKA strength had dictated 
its underground order of battle that, by 1958, consisted of twenty-three sector 
commands (Diagram 2).®"* There were three types of sectors, each one with a 
distinct composition, determined by the geographical characteristics of the 
sector and the particular operational needs of the organization in each area; the 
town sectors, the mountain-guerilla sectors, and the countryside sectors. All 
combat groups in every sector were under the command of Tomearchis [Sector
Grivas, Antartopolemos, p. 36.
Tromokratia, pp. 7-8, 12-13, 15; Grivas, Chronikon, p. 624.
Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 624-625.
Ibid., p. 624.
• Diagram 2 was prepared from a map showing EOKA sector borders in Grivas, 
Antartopolemos, Appendix.
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commander], while groups of the same combat type had a leader, mainly for 
the coordination of communication between the group leaders and the sector 
commander. By 1958, the interference of Cypriot Turk underground elements 
compelled Digenis \o create special combat groups against the Turkish threat, 
independent from the groups operating against the colonial authorities.
In the town sectors there were three different types of combat groups 
against the British. The saboteur groups®® were assigned specific types of 
targets such as military installations, airfields, and government buildings, and 
used imported and home-made explosives, incendiary mixtures, ordinary and 
electrical detonators, time bombs, and many other home-made devices. 
Probably the most famous act of sabotage was by Andreas Vasiliou, who 
succeeded, on 26 November 1957, In penetrating the highly secure area of 
RAF Akrotiri Air Base and planting two time bombs, causing the destruction of 
two Camberra bombers and damages to three other aircraft, of total value 4.5 
million Pounds.®® The ambush groups®  ^ were assigned various other targets 
such as mobile army and police patrols, and raids against police stations; their 
weapons were pressure or electrically detonated mines, homemade grenades, 
improvised launchers, and military rifles. The execution groups®® consisted of 
two to four daring men, and their mission was the extermination of soft targets 
such as British military personnel, members of the Intelligence Service and the 
police Special Branch, torturers of arrested EOKA members, and traitors or 
collaborators of the British. Notorious execution groups were those of Praxitelis 
Vogiazianos, Esehios Sophocleous, and Nikos Samson in Nicosia, and 
Michalakis Thrasivoulides in Limassol. The fourth type of combat groups, 
urgently formed in the main towns, in the summer of 1958, to confront the 
Turkish attacks against the Greek population, were the Eidikes Omades 
HeirovomvistonP^ (EOX) [Special hand-grenade throwing groups], which were
Grivas, Guerilla Warfare, pp. 64-65.
Grivas, Chronikon, pp. 411-415.
Grivas, Antartopolemos, p. 47-49, Appendix pp. 12-13. 
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intended to stop, by the use of hand grenades, the massive attacks of the 
Turkish mobs against innocent Cypriot Greeks and their property in areas 
neighboring the Turkish quarters of towns.
In the countryside the structure of sectors commands was quite similar, 
but the ambush groups were replaced by Omades Katadromon Tifekioforon 
(OKT) [Shotgun ranger groups] that consisted of 4-5 men equipped with 
shotguns, hand-grenades, mines, and sometimes with light automatic 
weapons;®® they undertook a variety of secondary, general-purpose missions. 
To face Turkish aggression against the Greek population, special anti-Turkish 
groups were formed as Omades Amynis (OA) [Defence groups], most of which 
did not possess any weapons and were armed with wooden sticks.®* Five of the 
thirteen countryside sectors included guerilla groups in their order of battle.
But probably the most hard-bitten combat groups were the antartikes 
omades^^ [guerilla groups] operating In the mountains, composed mainly from 
EOKA members that were wanted by the security forces. These groups usually 
consisted of three to eight men and operated in seven sectors on the Troodos 
mountain range. Each guerilla group was assigned a specific mountain area of 
the sector for its operation, and was accommodated in guerilla hideouts 
covertly prepared in the mountain areas. Many of the mountain guerilla groups, 
planned and executed sabotages against military targets, daring ambushes of 
military columns, and provocative raids against police stations, causing great 
destruction and harassment to the colonial forces.
The unfolding of underground action
Digenis, after the outbreak and for the whole duration of EOKA operations, was 
neither in a position to predetermine the development of the confrontation, nor 
its final outcome. The unfolding of underground action, characterized by
Digenis, Guerilla Warfare, pp. 69-70; Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 89-90. 
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dynamic waves of offensive strikes against the colonial authorities was dictated 
-  almost depended -  on political developments in Cyprus and the United 
Nations, rather than the military aspects of the campaign, and on the 
ambiguous assumption that the periodic military successes of EOKA would be 
politically exploited by Makarios and the Greek Government. Its operations 
were not based on a pre-planned schedule of action but rather on a month-by- 
month evaluation of underground operation and British counter-action. In spite 
of the fact that the British Army had undertaken extensive operations®® against 
EOKA and caused severe damage to the organization, mostly after treachery, it 
absolutely failed to ever undertake the military initiative of the campaign. 
Digenis ordered the interruption of underground operations in various 
instances; three times by a unilateral cease-fire®"* -  16 August 1956, 14 March 
1957, and 4 August 1958 -  and a few other times by the temporary suspension 
of activities. The two main reasons for these interruptions, were the pressure 
exerted by the Greek Government on Grivas, in the form of ‘suggestions',®® in 
order to facilitate the political dialogue, and the breath needed by EOKA to re­
organize its combat groups, recruit new men, evaluate its action during the
preceding period, and change its underground mode of action in adaptation to
■the political developments.
The patriotic resistance of EOKA against foreign domination, and the 
inability of the colonial government to contain effectively the underground 
campaign, turned very soon into a matter of prestige between the two 
opponents. Against Governmor Harding's boast that ‘the days of EOKA are 
numbered',®® Grivas decided and managed ‘to transform the whole island into a 
battlefield’®^causing extreme surprise and frustration to the British, who could 
not understand how a few hundred guerillas, saboteurs and ambushers, were 
able to compete and fight successfully against almost 40,000 men, amongst
“  Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 109-113, 180-182.
Ibid., pp. 120-121, 165, 272.
Grivas, Memoirs, p. 45; Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 131, 140, 158-159, 168-170. 
Grivas, Memoirs, p. 60.
Ibid., p. 66.
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them elite commandos and parachutists. The exile of Archbishop Makarios to 
the Seyhelles on 9 March 1956 caused the immediate reaction of Grivas who 
ordered Agon mechris eshaton [Struggle until the bitter end].®® He erroneously 
-  as was proven in 1958 -  believed that EOKA had nothing to loose and that it 
could fight unobstructed to the very bitter end. Digenis was so obsessed with 
his struggle against colonialism that was unable to see -  clearly around him -  
the rise of nationalism in Turkey and the gradual ignition of Cypriot Turk 
reaction. Realizing, from the very beginning, the military difficulties and 
embarrassment of the colonial forces to contain effectively and suppress the 
crisis, Grivas took full military advantage of the situation. By changing 
continuously the tactics and methodology of the underground campaign -  
implementing the tactical objective of creating friction, damage and confusion to 
the opponent, utilizing unorthodox underground tactics based on surprise, 
deception and cunning,®® enforcing guerilla warfare in the mountains and the 
countryside and a covert conspiratorial fight in the towns -  he managed to 
prevail in the military front. He based his military conception on a "Void” in the 
battlefield', by cultivating the idea to the opponent that ‘we are everywhere, but 
he is unable to find us’.^ °
EOKA and its Cypriot Greek opponents
Adding to the complicated geopolitical situation on the island, there were two 
controversial aspects In the relations and affairs of EOKA with the Greek 
community. Firstly, it was its involvement in an intra-communal confrontation 
against the communists; secondly, the appearance of internal intrigues within 
the organization and the abuse of EOKA membership against others as a 
means for solving personal differences.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 94 
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The strong anti-communist feelings of Grivas and other leading 
members of the organization, along with the superficial anti-EOKA attitude of 
the communist leadership of Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou, 
sparked a controversial confrontation between EOKA and the communists, and 
opened a second -  intra-communal -  front, that had grave consequences. 
Grivas, a pure anti-communist who fought against the leftist armed groups 
during the Greek civil war, avoided from the beginning any communist 
involvement in EOKA, and considered that participation was an exclusive 
privilege of the ethnikofrones [nationally-inspired]. Suspicion rose from the first 
day, when AKEL issued a proclamation condemning EOKA action, naming its 
members ‘thugs’ and ‘dynamidards’, and its leader ‘pseudo-Digenis’.^ * 
Passions rose a few weeks later when, in a radio broadcast, the leader of the 
Greek communist party Nikos Zachariades, publicly denounced EOKA and 
revealed the secret identity of its leader DigenlsJ^ Grivas initially avoided any 
counter-action against the communists, but deeply inside he was burning for 
retaliation.^® In a 1958 proclamation Digenis declared that ‘We are not attacking 
communists; we are respecting their ideology, but we do not bear having our 
way, flooded with blood, blocked by those who refuse to spill even a drop, for 
our liberation from the British’.^ "* The confrontation between EOKA and AKEL 
turned sour when the organization murdered, between 1956 and 1958, 
nineteen members of AKEL and the leftist trade unions, and attempted the 
murder of thirteen other. Harassment spread to beating, mauling, and stabbing 
of many other leftists, some of whom died from the heavy punishment;^® all 
incidents were carried out in villages by ‘unknown’ masked-men. The reasoning 
of both sides was contradictory and conflicting.
Neos Demokratis, 2 April 1955, p. 1.
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The organization openly accused AKEL and the leftists of treachery/® Its 
argument included a variety of accusations such as leftist cooperation with the 
British, threats of revealing publicly the identities of EOKA men,^^ the removal 
of the masks of EOKA men under the leftist slogan Kato e maskes [Down the 
masks], the shadowing of EOKA movements by the AKEL vigilance groups- 
omades epagrypnisis, the public denunciation of EOKA, even the refusal of the 
leftists to raise the Greek flag in their houses/® On the other hand the leftists 
accused EOKA of anti-communist prejudice and that the political 
assassinations and harassment of leftists were part of EOKA’s campaign to 
extinguish any Influence of AKEL in Cypriot political affairs and to secure the 
political monopoly of EOKA. They strongly refused the accusations of treachery 
and challenged the organization to investigate any rumors about leftist traitors 
in front of an independent enquiry committee.^® What is the truth in this 
ambiguous issue? EOKA, out of the nineteen murders of leftists, while 
accepted the responsibility for all of them, declared that only nine cases were 
‘proven’ to be related with treachery, while the other ten cases, were simply 
victims of the EOKA-AKEL confrontation.®®
There are also strong indications that there were dubious internal 
intrigues within EOKA, amongst its members. On a few occasions, some of 
them, exploiting their status, even took revengeful action against innocent 
individuals on the pretext that they were collaborating with the British or simply 
for not being faithful to EOKA. The full scale of such personal rivalries cannot 
be determined, since the issue is controversial and considered, even today, a
‘Idou Pioi Einai’ [Here who they are], EOKA proclamation, 1958, AECA; ‘Prodotai kai 
Lipotaktal Keroskopoi’ [Traitors and deserters opportunists], EOKA proclamation, date 
unknown, AECA.
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taboo. Nonetheless there are some notorious cases that remain unresolved: 
the mysterious disappearance and possible murder of EOKA member 
Christakis Demetriou,®* in December 1955; the cold-blooded murder of EOKA 
member Chrysanthos Mylonas and guerilla group leader Evagoras 
Papachristoforou by their comrade Michail Ashiotis in October 1957, who found 
refuge in Britain;®  ^ the disappearance and murder of former Nicosia sector 
commander Giannakis Stephanldes-A/n/as at the end of 1958. It is strongly 
believed that his fate was dictated by a rivalry with Nicosia sector commander 
Polykarpos Gf\oxka(X\\s-Kikeron.
The arbitrary abuse of underground power was not confined within the 
organization but in some instances spread into the innocent population. EOKA 
fighters themselves accept today that ‘it is possible that some mistakes did 
happen ... but the law of the struggle and the revolution excuses them’.®^ Under 
this statement personal interests, individual antipathies, inner obsessions and 
complexes, and selfish motives, found various forms of expression by few, in 
the name of EOKA. Although Digenis strictly forbade such discrepancies, the 
chaos created by the underground campaign gave the opportunity for the 
arbitrary occurrence of such acts. While the EOKA violence against the 
communists had the approval of Digenis, there were many instances where the 
beating and harassment of communists was dictated by personal differences 
and the law of guns, rather than the orders of the organization. The execution 
by EOKA of leftist Neophytes Kleanthous on 13 October 1956 was attributed to 
malicious and unfounded information.®® Similar were the cases of the executed 
leftists Andreas Michaelides on 18 October 1956, Kyriakos Patatas on 6 May 
1958, and Pieris Pistolas in 1957.®® In another instance an alleged member of
Makarios Drousiotis, EOKA e Skotini Ops/[EOKA the dark side] (Athens: Stachi, 1998), pp. 
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the organization accompanying a female foreign journalist, that was preparing 
an article on the organization, used his alleged EOKA status to sexually abuse 
his guest. When Grivas was informed about the atrocity he immediately 
ordered his execution.®^ While it is expected that in an anti-colonial struggle 
most victims would be those related to colonialism -  that is, soldiers, 
policemen, and government personnel -  in the case of EOKA, peculiarly, most 
victims were Cypriots. In the period between 1 April 1955 and 15 November 
1958, 393 people were killed while 1076 were wounded from the underground 
action of EOKA, excluding the victims of inter-communal violence. Among the 
dead were 104 British military personnel, 51 policemen, and 238 civilians, of 
whom 203 -  71.7% -  were Cypriot Greeks!®®
The tactical triumph and strategic failure of EOKA
Between 1955 and 1959 there were thousands of Incidents against the British 
colonial authorities on the whole island; ambushes, sabotages, shootings, 
bomb-throwing, vibrant student demonstrations, destruction of government 
property, stone battles against the police, executions of British agents and army 
personnel, and every other conceivable act of resistance. In 1956 alone there 
were 523 explosions of powerful bombs, 452 other explosions, 441 unexploded 
bombs, 15 massive strikes and 445 strikes by students and workers, 28 
massive demonstrations and 201 illegal gatherings. The fatal casualties were: 
60 military personnel, 24 policemen, and 112 civilians out of whom 94 were 
Greek.®®
Despite the severe ‘lawful’ measures taken by the Government of 
Cyprus, empowered by the State of Emergency, and the countless ‘illegal’ 
actions of the British Army and the security forces -  the revengeful harassment 
of the population, the cruel interrogation of arrested members, the extensive
Interview with Praxitelis Vogiazianos, 23 May 2006. 
Crouzet, Le Conflict, vol. II, p. 565.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 137.
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confinement of thousands in concentration camps, the abusive collective fines, 
and abundant violations of Human Rights -  EOKA remained operational and 
dangerous until the last day, when its leader Digenis ordered the termination of 
the underground campaign. There are four main factors that contributed to the 
tactical strength of EOKA. Probably the most crucial, was the competent, 
disciplined and imaginative command of its military leader. Colonel Georgios 
Grivas-Digenis. The strong personality, the decisive character, and the 
aggressive underground ingenuity of Digenis, left no pretensions to the local 
population about his intentions, and caused from the very beginning, great 
surprise and embarrassment to the British military. Similarly, the advanced 
guerilla tactics of unorthodox warfare utilized by Grivas led to the creation of ‘an 
invisible army’ that was almost impossible to discover and extremely difficult to 
combat. ‘This army was everywhere, in every village, spreading in the last 
corner of the island. It was everywhere but never revealed itself’.®® The main 
elements of his guerilla warfare conception were secrecy, surprise, flexibility, 
deception, cunning and courage.®* Another factor was the ethos and absolute 
dedication of most EOKA members towards the underground movement. The 
concept of Enosis became a precious virtue that inspired extremely hazardous 
operations against a dramatically superior opponent, and courageous acts of 
bravery, heroism and self-sacrifice. Finally, the extensive support of the local 
Greek population -  a rough estimation would revolve around 70%®^  -  that 
embraced the organization with passion, and offered great help to the 
underground operations. ‘The planning of a revolutionary movement, 
particularly of a guerilla warfare, does not have any chance of succeeding, no
Grivas, Antartopolemos, p. 20.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. vi.
There are no verified conclusions about the extend of EOKA support, but an arbitrary 
indication would revolve around 70%, taking into consideration that on the 13 December 1959 
presidential election, loannis derides, supported by AKEL and those who were against the 
agreements (DEK and pro-Grivas supporters), won 33.13% of the votes.
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matter how great the value of its leader is’ Grivas believed, 'if it does not have 
the absolute and unreserved support of the population’/®
While EOKA tactically triumphed in the battlefield against a much more 
powerful opponent, it failed strategically to achieve the national objective it was 
fighting for. The terminal outcome of the EOKA struggle was dramatically 
determined by various factors that involved three different parties; the Greek, 
the British and the Turkish.
The Greek responsibilities towards this strategic failure were immense 
and converged into a series of colossal mistakes and catastrophic 
mishandlings, before the outbreak (four strategic burdens inherited from the 
preparatory period, 1951-1955) and during the unfolding of the campaign. 
Firstly, the almost complete luck of proper understanding between the political 
and military leadership of the organization. The three most influential figures, 
Colonel Georgios Grivas-D/lgen/s, Archbishop Makarios \\\-S.Haris and Greek 
Foreign Minister Evangelos kverof-isaakios, despite the fact that, in theory, 
were supposed to defend the same strategic objective, careful examination of 
their secret correspondence®"* reveals that, quite often, they pursued their own 
line, the three lines contradicting one another. As a result, the political 
leadership of EOKA (Makarios) and the Greek Government, failed completely 
to exploit the tactical successes of EOKA in the diplomatic front. Secondly, the 
dramatic deviation of strategic objectives between Greeks and Cypriot Greeks. 
While Athens initially surrendered to Cypriot demands and ‘accepted’ the 
responsibility to support the Cypriot cause in the United Nations, quite soon 
proved unable to pull the diplomatic lever to the very end. By autumn 1956, the 
Greek Government realized that its internal political stability, the effort for the 
development of its economy, and the fate of Hellenism in Turkey, were much 
more important than the issue of Cyprus. The strategic roads of Greek Cyprus
Grivas, Antartopolemos, p. 21.
Averof, Istoria Hamenon Efkerion, vol. I, pp. 185-188, 271-274, 313-315, and vol. II, 221-225; 
Vlachos, Deka Chronia, pp. 183-187, 196-197.
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and Greece, started to diverge in June 1955, when Britain invited Greece and 
Turkey into a tripartite conference in London.
While Greek blunders never ceased, the other two parties involved, 
Britain and Turkey, took full advantage of the controversial relations between 
Cypriot Greeks and their motherland. The British contribution to this strategic 
failure revolved around two factors. Initially, the manipulative colonial doctrine 
of divide et impera; Britain, unwilling in the beginning and unable later to pay 
the high cost of confronting the Cypriot determination for Enosis, tried to 
safeguard her strategic interests by involving a third party. The British 
patronage of Turkish interest in the United Nations in 1954 and the introduction 
of Turkey in the Tripartite Conference in London in 1955, as a counter-balance 
to the Cypriot demands, were fundamental efforts destined to shift dramatically 
the fragile equilibrium on the island and the Eastern Mediterranean. Then, the 
introduction of partition-Ta/cs/m as a possible solution of the Cyprus issue. The 
infamous statement of Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lenox-Boyd, on 
19 December 1956 about partition®  ^ became the second coup de grace, after 
the infamous ‘never’ of Hopkinson in 1954, skillfully disguised in June 1958 as 
the Macmillan Plan.^^
The British inability to handle effectively the military situation in Cyprus, 
along with Greek hesitation to support decisively the political front of the 
underground campaign, created a ‘void’ that allowed the gradual infiltration of a 
third party into the crisis. Turkey, having nothing to lose, under the pretext of 
protecting the interests of Cypriot Turks, begun nursing her wrath. ‘The prime 
mistake is yours’ said Karamanlis to Prime Minister Macmillan. ‘You have put 
the Turks to bark and now they start to bite; and thus it is difficult for you to pull 
them together. Who is responsible?’®^ Eventually the British encouragement 
turned bitter when Turkey was unleashed to pursue her own strategic
House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol. 562 (London: HMSO, 1957), col. 
1268.
Cyprus: Statement of Policy, Cmnd. 455 (London: HMSO, 1958).
Averof, Istoria Hamenon Efkerion, vol. II, p. 69.
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■:
objectives, growing into the most decisive factor for the settlement of the 
Cyprus question. The Turkish contribution towards the strategic failure of EOKA 
was founded on two main factors: Firstly, the aggressive intervention of the 
Adnan Menderes Government that revolved around indirect threats against 
Greece for the fate of Hellenism in Istanbul and Smyrna, the crude pressure 
against the British in their bold demand for Taksim, as well as the clandestine 
establishment of an underground armed organization in Cyprus by the Turkish 
armed forces. Secondly, the instrumental role of the extremely violent -  but 
successful in its mission -  Cypriot Turk underground movement (November 
1957-August 1958), operating under the control of Rauf Denktash, against the 
Greek community.
Eventually, the fate of Cyprus was not determined by the military 
campaign, but by foreign geopolitical interests and diplomacy. Obviously it was 
not Greek or Cypriot Greek diplomacy. The Cypriot shortsightedness, the 
Greek diplomatic incompetence, the colonial manipulation, and the Turkish 
nationalist aggression, created a Gordian Knot, that led to the forced 
abandonment of Enosis, under the threat of Taksim, and to the establishment 
of a crippled Republic.
DIAGRAM 1 
Operational Structure of EOKA in 1958
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Chapter III 
The rise of Pan-Turkist nationalism and the birth of the 
first Turkish underground movements in Cyprus
The abandonment of Turkish interest for Cyprus
The ambivalent geopolitical realignment In Southeastern Europe -  after the end 
of the Balkan Wars, World War I and the Turkish War of Independence -  as 
well as the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923, had significant 
implications on the destiny of Cyprus. Turkey not only recognized, under Article 
20, the annexation of the island by Britain but renounced, under Article 16, all 
rights and claims on territories -  including Cyprus -  outside the frontiers 
defined by the Treaty.^ The abandonment of obsolete Ottomanism and the 
establishment of the modern Turkiye Cumhuriyeti [Republic of Turkey] by 
Mustafa Kema\-Ataturk [father of the Turks], accompanied by radical political, 
social and cultural reforms as well as the adoption of a progressive foreign 
policy under the Kemalist doctrine of Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh [peace at 
home, peace in the world], dissuaded, for many decades, any interest for the 
geopolitical position and the internal affairs of the British colony. The statement 
of Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak in the Parliament on 23 January 1950, 
immediately after the plebiscite in Cyprus, that ‘there is no such affair as 
Cyprus Issue^ was characteristic of Turkish foreign policy over Cyprus.
 ^ Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other Instruments Signed at Lausanne on July 24 1923, 
Cmd. 1929 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1923), pp. 21-23.
 ^Cumhuriyet {24 January 1950), quoted in Fahir Armaoglu, Kibris Meseiesi 1954-1959: Turk 
Hukumetinin ve Kamu Oyunun Davranislari [Cyprus question 1954-1959: The attitude of the 
Turkish Government and public opinion] (Ankara: [n.pub.j, 1963), p. 20.
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But this indifference was not meant to be eternal. The political agitation 
for Enosis, by the Ethnarchy of Cyprus, gradually began to attract Turkish 
attention; the statement of Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu a year later, was 
indicative of Turkish sensitivity:
Because o f geographical importance and our historical relations with the Turkish 
population on the island, we are closely interested in the situation in Cyprus. We do 
not see any reason to be concerned that the legal status o f the island would change. 
But i f  it  ever changes, we shall not a llow this to be done without us, in a way that is 
contrary to our rights.^
Ironically, it was not the Turkish Government that would exasperate Turkish 
interest in Cyprus In the following years; it was the unfortunate Greek 
diplomatic maneuvers, the covert incitement of the Turkish factor by the 
colonial power, and the emergence of acute Pan-Turkism in Turkish public 
opinion. Eventually, the Turkish Government could not resist manipulating 
these elements -  in pursue of her own expansionist strategic interests -  to 
penetrate deep into the heart of the Cyprus question, overturning both the 
colonial strategic planning and the idealist Greek national aspirations.
The emergence of Kibris Turktur, the covert colonial incitement, and the 
provocative interference of the Turkish Government
The nationalist ideology of Turkculuk [Pan-Turklsm^ -  that sought the cultural 
and physical union ‘among all peoples of proven or alleged Turkic origins’® 
particularly of ‘Outside Turks’ -  and the irredentism attached to it, provided, in 
1954, the catalyst for the awakening of public opinion and the rise of mass 
nationalism in Turkey; consequently, the re-emergence of Turkish strategic 
interest for Cyprus, ‘which had been one of the pet issues of Pan-Turkists in
® Hurriyet{2^ April 1951), quoted in Armaoglu, Kibris Meseiesi, p. 32.
Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, 2nd edn (London: Hurst and 
Company, 1995), pp. 1-179.
® Ibid., p. 1.
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Turkey since the end of the Second World War’.® Turkish unrest over Cyprus 
started to appear in the beginning of 1954 when the Milli Turk Talebe 
Federasyonou (MTTF) [National Turkish student federation] held meetings 
concerning Cyprus and issued leaflets of acute nationalist content.^ The Greek 
inscription of the Cyprus question in the United Nations brought the immediate 
reaction of nationalist circles in Turkey, and on 24 August 1954, the Kibris 
Turktur Komitesi (KTK) [Cyprus is Turkish committee] was born, the executive 
council of which consisted of nationalist MTTF members and newspaper 
editors.® The main objectives of the new organization were to influence world 
public opinion that Cyprus was Turkish, to defend Turkish rights regarding 
Cyprus, and to condition Turkish public opinion. At the same time the 
inflammatory articles and anti-Greek editorials that began appearing in the 
Istanbul papers Hurriyet, Istanbul Ekspres, Vatan, and the Ankara Zafer, 
created an unreasonably explosive atmosphere for Cyprus.® On 2 October 
1954, the organization acquired legal status under the name Kibris Turktur 
Cemiyeti (KTC) [Cyprus is Turkish society]. Ultranationalist advocate and 
Hurriyet editor Hikmet Bill became its president, discharged army officer and 
Zafer correspondent Kamil Onal became general secretary and the main 
provocateur of the organization, while publisher and Vatan editor Ahmed Emin 
appeared as the third most influential figure.^®
 ^Landau, Pan-Turkism, p. 135; Frank Dachau, ‘The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected 
in the Cyprus Dispute’, The Middle East Journal, XIII (3), Summer 1959, pp. 262-272.
 ^ Indictment 1150 of 9 February 1956, in Christos loannides, in Turkey’s image: The 
Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. 
Karatzas, 1991), p. 76; Speros Vryonis Jr., A Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom 
of September 6-7, 1955 and the Destruction of the Greek Community o f Istanbul {Nevj York: 
Greenworks.com, 2005), p. 79.
® loannides, Turkey’s Image, p. 77; Vryonis, Mechanism, pp. 48-50.
® loannides, Turkey’s image, p. 78.
Ibid., pp. 83-87.
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Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes -  under intense British 
pressure to strengthen Turkish involvement in Cyprus^realiz ing the vast 
potential offered by the nationalist activism of KTC, made his government a 
‘silent partner’ of the organization, that eventually turned out to be a 
dispensable instrument in the hands of the Demokrat Parti (DP) [Democratic 
party], after the completion of its catastrophic mission in September 1955/^ 
The three components of KCT -  the press, the students, and the labor unions -  
intermingled and strengthened by the vast DP network, grew, in almost a year, 
into an influential hard-line organization of eighteen branches in Istanbul, and 
another 118 in Turkey and Cyprus, with more than 200,000 members/® The 
inflammable mixture of Pan-Turkist nationalism, skillfully manipulated by the 
Menderes regime for the implementation of its new aggressive policy over 
Cyprus -  ‘the Cypriot diversion’^^ -^ became an effective antidote to the severe 
internal economic problems and to the discontent of the opposition.
In the United Nations, Britain -  unable to respond effectively against the 
Greek appeal -  used Turkey as an invaluable ally for the defense of her case 
against self-determination. While the formal Turkish position was the 
continuation of British rule over Cyprus, the British Foreign Minister, during the 
visit of the Cypriot Turk representatives in London, declared that ‘it is a shame 
in our times to ask for the continuation of colonialism’ and advised them ‘to 
request the return of Cyprus to her old owner’.^ ® Selim Sarper, the Turkish 
Ambassador to the UN, was eventually obliged -  although he was not 
authorized -  to adopt the manipulative British maneuver that ‘if Britain will 
withdraw from Cyprus, then the island must be returned to its former
”  Confidential report of Greek consul in Istanbul, revealed by Vyron Theodoropoulos in daily To 
Vima, 4 September 2005, p. 26.
Vryonis, Mechanism, p. 50.
Ibid., p. 51 ; Hikmet Bil, Kibris Olayi ve Ic Yuzu [The Cyprus incidents and the inner 
connection] {Istanbul: [n. pub], 1976), p. 89.
Holland, Britain and the Revoit, p. 256.
Excerpt from the Faiz Kaymak memoirs, in Tahsin, Anodos, pp. 204-211.
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occupant’/® While in September 1954 the inscription of the Cyprus issue by 
Greece was for British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd an Interference in a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction’/^ in July 1955, Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
unexpectedly invited Greece and Turkey for discussions ‘on political and 
defense questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus’/® 
The colonial planning -  based on the doctrine of divide et impera -  to 
introduce a third party, as a political counterbalance against the Greek demand 
for self-determination, soon collapsed; the Turkish Government of Adnan 
Menderes, initially playing the British game, vigorously started to depart from 
the colonial line in pursue of her own strategic objectives. A malicious rumor 
spread by Dr Kutchuk -  originally contained in a letter to Hikmet Bil on 13 
August 1955 -  about an alleged massacre of the Cypriot Turks on 28 August, 
initiated a vast disinformation campaign by the KTC network that spread 
immediately through the press to the ethnic Turkish rnasses/® On 24 August, 
Menderes himself did not avoid intensifying the inflammable content of the 
rumor. While the misinformation was proven completely false, it served 
adequately its purpose in exasperating anti-Greek feelings. On 6 September 
1955, the detonation of a fuse -  imported secretly from Turkey by Oktay Engin, 
and planted by consular employee Hasan Ucar -  in the consular complex in 
Thessaloniki against the alleged house of Ataturk, '^  ^ turned out to be the signal 
for the outbreak of a devastating pre-planned catastrophe. In just nine hours, 
the synchronized and pre-orchestrated attacks of infuriated crowds, armed with 
implements, against Greek quarters and neighborhoods in Istanbul and Izmir, 
created immense destructions, that cost the lives of at least thirty-seven 
Greeks, the serious injury of many others, and the rape of an undisclosed 
number of women.^^ 4214 Greek shops and 1004 houses were destroyed, 73
Faiz Kayak in Tahsin, Anodos, pp. 37-39.
Report on the Inscription o f the Cyprus item, Cmd. 9300, p. 8.
The Times, 1 July 1955, p. 10.
loannides, Turkey’s image, pp. 102-110; Vryonis, Mechanism, pp. 82-93. 
Vryonis, Mechanism, pp. 93-95; loannides, Turkey’s image, pp. 110-113. 
Vryonis, Mechanism, Appendix B, pp. 581-582.
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Greek Orthodox churches were destroyed or burned and two Greek cemeteries 
were desecrated.The full responsibility of the Turkish Government for 
planning the Turkish pogrom, and the involvement of KTC and of DP, were fully 
disclosed in the following years -  during the courts-martial administered by 
General Aknoz in 1956, and the eleven-month Yassiada Trials of 1960-1961 -  
where former government officials Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan were found 
guilty for violating the constitution and were subsequently hanged, while many 
of their associates were sentenced to life imprisonment or given various prison 
terms.^®
The Turkish pogrom of 6/7 September 1955 against the affluent Greek 
communities of Istanbul and Izmir brought the material and psychological 
destruction of Hellenic presence in Turkey, deeply traumatized Greek 
conscience and national pride, and touched the Greek AchiHe’s heel. The 
Tripartite Conference in London "^  ^ ended ingloriously with Greece recognizing 
the new British position, that Turkey was a formally interested party. The frozen 
reaction of the Greek government after such a monumental catastrophe was 
indicative of the new regional realities: Turkey ceased to follow the British 
diplomatic directives over Cyprus and entered a period of aggressive, nothing- 
to-lose foreign policy; Greece, realizing that the Greek community in Turkey 
turned into a hostage of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, started to 
abandon its theoretically strong supporting role towards the anti-colonial 
campaign of EOKA; Britain realized that the Cyprus solution had to pass 
through Ankara.
Dilek Guven, 6-7 Eylul 1955 O/ay/ar/[The 6-7 September 1955 incidents] (Istanbul: lletisim 
Yayinlari, 2006), p. 220.
Vryonis, Mechanism, pp. 523-530.
The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, Cmnd. 9594 (London:
HMSO, 1955).
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The Turkish role in the Cyprus Police
The outbreak of the EOKA campaign caught the colonial Government of 
Cyprus unaware and unable to cope effectively with the internal crisis. When 
the administration realized that the underground campaign was unfolding in 
unpredictable ways, it decided to reinforce the Cyprus Police by the massive 
recruitment of Cypriot Turks.^® Theoretically, the practical need to strengthen 
the security forces was logically turned towards non-Greeks. Politically, the 
indirect introduction of Turks into the conflict served as a buffer, between EOKA 
and the colonial regime, absorbing part of the fatal blows that sooner or later 
would inflict Turkish reaction.
The establishment of the Cyprus Police Mobile Reserve on 20 
September 1955 -  an all-Turk force under the command of a small number of 
expatriate officers who were assigned key positions in its paramilitary structure 
-  the members of which were known to the Turkish community as the 
Komando/ar [commandoes] was meant to dramatically change the internal 
security situation on the island. Not by its ‘lawful’ police action, but rather as an 
instrument of counter-violence against EOKA and the Greek population, both of 
which experienced an unprecedented harassment by its provocative actions. 
Beyond its main anti-riot duties, the Mobile Reserve became the operational 
‘reserve striking force’®® of the Cyprus Police against EOKA, participating in 
mountainous anti-guerilla operations -  sixteen of its men were trained as 
mountain trackers,®^ in the horrific interrogation of EOKA suspects for the 
extraction of information, in the destruction of Greek property during searches, 
and many other, exclusively anti-Greek, duties. The demand for its units was so 
great that the 1955 planning for a composition of nine units proved 
inadequate;®® the initial strength of 170 men in 1955, grew in the following year
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 98. 
Times of Cyprus, 18 October 1955, p. 1.
Annual Report on the Cyprus Poiice Force for the Year 1956, ed. by Lt.-Col. G.C. White 
(Nicosia: Police Force Headquarters, 1957) p. 8, Cyprus Police Academy Library (OPAL). 
Colonial Reports, Cyprus 7955 (London: HMSO, 1956), p. 58.
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to 569 men.®® By the end of 1957, the Mobile Reserve numbered 580 men, 
comprised of 12 units of 30-35 men; three units were held at police 
headquarters while the other nine were posted at police divisions. Each unit 
was operationally independent and consisted of five sections under the 
command of a Gazette officer or an Inspector.®®
Similarly, an emergency Cyprus Auxiliary Poiice (CAP)®^  was established 
on 1 August 1955, the members of which were assigned guard, patrol and 
paramilitary duties in order to relieve the Cyprus Police to other more important 
security assignments.®® The temporary auxiliaries were given the same salaries 
as regular policemen, and became another critical pole of attracting more Turks 
to the security forces. The strength of the emergency CAP in 1955 was 1084 
men while in 1956 its manpower rose to 1417,®® reaching 1594 men in 1958.®"^  
The enlistment of men in the CAP lasted for the whole duration of the 
emergency while, not surprisingly, its racial composition revolved around 96- 
100% for the Turks and 4-0% for the Greeks. Additionally, the Cyprus Special 
Constabulary (CSC)®® established in the six main towns in January 1953, was 
reorganized in 1955 and its strength increased considerably with more Turks
Annua! Report on the Cyprus Police 1956, p. 8, CPAL; Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 
Force for the Year 1957, ed. by Lt.-Col. G.C. White (Nicosia: Police Force Headquarters, 1958) 
p. 6, CPAL
Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1957, pp. 22-23, CPAL.
A Law to Amend the Police Law, No. 39 of 1955, 7 September 1955, Supplement 2 to The 
Cyprus Gazette, No. 3858, 8 September 1955, pp. 172-173; No. 530, The Police Law Notice 
Under Section 42A(i), Supplement 3 to The Cyprus Gazette, No. 3858, 8 September 1955, p. 
517; No. 567, The Auxiliary Police Regulations 1955, 12 September 1955, Supplement 3 to The 
Cyprus Gazette, No. 3861, 22 September 1955, pp. 564-565.
The Times of Cyprus, 6 August 1955, p.5; Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1957, p. 4, 
CPAL.
”  Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1956, pp. 27-28, CPAL.
Annual Report on the Cyprus Poiice 1956, p. 25, CPAL; Colonial Reports, Cyprus 1958 
(Nicosia: Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 66.
Special Constables Law 1952, No. 14 of 1952, 25 June 1952, Supplement 2 to The Cyprus 
Gazette, No. 3631, 2 July 1952, pp. 93-94; Colonial Reports, Cyprus 1954 (Nicosia: Cyprus 
Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 91.
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and a few British; its 1955 manpower of 750 men rose to 1595 in 1956 and 
declined to 560 by 1957.®®
A similar phenomenon appeared in the composition of the Cyprus 
Police. The 1954 strength of 1397 men, rose to 1838 men in 1955, 2417 men in 
1956, 2692 men in 1957, and reached its apex in 1958 with 3014 men;®^  the 
ethnic composition of the force in 1958 was indicative of the internal racial 
politics within the Cyprus Police: 47% Turks (population 18%), 31% Greeks 
(population 80%), 21% expatriates, 1% Armenians and Maronites.®® The need 
-  real or intentional -  to strengthen the security forces through the massive 
recruitment of Turks into the regular and emergency forces was encouraged by 
the shrinking of educational and basic entrance requirements. The condition for 
the Mobile Reserve recruits was to be ‘literate with ability to read and write 
Turkish or Greek’ while for the auxiliaries the educational requirement was 
none!®® A great number of them were proven unfit for security duties, many 
being convicted for various criminal offences ranging from homicide and 
attempted murder to theft, while numerous others were discharged from the 
police f o r c e . T h e  Greek complaints for the immediate dismantling of the CAP 
and the Mobile Reserve and disarm of Turkish policemen were continuous but 
as expected, without any resul t .The almost non-existent requirements and 
the high salaries offered -  almost double than the average salaries earned with 
difficulty by uneducated and poor workers -  made a great difference for the 
Turks; ‘it was better to be a policeman than a shepherd’."^® The illusion of
Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1956, pp. 26-27, CPAL; Annual Report on the Cyprus 
Police 1957, pp. 24-25, CPAL,
Annual Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the Year 1958, ed. by John E. S. Browne 
(Nicosia: Police Force Headquarters, 1959), p. 6, CPAL.
Annual Report on the Cyprus Police 1958, p. 8, CPAL.
Weekly Order No. 8 of 24 February 1956, Cyprus Police Weekiy Orders 1956 {Part I), CPAL. 
Times of Cyprus, 6 December 1955, p. 6; Efeftheria, 14 January 1956, p. 1 ; Cyprus Mail, 3
January 1956, p. 1 ; Cyprus Mail, 9 September 1957, p. 1 ; Eleftheria, 29 April 1956, p.1 ; The
Times, 4 May 1956, p. 10; Times of Cyprus, 7 June 1956, p. 1.
Times of Cyprus, 31 May 1956, p. 6.
Personal interview with Kamil Tuncel, 25 February 2006.
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temporary power and financial comfort gradually changed their behavior 
towards the Greeks; while in the beginning their attitude was rather reserved, it 
later became hostile and abusive,culminating by 1958 in raw hatred.
But most importantly, the Turks of the security forces infiltrated into the 
Turkish underground organizations, either as active members or in auxiliary 
duties. According to Grivas, Turkish policemen were providing arms training in 
Turkish villages in the Nicosia district, while EOKA information indicated that 
the British had informally given the green light for the execution of Greek 
policemen by Turkish members of the security forces, the murders of whom 
would be debited to EOKA.' '^  ^ Underground execution teams composed of 
Turkish policemen were allegedly organized in the Nicosia area under the 
direction of British sergeant Willard and the command of Turkish policeman 
Tahsin Ali Riza for the indiscriminate attack against Greeks, such as the 
Heracleous family in Palouriotissa, Andreas Ashiotis in Famagusta, and many 
others."^ ® According to EOKA information, discharged or active police members 
such as officers Kasim and Nihat of Lefka police station, and corporal Enis and 
British constable Macloud, went to Turkey for secret training on 14 May and 20 
May 1957 respectively."^® Under the cover of their police identity, Turkish 
members of the security forces, such as Turgut Ozkaloglu in Nicosia,Ahmet 
Bahic, Ibrahim Davulcu,"^ ® Selcuk, who had his own underground group in 
Sackarla, and Rasit, who kept underground groups in Nicosia, Famagusta, and 
Vatyli,"^ ® offered invaluable services to the Turkish underground organizations.®®
Personal interview with Kamil Tuncel, 25 February 2006; personal interview with Thasos 
Sophocleous, 25 October 2006.
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EOKA and the Turks, the first attacks against the police
The operational conception of Grivas for the Turkish element was 
straightforward; he was so focused against the colonial rulers that the existence 
of the minority offered -  he arbitrarily considered -  no obstacle in his 
underground plans.®^  For this purpose, he had given strict orders to his sector 
commanders that there would be no direct attack or any intimidation against the 
members or the property of the Turkish community.®® A directive that he kept 
with devotion until the bitter summer of 1958, when the indiscriminate Turkish 
attacks against innocent Greeks, led -  after a four-week hesitation -  to the 
retaliation of EOKA.
A controversial exception to this policy -  with intricate consequences -  
appeared from the very beginning, when EOKA began its intimidation 
campaign against the police. The objective of Grivas -  in preparing the ground 
for the operations of the guerilla groups -  was to terrorize the police and cause 
the paralysis of its command in order to attract the involvement of the British 
Army in security tasks and cause the dispersion of its forces.®® For this purpose 
he issued a strict warning to the police: ‘Do not try to stand against us because 
your blood will be spilled, without you being able to obstruct our objectives ... I 
have ordered: Anyone providing resistance against the Cypriot patriots will be 
executed.’®"^ His action plan consisted of forceful attacks against police stations 
and patrols, as well as executions of suspected policemen collaborating with 
the colonial administration against the organization.
There is not a single indication In the works of Grivas -  Apomnemonevmata, Chronikon and 
Antartopolemos -  which suggest that he ever considered any threat or made any planning 
against the minority, either during the preparatory period or the first years of the campaign.
Personal interviews with former EOKA sector commanders: Thasos Sophocleous, 25 
October 2006; Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006; Gregorls Gregoras, 20 March 2006. 
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21 June 1955, was a conspicuous turning point for the EOKA struggle; 
Digenis -  wrote in his diary -  ordered Meias ‘to strike indiscriminately against 
traitor policemen, Greeks or Turks'.®® He was so passionate about the action 
against the colonial administration, that he was unable to foresee the 
consequences of his order. On the same day, several Turkish Cypriot 
policemen were slightly injured -  it was the first attack involving Turkish 
members of the security forces -  and a Greek passer-by was killed, when an 
EOKA time bomb exploded outside the Nicosia Divisional Police Headquarters. 
The incident caused the furious reaction of Cypriot Turk leader Dr Fazil Kutchuk 
who sent telegrams to the Prime Ministers of Britain and Turkey, and to 
Governor Armitage, protesting that ‘extremist Greek elements have attacked 
our right of existence, and the blood of fourteen innocent Turks has been shed. 
We demand a guarantee of our security, our life and our property, and the 
termination of this situation’. He then asked prophetically: ‘Is the Government 
expecting that the Turkish community will take measures for the defence of its 
life and property?’®® The Turkish casualties shocked the minority and daily 
Bozkurt clarified that ‘the Turkish community will not sit with folded arms ... but 
will certainly take drastic measures’.®^ A critical question arose. Would the 
outcome of the Greek campaign have been different if Digenis concentrated his 
attacks exclusively against British policemen and Greek ‘traitors’ in the police 
force? Most probably not. Turkey had already penetrated deep into the heart of 
the Cyprus question, and the Cypriot Turks began their own underground 
preparations (Diagram 3) to defend the new Kibris Turktur policy;®® its first 
victim was 21-year old Flkret Mehmet, killed accidentally on 18 April 1955 when 
he was secretly negotiating the purchase of a revolver.®®
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KITEMB
The first Cypriot Turk underground movement appeared six weeks after the 
beginning of the EOKA campaign, in the middle of May 1955, under the name 
KITEMB, that, according to Ahmet An, means Kibris iik Turk EOKA’ya 
Mukavemet Biriigi [Cyprus Turk initial resistance union against EOKA],®® or just 
Kibris Turk EOKA’ya Mukavemet Biriigi [Cyprus Turk resistance union against 
EOKA]. The life of the organization was very short -  from May to September 
1955 -  and its existence became known from a few leaflets and threatening 
letters that were circulated or mailed in three Cypriot towns (Nicosia, Limassol 
and Paphos) and London. Although there are no accurate indications about its 
leader, Dr Kutchuk appeared to had some involvement and knowledge of its 
operation.®  ^ His clinic in 172 Kyrenia Avenue in Nicosia probably served as the 
center of the group,®® where Dr Kutchuk allegedly swore trusted individuals as 
members of the organization in front of a small Turkish flag.®®
KITEMB’s operation was passive -  an ideological reaction to Enosis 
rather than an armed response against EOKA -  and focused on the exchange 
of written threats with the Greek organization. Its first public appearance was 
made on 14 May 1955, when Reuters reported that Themistoklis Dervis, the 
Greek Mayor of Nicosia, received a letter, written in Turkish and signed by 
KITEMB, that threatened to ‘kill the mayor and his friend the Nicosia district 
commissioner’, and that it would ‘settle the accounts with Archbishop Makarios 
as weir.®"^  Four days later, in his editorial entitled ‘Lie and Deceive’, Dr Kutchuk
Ahmet An, KibrisH Turklehn Siyasal Tarihi (1930-1960) [Political history of the Cypriot Turks 
(1930-1960)] (Nicosia: [n. pub.], 2006), p. 515.
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claimed that the alleged organization was a Cypriot Greek plot to harm the 
relations between the two communities.®®
On the night of 29/30 June 1955, a number of leaflets written in the 
Turkish language were found in Limassol, some of which were posted on walls, 
calling the Turkish youth to help KITEMB combat EOKA and E/?os/s.®® On the 
night of 1/2 July 1955 more KITEMB leaflets, typed in the Turkish language, 
were found in the streets of oid Famagusta, that announced the formation of a 
secret organization to fight against EOKA and invited the Turkish youth to 
join.®^  Similar leaflets were distributed and posted on walls in Nicosia, some of 
which were typed while others were handwritten.®® The next move appeared on 
4 July 1955, allegedly coming from EOKA which sent a threatening letter, 
handwritten in Greek with red ink, to Turkish leader Dr Kutchuk. The letter 
stated that EOKA learned that the Turkish national party had recently formed 
an organization named KITEMB, and gave the advice that the Turks ‘should not 
stand against our sacred struggle and should be advised to sit quiet’. ‘In case 
the Turks continue their actions they will get what they deserve’. The letter 
warned Dr Kutchuk that if the directives are not followed, ‘you will be the first 
victim, and if needed you will be accompanied by his excellency the Governor 
Sir Robert Armitage’.®®
On the same day, EOKA circulated a proclamation in the Turkish 
language, reassuring the Turks of Cyprus that its struggle was focused against 
the colonial rulers and not against the Turkish community. The proclamation 
clearly stated that ‘our intentions for the Turkish inhabitants of the island are 
pure and friendly’. ‘We perceive the Turks as honest friends and allies, and as 
far as we are concerned, we are not going to endure any provocation against
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the life, dignity, honor and property' of the Turkish community7° There was an 
immediate reply -  6 July 1955 -  from KITEMB, which issued a two-page 
proclamation in English entitled ‘Why No Enosis’, where it was alleged that 
Cyprus had never been Greek and that Greece was not its motherland. The 
organization asked for the deportation of Greek teachers, the distinction 
between the Greek Church and politics, the prohibition of raising Greek flags in 
the churches, and the indefinite rule of Cyprus by Great Britain.^^
Later in July, a threatening letter was sent by KITEMB to a [Turkish] 
police sergeant,^® while on 8 September 1955, Zenon Rossides, the Cypriot 
adviser of the Ethnarchy in London, received a blood-stained threatening letter 
from KITEMB, posted from central London, that carried the warning: ‘If you love 
your life, stop the folly for Cyprus’.^ ® Eventually the organization silently 
disappeared, probably because of its detection by EOKA, obliging Dr Kutchuk 
to establish a new underground organization under another name. "^^
Threats for the eruption of the Volcano
The campaign for the intimidation of the poiice continued indiscriminately; 
during a guerilla raid against Amiandos Police Station, on 22 June, EOKA killed 
the first member of the police force, Greek PS (Police Sergeant) ioannis 
Demosthenous.^® The second police fatality was another Greek PS Costas 
Costopoulos executed by EOKA in Famagusta on 12 August,^® followed by the 
execution of Greek PC (Police Constable) Herodotos Pouliis on 28 August in
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Nicosia/^ the execution of Greek PC Nicolas Panayi on 5 October in 
Famagusta/® and the fatal wounding of Greek PC Panayiotis Constantinou in 
an ambush against the security forces on 5 December 19557®
In its violent attacks, EOKA did not distinguish race or nationality among 
its victims; during its four-year operation, many innocent Greek civilians were 
killed as a result of its actions, such as Kyriakos Kyprianou, and ioakim 
Panayi,®® while hundreds of others were injured, in this cyclone of patriotic 
enthusiasm and violence against the colonial authorities, Digenis, and 
consequently his sector commanders and combat group leaders, were not 
interested to discriminate the civilians from the security forces, or the Greeks 
from the Turks. While the operational principles of EOKA did not inciude 
attacks against the minority, the organization failed to protect the lives of 
innocent Cypriots, Greek or Turk. The first injuries among Turkish policemen 
and innocent Turkish civilians, caused great concern within the minority,®^and 
offered the excuse -  or the need -  for the formation of a respective 
underground organization that would undertake the mission to protect the 
minority from indiscriminate EOKA action.
in the middle of August 1955 -  while KITEMB appeared to be still in 
operation -  a new Turkish organization named VOLKAN [volcano] emerged, 
which warned that ‘for every Turk kiiled, four EOKA members wili be killed’ in 
retaliation.®® On 9 September, another proclamation distributed in Nicosia, 
declared that the organization will avoid any bloody clashes between the two 
communities, ‘but if they touch a Turk, be it policeman, government official or 
civilian, we will not hesitate to take immediate strong action’. The leaflet 
affirmed that VOLKAN was established to protect the life, honour and property
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of the Turkish community.®® On 12 October, a new prociamation addressed to 
Sir John Harding, the new Governor of Cyprus, stated that the ‘British 
colonialists sooner or later will abandon the island ... no other flag will be 
streaming other than the Turkish. This isiand which was never Greek, wiii never 
become Greek as long as the children of bozkurt [gray wolf] live.’®"^
The unexpected appearance of the new Turkish organization and the 
threatening tone of its proclamations surprised the Greek community, while 
rumours began spreading in the Greek press and Athens Radio that VOLKAN 
was organized and directed by the British.®® in one of its proclamations, EOKA 
even threatened that it would execute ‘Mr Roe’,®® the alleged British leader of 
VOLKAN. Even Rauf Denktash implied later -  causing strong reaction among 
former members -  that VOLKAN was established by the British,®  ^and accused 
those ‘who had served the British during that period’ that they ‘had received 
their compensation and left’ to Britain.®® Denktash’s mistrust was born when he 
learned that Hussein Selcuk -  the deputy leader of VOLKAN -  was teaching 
Turkish ianguage iessons to the British director of the Public Information Office. 
‘From that day a suspicion rose in my mind, i suspected that our organization 
was established by the British themselves.’®®
VOLKAN, through the patriotic content of its proclamations under the 
slogan Her Turk Bir Volkandir [Every Turk is a volcano],®® gradually developed 
into a symbol-concept of hope and resistance within the Turkish community, 
helping the people to keep their morale high.®^  On 17 November, a VOLKAN
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warning was addressed to the Governor: ‘We will never, and in no way, allow 
the Turkish Cyprus to become Greek. Do not forget that next to us are twenty 
five million Mehmetcik [soldiers]. If you feel unable to rule Cyprus, then deliver 
the island an hour earlier to its real owner, Turkey’.®^ Other leaflets scattered in 
Nicosia on 3 December 1955 defined clearly the political ideology of the 
organization:
We come from a race that knows how to fight and die fighting.W e do not have any 
intention to spill blood in our hands, but we, the Turks of Cyprus, who have the noble 
blood of the Great Turkish Nation ... we have only one reply to those who aim to drive 
us into slavery: Ya Olum Ya Istiklal [Death or Independence]./ OI You noble children of 
the Great Turkish Nation I ... The days of the national struggle are approaching. Be 
readyF"^
In 1955, VOLKAN action was limited to verbal threats, but the situation 
began to change when Turkish ARC (Auxiliary Police Constable) Ibrahim 
Muhsin ‘accidentally’ shot and wounded two Greek children at Kilani village. In 
retaliation, EOKA shot and wounded Muhsin,®® while on 17 December, it 
wounded Turkish ARC Fahri Osman.®® VOLKAN, in a prociamation distributed 
in Nicosia on 20 December 1955, announced that ‘after an explicit decision of 
its Executive Committee' the organization would execute retaliatory actions and 
informed ‘our esteemed people that the time has come for cooperation with the 
[colonial] government for the extinction of these dogs'.®^
The leading decision-making nucleus of VOLKAN -  the alleged 
‘Executive Committee’ -  consisted of three men; carpenter Sakir Ozel, an 
acquaintance of Dr Kutchuk, and teacher Hussein Selcuk, were the operational 
leaders of the organization, under the political guidance and influence of Dr 
Kutchuk. The close relation between the leader Sakir Ozel and Dr Kutchuk, was
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not coincidental in the control of the organization, since quite often it was the 
Turkish leader that was giving the political directions for the termination of the 
VOLKAN agitation.®® The main operational nucleus of the organization was in 
Nicosia, composed of men like Kemal Mison, the bomb-maker of VOLKAN, 
Yekta Remzi, Hasan Skordo, Topal Mahmut (Buyuk), Ismail Sadikoglu, Kasap 
Ahmet, Ulus Ulfet, and ismaii Beyoglu.®® The role of Turkish members of the 
security forces, such as Turgut Ozkaloglu -  an ARC and bodyguard of a British 
public prosecutor who used the service car to carry out operations for the 
organization^®®- was instrumental in the underground operations of the 
organization. Grivas wrote that many young men of VOLKAN were recruited in 
the CAR and the Mobile Reserve, which became the ‘mastix’ [scourge] of 
Cyprus; Turkish members of the force were used as torturers of EOKA 
suspects during interrogation, and as collaborators and guides of the British 
Army in searches and destruction of Greek property/®^ According to Kemal 
Tanrisevdi, Turkish members of the security forces, under the influence of their 
British superior officers, encouraged the Turkish youth to trust VOLKAN.^®®
While most members of EOKA -  whose occupational background 
ranged from university graduates (pharmacists, doctors, high-school teachers, 
agriculturalists, and other professionals) to secondary education students, 
villagers, clerks, workers or employees -  were everyday men and women that 
entered the organization to contribute towards the collective national Cypriot 
Greek effort for Enosis, membership in the Turkish organization was rather 
different. The hard core of VOLKAN consisted of men well-known to the 
nightlife of the island,^®" -^ a few of its members were involved in black market 
transactions, gambling, and underworld activities -  as well as physically strong 
men. On the contrary the Greek members of the underworld not only did not
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support the anti-colonial struggle, but often turned into collaborators of the 
British, such as the notorious Zacharias family from Ipsonas village, while some 
of them were executed by EOKA as a precautionary measure/®®
VOLKAN had neither a definite underground structure nor organized 
combat groups as EOKA; it was rather an emergency underground 
organization that was responding spasmodically against EOKA activities. The 
nucleus of the organization was in Nicosia, but progressively it spread to the 
Turkish quarters of other towns, in Famagusta and Limassol, as well as to main 
Turkish villages such as Lefka and Louroudjina. The Turkish organization did 
not possess its own armory, and the handguns used in its operations were ali 
personal weapons that belonged to its members. The meetings between the 
members of the organization were held at Sakir Ozel’s shop at Abdi Cavus 
street in Nicosia, while some of its leading members frequented in Chetynkayia 
football club for gambling.
While 1955 passed with wounded Turkish policemen and accidentally 
injured Turkish civilians, the execution of PS Abdullah Ali Riza in Ktima by 
EOKA, on 11 January 1956 -  the first Turkish fatality -  caused the immediate 
appeal of Dr Kutchuk to Archbishop Makarios, for the denunciation of the 
murder, who indifferently avoided to reply. On the same day, hundreds of 
Turkish youths -  some armed with knives, shouting ‘VOLKAN’, ‘We shall 
avenge Abdullah’s death’ -  entered, for the first time, the Greek quarters of 
Tahtakalas and Chrysaliniotissa in Nicosia, breaking windows and stoning 
Greek shops, houses and cars.^ ®® VOLKAN supported the riot with explosions 
of bombs against Greek premises near Ataturk Square, the heart of the Turkish 
quarter in Nicosia,^®  ^ and a few noisy explosions in the Turkish quarter, that, 
according to Grivas, ‘were intended to fanaticize the Turkish mob’ against the 
Greeks.^ ®®
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On 19 March, a serious inter-communal clash in the mixed village of 
Vasilia caused by Greeks after a feast, ended with sixteen Turks and three 
Greeks injured, and the destruction of property in the Greek quarter of Nicosia 
‘while the police, the majority of whom are Turks, looked on passively’/®® 
Speaking to foreign correspondents, Dr Kutchuk warned that if there was no 
end to the Greek outbreaks, the ‘knives and daggers of Turks wili be the 
decisive factor'/®® In April, the killing of Turkish PC Nihat Vas if by EOKA, as 
well as of Turkish worker Djafer Ferhat at the Adarth tobacco factory, caused 
serious clashes between the two communities/^® Following the pattern of the 
two previous demonstrations, outraged crowds smashed windows and 
furniture, and stoned Greek shops and houses in the Greek quarter of Nicosia. 
But the new retaliatory element introduced by VOLKAN was arson; five fires 
broke out simultaneously in a Greek timber yard and other premises, while on 
the following day, the riots continued with nine more fires burning Greek 
property and causing extensive damage.^^^
Digenis -  completely underestimating the Turkish factor -  continued to 
focus his attention purely on the anti-coloniai campaign, failing to assess the 
hazardous potential of the escalating Turkish counter-actions. May was a 
month of heavy inter-communal tension and hazardously different from 
previous incidents, both in the duration and the extent of violence; the new 
retaliatory elements introduced by VOLKAN -  beyond the destruction of Greek 
property by rioters, and arson -  were attacks against innocent Greek civilians 
and murder. On 23 May 1956, the execution of Turkish PC Lisani Ahmed in 
Polls Chrysohous by EOKA, led to strong anti-Greek demonstrations and inter­
communal clashes in various towns, that resulted in serious injuries of Greeks 
and extensive damage to Greek property, in Hermes street Nicosia, VOLKAN 
members shot, from a passing car, and wounded a Greek, while other innocent
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Greeks were beaten up by excited T u r k s . O n  25 May, the statement of Dr 
Kutchuk that ‘it could not be expected, we should stand by and see innocent 
Turkish blood flowing’^ ^^  was accompanied by Turkish attacks against Greek 
neighborhoods in Larnaca, that caused severe damage to shops and houses, 
while seven Greeks and a Turk were taken to hospital; four of the Greeks were 
seriously injured from stab w o u n d s . T h e  following day, Turkish APC’s 
returning from a wedding celebration opened indiscriminate fire against Greeks 
in a coffee shop in Aphania village wounding eight of them, in the violent 
clashes that followed, Turkish RAF ARC Aii Mustafa Ekmedji was killed by 
Greek rioters, five Greeks were seriously injured and a Greek was killed by the 
security forces.^ After an EOKA bomb explosion in Ktima on 27 May, the 
death of Turkish ARC Ahmet Mouila Hussein lead to more clashes. The 
following day, the funeral of Turkish policeman Irfan All, who died from wounds 
sustained from an EOKA bomb, turned into an attack of fanatic Turks and 
ARC'S against a Greek factory, causing the death of one Greek, Christos 
Saiides, and the injury of twenty others.” ® On 29 May, two Greeks, Rieris 
Ranteli and Costas Michael, were murdered in an ambush outside Nicosia.
The explosive inter-communal strife in May eventually ended with the 
implant of the first seeds of segregation between the two communities. The 
erection of a temporary barbed wire fence between the two quarters of the old 
city of Nicosia, by the British Army, -  the Mason-Dixon was not only a
bitter necessity for the protection of life and property, but a sign of geographical 
partition and the prelude to the imposition of the infamous Green Line in 
December 1963 and of the Attila Line in August 1974.
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Despite the violent attacks against Cypriot Greek property and the killing 
of innocent Greeks by VOLKAN and infuriated Turkish mobs, EOKA continued 
undeterred its anti-colonial campaign and its attacks against the security forces 
“  including Turkish and Greek policemen -  without following the VOLKAN 
practise, to retaliate against innocent members of the minority. The pattern of 
killing Turkish policemen by EOKA and of innocent Greek civilians by Turkish 
policemen, inexplicably continued until the summer of 1958.
In the middle of August 1957, Digenis -  alarmed by the murders of 
innocent Greeks by Turkish policemen, the catastrophic action of the Turkish 
mobs, the provocative agitation of VOLKAN, and the increasing ‘Anglo-Turkish 
collaboration’ -  realizing his deep responsibilities and the possibility of ‘the 
slaughter by the Turkish mob’"® started, for the very first time, to consider the 
introduction of defensive measures against the Turkish threat."® After careful 
consideration of the two-fronted situation, he developed a defensive conception 
that revolved around the following three elements. The already existing -  anti- 
coionial -  combat groups of EOKA would not participate in the defence against 
Turkish at tacks.Secondly,  special independent combat groups would form, 
with the mission of reacting against Turkish attacks on Greek neighborhoods 
and quarters. For this purpose, he issued directives to the sector command 
leaders for the preparation of Plan T-P [Plan for Turks in the towns] and Pian 
T-X [Plan for Turks in the villages] for each sector. Thirdly, the Greek civilian 
population would undertake various passive self-defensive measures for the 
protection of Greek property and life, such as night-watch guards by 
shopkeepers, neighborhood protection groups in towns, and surveillance 
groups in villages; for this reason Grivas issued Instructions for Village Defense 
against Turkish Attacks^^^ -  a special directive regarding the organization of
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armed and passive defense in villages -  as well as Genera! Instructions for the 
Self-defense of the Greek Population against Turkish Attacks in the cities/^®
Later, in December 1957, Grivas ordered the sector commands to 
prepare reports about the conclusions derived from Turkish attacks against 
Greek property and life, and special assessments about the possible methods 
and future Turkish plans against the Greek population in each sector. His 
intention was to make operational alterations to the already existing Pian T-Ps 
and Pian T-X's. He also issued a special order to encourage the Greeks living 
or working near the Turkish quarters, indicating the importance of self-defense 
for the protection of Greek property and life against Turkish a t t a c k s . O n  16 
January 1958, the growing threat of Turkish attacks forced Digenis to issue an 
order authorizing the sector commands to be on alert for the immediate 
implementation of the Plan T-Ps and Plan T-Xs without further order.
VOLKAN continued its underground operation, but it appeared that the 
threats in its proclamations, the demonstrations it initiated, and the uninhibited 
action of the Turkish auxiliaries supporting it, could not meet the expectations 
of the nationalist circles in the minority. The heat of the volcano that gradually 
turned VOLKAN into the organization of Var Olmak Lazlmsa Kan Akitmamak 
Niye [If we have to exist why not spill b lood] ,proved inadequate to become 
an effective counter-force against EOKA. The Turks, in their desperation and 
thirst for protection against Greek ambitions, ‘tried to trust the organization, but 
soon realized that it was unable to provide what the Turks of Cyprus were 
expecting ... it was working for its own advantage and not the national interests 
of the community. The people had expectations which at the end remained 
unfulfilled.
Grivas, Guerilla Warfare, pp. 97-98.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 211-212.
2^5 Ibid., p. 223.
Interview of Mehmet Ali Tremeseil to Neiman Gahit, in Ortam, (20 -  28 Aprii, 1992), 22 April 
1992, p. 7.
Personal interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006.
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Other peripheral underground groups, 9 Eyiul Cephesi, and Kara Cete
The dynamic progression of the Greek anti-colonial campaign and the 
casualties among Turks had caused great anxiety to the minority of the island, 
both for the personal safety of its members and the future of the community 
under Enosis. Although EOKA had never intended or planned to strike against 
the Turkish community, Mehmet Ali Tremeseli, the leader of a strong peripheral 
underground movement, remarked that ‘the armed uprising started from the 
villages and not the center ... since it was the Turks in the mixed villages that 
felt the dangerV^® By 1956, when the attacks of EOKA against Turkish 
policemen remained unanswered by VOLKAN, other local organizations started 
to germinate in the periphery. But since there was no central command for their 
co-ordination, each group operated on its own initiative.
One of the most powerful of these underground movements, having 
probably more arms than VOLKAN, consisting of about fifty armed men in six 
self-formed combat groups, emerged in the Spring of 1956 under the control of 
Tremeseli, in six Turkish and mixed villages, not far from the capital. A thirteen- 
member group under Tremeseli began operating in the mixed village of 
Tremetousia, while other groups were formed in the neighbouring villages: 
Arsos, six members under Mehmet Kucuk; Melousia, eight members under 
Mehmet Kondoz; Agia, 12 members under Ahmet Yaman; Petrophani, four 
members under Ali Riza Veil; Pyrol, six members under Hasan Skordo.^ ®®
The members of the groups were armed with personal handguns which they 
secretly bought with their own m o n e y , t h a t  were also used ‘to avoid being 
caught sleeping’ by local EOKA groups, the moves and activities of which were 
constantly under surveillance by the Turkish groups.
Mehmet Ali Tremeseli In Ortam, 22 April 1992, p. 7. 
Personal interview with A.A., 18 March 2006. 
Tremeseli, Ayios Sipiridon, pp. 101-103.
Mehmet Ali Tremeseli in Ortam, 23 April 1992, p. 7. 
Personal interview with A.A., 23 March 2006.
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In 1956, the effort of the Tremeseli groups to buy water-pipe bombs from 
VOLKAN almost ended in bloodshed. Raising fifty pounds among the poor 
Turkish villagers for the purchase of bombs -  for five pounds each -  from 
VOLKAN, turned bitter when Selcuk and Mison sent, through a Turkish 
policeman, five black gun powder-filled bombs which, when tested, proved to 
be completely ineffective. The demand for the return of the money -  which 
were already lost in gambling -  brought the immediate reaction of Mison who 
was sent to execute Tremeseli; coincidentally, he was away from the village at 
that night and the attempt failed.^ ®® This incident terminated the effort of the 
group to approximate itself to VOLKAN, and inspired the production, with the 
help of Ahmet Omer, of their own TNT-filled water-pipe bombs at a cost of one 
to two pounds each.^ ®"^
EOKA identified the movements of Tremeseli and made its first 
unsuccessful attempt against his life in 1957. By the summer of 1958, the 
Tremeseli groups were fully engaged in the merciless inter-communal 
confrontation between EOKA and Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (TMT) [Turkish 
Resistance Organization], and the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians 
from both communities, operating in their area, but also in Nicosia, with other 
TMT groups. Greek Orthodox monk Nectarios and nun Agathoniki, who were 
shot outside the Metamorphosis Monastery at Avdeliero on 10 July 1958, and 
three young alleged EOKA members, Anastasis Michael, Christofis Panayides, 
and Georgios Georgiou, who were shot and stabbed near Tremetousia on 2 
August 1958, were among the fatalities in the operational zone of the Tremeseli 
groups.^ ®®
Another independent underground group was the Ayse Hanim [Lady 
Ayse] in the Paphos district, consisting of five to six members under the 
leadership of brothers, Halil and Kamil; their fate turned out almost fatal. Even 
though the group was invited to Nicosia by Rauf Denktash, who arranged for
Personal interview with A.A., 18 March 2006. 
Mehmet Ali Tremeseli in Ortam, 24 April 1992, p. 7. 
Tremeseli, Ayios Sipiridon, pp. 192-195.
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their settlement in the capital, later, three of its members were shot and 
wounded by TMT, in broad daylight, in the Nicosia municipal market. The three 
injured victims urgently left Cyprus for the United Kingdom. There are two 
possible explanations given for the incident. Rauf Denktash asserts that the 
group was invited to Nicosia by the new TMT leader Lieutenant Colonel Riza 
Vurushkan; their execution was ordered by Vurushkan when Denktash was 
away in Ankara, as there were suspicions that they were informing the British 
intelligence both about EOKA and Turkish activities.^®® According to another 
explanation, members of the group went to Turkey and brought arms, which 
they refused to surrender to TMT. Since TMT was an organization which 
enforced its will by force, its leadership did not hesitate to order the execution 
of the Ayse Hanim leadership, to safeguard its absolute monopoly in the 
underground life within the Turkish community.^®^
During the EOKA campaign, other Turkish underground armed groups 
were formed, operating independently in various areas of the island. One such 
group was established in Sakarya Famagusta by police officer Selcuk and his 
brother Fikri, well-known members of the Famagusta nightlife. Police officer 
Rasit of Agios Sozomenos organized his own independent groups in the towns 
of Nicosia and Famagusta as well as the villages of Vatyli and Agios 
Sozomenos. In the town of Paphos, the Cakirlar brothers formed their own 
underground group, while Husein and Ziya from Kantou village, well-known 
members of the Limassol nightlife, operated a strong group in Limassol and a 
smaller group in Kantou.^ ®®
The failure of VOLKAN to effectively react to the attacks of EOKA 
against Turkish members of the security forces, gradually diminished the hopes 
of the Turkish community, which realized that the organization was unable to 
offer protection and safeguard the new Turkish cause of Taksim [partition of the 
island between Greece and Turkey], formally introduced on 19 December 1956,
Rauf Denktash in Nezire Gurkan, ZIrvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi, p. 129. 
Personal interview with A.A., 16 May 2007.
Mehmet Ali Tremeseli in Ortam, 24 April 1992, p. 7.
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by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lenox-Boyd, where London 
recognized ‘that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population 
must include partition among the eventual options’.''®®
In the Summer of 1957, dissatisfied members of VOLKAN formed with 
the support of Dr Burhan Nalbantoglou -  later one of the TMT co-founders -  a 
new underground organization under the name 9 Eyiul Cephesi [9 September 
Front]. The choice of the specific date had a significant historical importance in 
Turkish conscience as a milestone of victory against the Greeks; on 9 
September 1570, the besieged city of Nicosia fell into the hands of Lala 
Mustafa Pasha, while on 9 September 1922 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk enXexed 
triumphantly in Smyrna during the Turkish War of Independence. The short life 
of the new organization -  its activity was limited to a few bomb explosions and 
the circulation of a few leaflets -  was cut off when a tragedy blew its leading 
nucleus apart. On the night of 31 August 1957, a mysterious bomb explosion in 
an Omorphita house caused the fatal wounding of four of its members; Ismael 
Bayogolou, Kubaiay Altayli, Mustafa Ertam Djalal, including its leader Ulus 
Uifet."® During the same period, a leaflet distributed in Nicosia, signed by 9 
Eyiul Cephesi, threatened to destroy Ledra Street -  the most commercial Greek 
road of the capital -  on 9 September 1957, the Turkish national day."^ Taking 
into consideration the catastrophic strength of the Omorphita bomb, as well as 
the material found by the police in the house of the explosion -  sixteen water- 
pipe bombs, bags of gunpowder, fuses and detonators -  it appeared that the 
execution of the threat by the organization was quite possible.
The circumstances under which the explosion occurred were never 
clarified, but a series of indications around 9 Eyiui Cephesi raised questions 
whether the incident was accidental, given that its leader Ulus Ulfet, a 
university student in Ankara, at some time served the British administration as 
an auxiliary policeman in the Special Branch, the intelligence section of the
House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates Vol. 562, col. 1268.
Times of Cyprus, 2 September 1957, p. 1.
Times of Cyprus, 4 September 1957, p. 1.
66
Cyprus Police."® Kemal Tanrisevdi -  another TMT co-founder -  asserted that 
Ulus Ulfet was probably a British agent,"® and remarked that Ulfet had political 
ambitions and wanted to prove himself by making bombs. Tanrisevdi revealed 
that on that night he was himself invited, but learned about the explosion when 
he was in Paphos."'' Writer Arif Hasan Tahsin remarked that all the allegations 
against Ulus Ulfet were meant to diminish the importance of 9 Eyiul Cephesi, 
an underground organization that was established before TMT."® Researcher 
Dr Ahmet An also questions whether the tragic explosion of 31 August was an 
accident, and remarks that 9 Eyiul Cephesi was a progressive underground 
group, rather anti-British and probably left-oriented."® These inclinations of the 
organization might have alarmed the nationalist circles of the minority; 
whatever the real circumstances were, the new organization, accidentally or 
intentionally, crushed before it commenced its underground operation.
One of the very few known proclamations of 9 Eyiul Cephesi released 
after the tragic explosion, on 29 September 1957, signed by S.B. on behalf of 
the organization, referred in mild language -  contrary to the nationalistic 
language of the VOLKAN leaflets and the inflammable content of the TMT 
proclamations -  to general issues concerning the organization and the Turks of 
Cyprus, without announcing anything of importance. It was mentioned that the 
organization was formed out of the bagrindan [bowels] of the Cypriot Turks. 
‘Coincidentally’, the same wording was used two months later in the first 
proclamation of TMT.
Another group that emerged in Nicosia during the period was Kara Cete 
[Black Gang]. Its members were young men of the Turkish underworld, closely
Personal interview with A.A., 16 May 2007.
Arif Hasan Tahsin in Avrupa, 6 February 2000, p. 7.
Kemal Tanrisevdi, discussion in BRT television station (1 August 1994), in Hasan Demirag, 
Kibrls, Onlar ve Biz: 1957 Yiiinda [Cyprus, us and them: Year 1957], (Nicosia: [n. pub.], 2000), 
p. 317.
Arif Hasan Tahsin in Avrupa, 6 February 2000, p. 7.
Personal interview with Dr Ahmet An, 21 April 2007.
Altay Sayil in Haikin Sesi, 18 June 1997, p. 4.
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connected with prostitution and the Nicosia nightlife, that wondered around the 
town riding on motorcycles under the leadership of Kambur Salahi, Kemal 
Sirrik, Gunay Bulli, Harbi, and Ozeragi."® Initially, the Turks of Cyprus thought 
that Kara Cete was protecting the national ambitions of the community, but 
then realized that they only worked for their personal interest. They acted on 
their own, without the knowledge of the Turkish leadership and did not hesitate 
to terrorize, abuse and beat innocent Turks. When EOKA began targeting 
Turkish policemen, Kara Cete found the opportunity to act indiscriminately 
against the Greeks, destroying property, looting shops, breaking into Greek 
property, and setting Greek premises on fire."® The gang was also 
systematically abusing and terrorizing left-wing Turks, while the progressive 
athletic and cultural club TEK became a permanent target.^ ®® On 7 June 1958, 
the opening day of the Turkish offensive, TMT informed the Turkish people that 
the ‘worthless band, who is uttering threats right and left, is robbing and 
defrauding people and is demanding money from everyone’ was watched 
closely by TMT. The proclamation warned the members of the gang, which 
were no more than ten, that unless they suspended their activities ‘which bring 
total harm to our cause’ they would be wiped out by the TMT ‘killer teams’.^ ®^
Rauf Denktash, critically analysing the operation of the Turkish 
underground organizations in Cyprus, remarked that VOLKAN was a ‘very 
amateurish organization’, while 9 Eyiul Cephesi and Kara Cete ‘led the situation 
into a stalemate due to the terrorism that they had started to exercise on the 
people’.^®® He observes that the actions of some individuals, in the name of 
various underground organizations, began damaging the Turkish cause; thus it 
was time to establish a new organization that would ‘bring the actions of 
underground organizations to a level that was in harmony with the national
Tremeseli, Ayios Sipiridon, pp. 116-118.
Personal Interview with Hasan Demirag, 5 September 2006. 
150 Personal Interview with Kiamil Tuncel, 25 February 2006. 
TMT proclamation, 7 June 1958, 236/58, CO 926/952, TNA. 
Personal Interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
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policy’. The new organization, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, ‘was established to 
dissolve this chaos’ and take charge of this ‘irresponsibility.^®®
Rauf Denktash in Gazioglu, Direnis Orgutlen] p. 2.
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Chapter IV
The critical emergence of Turk Mukavemet Teskilati 
and the Turkish offensive of Ta/rs/zn against Enosis
The preparatory period
The inability of VOLKAN to effectively deter EOKA attacks against Turkish 
policemen, the absence of a cohesive Cypriot Turk policy against Greek 
objectives, the fear that the Greeks would eventually impose their will on the 
British for self-determination and eventually Enosis, as well as the urgent need 
to implicate the direct involvement of Turkey in the protection of the minority 
and the defence of Cypriot Turk aspirations, led, in November 1957, former 
Crown counselor Rauf R. Denktash code-named^ Muiayim, medical doctor 
Burhan Nalbantoglu-A/az//??, and Turkish consular employee Kemai Tanrisevdi- 
Raci, to the decision of establishing a new underground armed organization 
under the name Turk Mukavement Teskiiati iJM l). The appearance of the new 
movement -  the name of which did not include the word Kibris [Cypriot] -  was 
the offspring of continual night meetings in Tanrisevdi’s house and extensive 
discussions, between the three co-founders,® until morning hours.®
Initially, Nalbantoglu and Tanrisevdi thought of forming an organization 
under Cypriot Turk control without involving Turkey, and of collecting money 
from the local Turks for the purchase of arms. Denktash insisted that, in order 
for the new organization to be ‘effective’, Turkey should undertake the supply of 
arms and the financial support of the organization, as well as become involved
‘ The codenames are according to Kemal Tanrisevdi, in Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, p. 
38.
 ^Gazioglu, Direnis Orgutleri, pp. 6-7, 9-12.
 ^ Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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in the command and training of its men by Turkish Army officers." As he 
foresaw deep into the future, Denktash, from the very beginning, considered 
that TMT was ‘the armed wing of a national policy’;® he was certainly not 
referring to the trembling Cypriot Turk underground alchemies of the past, but 
to the new national policy of motherland Turkey and the aggressive policy of 
the emerging young Cypriot Turk leadership.
The murder of Special Branch Inspector Mustafa Ahmet Bayaz and the 
injury of his young fiancee Fatm a Hussein by EOKA, on 9 November 1957, 
culminated Turkish anger and became a catalyst for the formation of the new 
movement.® The decision of the three co-founders to send Nalbantoglu -  with 
the objective of requesting their, selective as was proven later, participation in 
TMT -  to the local VOLKAN leaders in all districts,^ was a wise move that 
prevented any opposition from them and initiated the gradual ‘transformation of 
VOLKAN into TMT.® In the first TMT proclamation of 27 November 1957, 
announcing the formation of the new organization and the dissolution of 
VOLKAN and 9 Eyiul Cephesi, the Central Committee -  initially consisting of 
the three co-founders -  assured that it was not an offensive organization and 
emphasised it mission: ‘the duty of defending the Cypriot Turks from the 
imperialist colonial administration as well as from the Cypriot Greek gangs that 
strive to achieve Enosis'.^ Strangely, the proclamation contained almost 
identical wording -  in its affirmation that the organization was formed out of the 
bagrindan [bowels] of the Cypriot Turks -  as the 9 Eyiul Cephesi leaflet.
Dr Kutchuk -  who was marginalized by the Central Committee because 
he allegedly did not have good relations with Nalbantoglu and would 
supposedly react negatively against a new organization -  was upset and
'* Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006; Gazioglu, Direnis Orgutleri, p. 8; 
Rauf Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi, p. 120.
 ^Rauf Denktash, ‘Not Defteri,1957’, in Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, p. 44.
 ^Rauf Denktash in Gazioglu, Direnis Orgutleri, p. 7.
’ Personal interview with Rauf R. Denktash, 22 August 2006.
® Rauf Denktash, ‘Not Defteri,1957’, in Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, p. 45.
 ^TMT proclamation, 27 November 1958, Ibid., pp. 39-40.
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suspicious; he perceived -  not erroneously -  that the dissolution of VOLKAN 
and the formation of TMT without his knowledge, was an intentional act against 
his leadership/® The suspicions of Dr Kutchuk were not unrealistic. Not long 
ago, Denktash had undertook, under obscure conditions," the presidency of 
Kibris Turk Kurumieri Federasyonu (KTKF), ostracizing Faiz Kaimak. But the 
maintenance of Dr Kutchuk in the leadership of the community and the 
presidency of the Kibris Turktur Partisi (KTP) [Cyprus is Turkish party] 
provided a perfect alibi for the covert agenda of Denktash, the role of whom 
proved instrumental in the derailment of Enosis kai Monon Enosis and the 
forceful imposition of Ya Taksim Ya Olum [Partition or Death], in the following 
year.
Although the life of TMT under Cypriot Turk control was quite short -  
from November 1957 to July 1958 -  its contribution to the almost terminal 
disruption of the anti-colonial struggle, was nevertheless extremely crucial.^® 
The selective recruitment of former VOLKAN members such as Kemal Mison, 
Yekta Remzl, Topal Mahmud (Buyuk) and Ismail Sadikoglu -  its two leaders 
Sakir Ozel and Hussein Selcuk were not invited -  in the following months," as 
well as of Turkish auxiliary and Mobiie Reserve police constables, members of 
other peripheral organizations such as Mehmet Ali Tremeseli, and new 
members such as strong-men Topal Mahmud (Kucuk), Alpay Mustapha,
"  Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006; Rauf Denktash, ‘Not Defteri 1957’, 
in Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, pp. 40-41.
"  Tahsin, Anodes, pp. 46-47.
loannides, Turkey’s Image, pp. 99-100; Bozkurt, 25 June 1955, p. 1.
There are tens of publications by Greek authors, mostly journalists, about the patriotic 
character of the EOKA struggle and the heroic self-sacrifice of some of its cadres, but almost 
none investigates the role of the Turkish underground armed movements and the impact of 
their action on the anti-colonial campaign; the mythological dimension of EOKA in Cypriot 
Greek conscience had erroneously diverted research away from this critical element.
"  Personal interview with A.A., 16 May 2007.
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Mehmet Kondoz and Unal Raif, had brought, in the summer of 1958, the 
manpower of the new organization to 200-300 men/®
TMT had neither the combat experience of EOKA nor an organized 
underground order of battle, composed of distinct combat groups. Its armory 
consisted of the personal revolvers and pistols of some of its members, and 
according to Denktash, of home-made hunting guns constructed from water- 
pipes.^® Despite Greek rumors for the secret importation of arms from abroad, 
TMT, with rare exceptions, did not posses the quantity or the quality of 
weapons in the EOKA armory, that included among others, Bren light machine 
guns, Sten, Sterling, Thomson, and MP 38/40 sub-machine guns, as well as 
Lee-Enfieid No. 4 rifles.^® Its underground actions were carried out by an inner 
circle of tough, hard-line men, and Turkish policemen that were using their 
police identity to operate undisturbed, even under curfew.^® Many Mobile 
Reserve members actively involved in TMT operations, in addition to their 
service arms, possessed and used in underground activities their own personal 
hand-guns.®®
Analysis of its operations reveals that the tactical success of TMT -  and 
the consequent strategic implications of its underground action on the anti- 
colonial struggle of EOKA and the Cypriot Greek objective of Enosis -  derived 
from the following factors: The pre-determined and methodological directives
Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006. The assessment of the colonial 
administration about TMT membership referred to 300 members throughout the island; Foot to 
Colonial Office, No. 1116, 16 July 1958, Top Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.
"  Rauf Denktash In Kasimoglu, Eski Gunter, p. 81 ; Milli Mucadele Mwzes/[National struggle 
museum] arms collection, Nicosia.
"  Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, pp. 118-119.
Mouseio Agonos EOKA 1955-1959 (W\AE) arms collection, Nicosia.
"  Anglotourklkl Synergasia [British-Turkish cooperation], EOKA proclamation, (June 1958), 
MAE; Anglotourkiki Engtimatiki Synergasia [Criminal British-Turkish cooperation], EOKA 
proclamation, (July 1958), MAE; Deftion Angiotourkikis Synergasias [Report of British-Turkish 
cooperation], EOKA proclamation, (July 1958), MAE.
interview of gunsmith Omer Akay in Olay {22 January 1979), in Public Information Office, 
Turkey’s Expansionist Designs on Cyprus: The Role of TMT (Nicosia: PIO, 1979), pp. 7-8.
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and the nothing-to-lose aggressive orders of the TMT leadership, and 
particularly of Rauf Denktash, whose role proved pivotal; the dedication of its 
members to Impose forcefully, at any cost, the hard-line policy of the TMT 
leadership against Greek soft targets, mostly innocent unarmed civilians; the 
pro-Turk tolerance and anti-Greek discrimination of the colonial administration 
and its security forces; and the void in the tactical operation of EOKA, that 
focused its underground action against the colonial administration avoiding -  
until the summer of 1958 -  to take retaliatory action against Turkish civilians.
The nine-month life of TMT under Cypriot Turk control may be 
distinguished into four phases: the preparatory stage (end of November 1957- 
early January 1958), the anti-British demonstrations for Taksim in January 
1958, the establishment of control within the community (February-May 1958) 
culminating to the anti-communist campaign in May, and the Taksim offensive 
against the Greek community between 7 June and 5 August 1958.
On 13 December 1957, the second TMT proclamation of the 
‘preparatory stage', addressed to the Turkish villagers, clarified the intentions of 
the Central Committee and began to prepare the ground for action. The leaflet, 
by exaggerating previous inter-communal clashes and manipulating fake 
incidents such as alleged attacks against Turkish schools and mosques, rapes, 
and kidnappings, skillfully cultivated anti-Greek fanaticism and encouraged the 
rise of nationalism for the defence of ‘the soil that was soaked by your fathers' 
blood’; it gave directions for the immediate formation of defensive armed 
groups in villages, warning that traitors would be executed.®  ^ On 20 December 
1957, the TMT Central Committee, analysing the British foreign policy over 
Cyprus, expressed its deep concern for a possible colonial compromise over 
Greek demands for Enosis. It clearly stated that the Cyprus Issue was not a 
local affair but one involving twenty-six millions of Turks, and that Taksim 
sedece Taksim [Partition and only partition] was the sole political principle 
acceptable by the Cypriot Turks.®® Careful examination of its content allows the
TMT proclamation in Demirag, Kibris, pp. 370-371 ; Hursoz, 18 December 1957, p. 1. 
Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, pp. 71-74.
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extraction -  at a very early stage, only three weeks after the appearance of the 
organization -  of TMT strategic objectives: to prove ~ to the British -  that the 
Turks of Cyprus would never accept Enosis or any concessions to the Greeks; 
to declare that Taksim was the only acceptable political solution; and to attract 
the attention and convince the Turkish Government®® that the Cyprus issue was 
a national affair of the motherland and not a foreign local dispute.
After a mutual arrangement between Denktash and Kutchuk, in a 
meeting in Ankara with Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu on 2 January 1958, 
Denktash informed Zorlu about the formation of TMT and directly asked for the 
support of the Turkish Government, requesting ‘experts to organize it properly 
and also arms'.®" Zorlu expressed an interest on the issue, but on the question 
whether the organization could receive arms safely, Kutchuk -  contrary to 
Denktash’s positive reply -  remarked that he was not sure.®® Denktash 
returned to Cyprus while Kutchuk remained in Turkey for further consultations; 
according to Denktash ‘that comment of Dr Kutchuk delayed our work, the 
sending of experts and later of arms, by about nine months’.®®
The anti-British demonstrations for Taksim
His return to Cyprus signaled -  not coincidentally in Dr Kutchuk’s absence -  a 
series of anti-British demonstrations which were of tremendous importance, 
both, for Cypriot Turk claims and the colonial attitude towards the minority. 
According to Denktash, past experience had revealed that the British rulers ‘did 
not seriously consider an ineffective, unarmed organization without political 
directives’.®^ Denktash, fearing a possible British concession over Cyprus -  
‘self-determination was going to be implemented within, first fifteen years, then
Kemai Tanrisevdi, discussion in BRT television station (1 August 1994), in Demirag, Kibris, p. 
317.
Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
Rauf Denktash in Kasimoglu, Eski Gunter, p. 79.
Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
Rauf Denktash, ‘Not Defteri, 1958’, in Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskiiati, p. 21.
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ten years, then seven years’ -  ‘realized that we are going to lose’; ‘that Britain 
was going to play this role, trying to protect the minority but give Cyprus to 
Greece’.®® Thus it was time for TMT action. At this stage, the community had to 
make sacrifices to prove, to all interested parties, that the Cypriot Turks had 
autonomous political aims, and also to lever pressure on Turkey, after the 
failure to attract its immediate support in the Zorlu meeting.
The misinformation campaign and the ‘political smoke screen by 
Kutchuk’ started in December 1957 when he and his colleagues ‘recounted 
many tales of the hazard to Turks in mixed villages’, which at the end, had 
‘been checked and found to be mainly distortion of facts’. In Ankara, Kutchuk 
continued his provocative statements about alleged threats for the massacre of 
the Turks, openly declaring ‘that further co-existence is impossible and partition 
is the only remedy’.®® On 21 January, a Turkish demonstration in Nicosia, 
caused allegedly by EOKA slogans on the Turkish Lycee, peculiarly ended up 
with strong anti-British -  instead of anti-Greek -  demonstrations against 
Governor Hugh Foot and in favor of Taksim, as well as clashes, for the very 
first time, with the security forces.®® On the following day, the British Embassy 
in Ankara reported that ‘these were part of the recent campaign to increase 
excitement among the Turkish community’ and prophetically foresaw that ‘they 
might lead to more serious demonstrations to coincide with the Secretary of 
State’s visit to Ankara’.®^ Dr Kutchuk, continuing his ‘inflammatory statements’,®® 
blamed, for the incidents, the Greek Cypriots and ‘the mistaken policy’ of ‘Sir 
Hugh Foot’s lack of control and partiality’.®® On 25 January, a pro-Taksim 
demonstration in Limassol, timed to coincide with the opening of informal 
discussions in Ankara between Foreign Secretary Selwyn Loyd and the Turkish 
Government over the Cyprus question, after heavy stoning of the security
Personal interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
O.A.G. (Cyprus) to Colonial Office, No. 23, 6 January 1958, Secret, FO 371/136279, TNA. 
Cyprus Mail, 22 January 1958, p. 1.
Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 130, 22 January 1958, Confidential, FO 371/136279, TNA. 
ibid., TNA.
Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 133, 23 January 1958, FO 371/136279, TNA.
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forces and the Mobile Reserve itself, was broken up by tear gas and ended 
with two rioters and ten Turkish policemen injured.®"
The sudden and mysterious anti-British feeling of the minority -  the 
initially softer, less aggressive approach of Governor Foot towards the anti- 
colonial campaign and the release of a few Greek detainees (as a political 
gesture of goodwill) raised Turkish fears for a pro-Greek discrimination -  ‘the 
extreme course on which the Turks now seem to be embarked',®® culminated 
on the birthday of Denktash on 27 January 1958, when Bozkurt in a 
provocative headline announced that Ingiltere Taksimi Kabul Etti [Britain 
Accepted Taksim].^^ The absence of Dr Kutchuk to hold back the crowds, the 
presence of Denktash in the streets, allegedly trying to pacify the 
demonstrators,®^ and the unfounded -  as was proven -  headline of Bozkurt on 
Denktash’s birthday, were accidental coincidences, where simply the ‘savagery 
of the rioting’ turned the pro-Tax/m demonstrations to ‘the fiercest anti-British 
outbreak ever by the Turkish minority’. The Turkish riots in Nicosia, under a 
heavy barrage of stones, bottles and bricks against the British Army and the 
Turkish policemen, ended up with two Turks fatally wounded by a military Land- 
Rover heavily stoned by angry crowds, four others seriously wounded, while 
another fifty were treated for injuries; twenty-eight policemen, twelve soldiers 
and fourteen firemen were injured.®® The following day, the continuation of 
violent riots in all major Turkish quarters of towns, ended with two Turks shot 
dead in Famagusta and another three shot dead in Nicosia by the British 
Army.®®
A series of critical questions arose regarding these sudden events. How 
accidental or spontaneous were the Turkish riots? How coincidental was their 
timing only sixty days after the formation of TMT? Tanrisevdi admitted that the
"  Cyprus Mail, 26 January 1958, p. 1.
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demonstrations were organized by TMT,"® whiie Denktash contradicted 
Tanrisevdi’s statement and remarked that the Turkish resistance against the 
British forces began and developed as a people’s movement; It was 
spontaneous, it was not planned’ and ‘we were not prepared for it’."^  As for their 
objective, the words of Denktash are revealing: ‘These dead are useful to us. 
With these we will make our voice to be heard in the world’."® ‘Now the world 
will understand what we are trying to defend’."® Researcher Arif Hasan Tahsin 
remarks that the events were precipitated by Denktash since ‘in such a struggle 
you can not win without the pouring of blood ... it was impossible to achieve a 
result just with words’."" Denktash, analysing the impact of the demonstrations 
remarked that ‘the 27-28 January incidents, indicated to the British that the 
Turks are claiming rights as well in Cyprus and that they can resist even 
without Turkey’."®
The exercise of control over the community and the anti-communist 
campaign
The third phase of TMT operation, between February and May 1958, revolved 
around two main objectives. Realizing the importance of discipline and 
cohesiveness, the Central Committee decided to exercise full control over the 
internal affairs of the minority, either by earning the respect and trust of the 
people or by imposing forcefully its will and its national directives on the 
community. The period provided also the opportunity for the psychological 
preparation of the Cypriot Turks, and the strengthening of nationalist feelings, 
before the opening of the summer TMT offensive.
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in May 1958, the decisiveness of the Central Committee to impose strict 
discipline to TMT objectives, culminated against progressive and leftist Cypriot 
Turks. The massive 1 May parade organized by communist party AKEL, where 
hundreds of Greek and Turk workers -  in an effort to ‘prove to the people of 
Cyprus that the Turks and the Greeks could live together’"® -  marched in 
Nicosia holding Greek and Turkish flags, attracted the immediate attention of 
right-wing TMT. Denktash, perceived the strong participation of Turks in the 
parade as a threat ‘not necessarily to TMT but to the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership’ and assumes that ‘that may have been the reason that triggered the 
executions’ of leftists Turks."^ On the same night, TMT members broke into the 
premises of the progressive Turkish Cypriot athletic and cultural association 
Turk Egitim Klubu (TEK) [Turkish cultural association] in Nicosia, and destroyed 
all the furniture, setting the building on fire."®
The Central Committee of TMT -  in reality Rauf Denktash, since 
Tanrisevdi was abruptly transferred to Teheran on May 1958 while Nalbantoglu 
was sent, in the summer of 1958, to Turkey in order to avoid his arrest by the 
colonial regime as well as friction with Kutchuk"® -  by manipulating in its 
proclamations anti-Greek hatred and anti-British feelings, intensified the 
psychological preparation of the minority for dynamic action. On 5 May 1958, a 
TMT leaflet accusing Governor ‘Foot, the enemy of the Turks’ as serving Greek 
ambitions, ridiculed the Greek organization as ‘the EOKA comedy’ and 
provoked Turkish feelings, that under a self-governing regime ‘the Turks would 
either have to leave the island or they would completely annihilated’. The 
proclamation warned that if any attempt was made to force a settlement other 
than Taksim, then ‘it would not be necessary to wait for an order to go into
Personal interview with Kiamil Tuncel, 25 February 2006.
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general action’, and stated that ‘a separate order will be given as regards 
killings’.®®
On 8 May, TMT circulated an inflammatory leaflet that advised ‘the 
killers’ of EOKA, the ‘minister of slaves’ Lennox-Boyd, and Greece, ‘the illegal 
child of England’, to consent immediately to the partition of the island. The 
proclamation declared that ‘the Turks of Cyprus are a volcano, and nobody can 
play with them’, and threatened that it will erupt and ‘the island will turn into a 
field of violent conflict, unprecedented in history’; it concluded with the phrases 
Ya Taksim Ya Olum [Taxim or Death] and Ne Muitu Turku Diyene [How Happy 
is the one who says he is a Turk].®^  On 11 May, a TMT leaflet announced the 
imposition of drastic passive resistance measures -  the avoidance of 
commercial dealings with the Greeks, the prohibition of entertainment in Greek 
bars and cabarets, the deletion of Greek and English street names in the 
Turkish quarters, as well as the compulsory use, within fifteen days, of the 
Turkish language on ail Turkish shop names and trade signs -  and gave an 
austere warning that the organization’s ‘special teams’ would continue their 
‘control activities’ for the strict implementation of the measures within the 
community. It also warned that ‘drastic measures will be mercilessly taken 
against anyone’ who acted or spoke against TMT.®®
On 19 May, the Central Committee referred to the martyrdom of 
Anatolia’s War of Independence which ‘was fought with sticks and axes’ and 
informed the community that ‘the hour of the declaration of self-government will 
be the day of general action and uprising’, and that ‘the Turkish Resistance 
Organization VOLKAN will be the main target’.®® The strange reference to 
VOLKAN, almost six months after the first TMT proclamation that announced 
its dissolve, might have not been coincidental. On one hand, it created 
confusion to EOKA and the colonial administration regarding the operation of
TMT proclamation, 5 May 1958, 173/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
TMT proclamation, 8 May 1958, in Akkurt, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, pp. 189-191. 
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Turkish underground movements, and on the other, it prepared the ground, 
within the Turkish community, for underground acts the responsibility of which 
would not damage TMT image.
Meanwhile, the strict directives of the organization had not excluded the 
progressive Cypriot Turks -  leading members of TEK or the Turkish office of 
the Greek leftist worker’s union PEO, who refused to adopt the nationalist Ya 
Taksim Ya Olum -  that, after the 1 May parade, were labeled as ‘the nation’s 
mean traitors’.®® The harassment of progressive or leftist Turks by TMT during 
the following weeks ranged from intimidation, to threatening and beating, 
culminating into murder.®® The first victim of TMT was trade union ieader Ahmet 
Sadi -  former editor of banned Turkish progressive newspaper Emekdji 
[Labourer] and director of the Turkish office of PEO -  and his wife, who were 
shot outside their house on 22 May 1958 and were seriously wounded;®^ they 
eventually escaped to England and never returned to Cyprus. The second 
victim was leftist, former editor-owner of banned Turkish newspaper inkiiapci 
[Reformist], Fazil Onder, shot and stabbed to death on 24 May 1958, in the 
center of Nicosia.®® Another left-winger, Abdurahman Djemal, was shot and 
wounded by off-duty auxiliary policeman H.Y.®® near Famagusta Gate in 
Nicosia on 27 May 1958.®° Kamil Tuncel, who had already an attempt against 
his iife,®^  was in a great dilemma: to save his life by renouncing publicly his 
membership in the Greek trade union PEO or escape to England without 
abandoning his political beliefs.®® Inspired by Niazi Hikmet’s poem ‘against the
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enmity of the enemy I will live for one more day’, he eventually decided to place 
a special declaration, on 25 May, in Haikin Sesi and Bozkurt newspapers, that 
‘as of today 1 quit from the Greek trade union, I have no relationship with them, 
and that I fully support the views of the Turkish community’.®®
The following day, TMT Issued a leaflet taking full responsibility for the 
actions against Ahmet Sadi and Fazii Onder. The proclamation in extremely 
harsh wording stated that ‘TMT has passed into action’ against the 
‘degenerates’ who received their ‘merited death penalty’, and warned their 
comrades that their punishment ‘will be a bullet fired into their brains’. The 
Central Committee announced that the lives of those who publicly clarified their 
position in Turkish newspapers and ‘genuinely purged their souls of communist 
poison have been spared for the present’, but warned that ‘our kiiler teams’ 
were closely watching and shadowing the national traitors.®" Under death 
threats from TMT, a great number of leftist Cypriot Turks were obliged to 
declare publicly in paid Aciklama [declaration], in the two Turkish newspapers 
Haikin Sesi and B o z k u rt,their devotion to the Cypriot Turk cause of Taxim, by 
renouncing their loyalty to the Cypriot Greek worker’s union PEO. The fate of 
another victim, Ahmet Yahya, was ironically predestined on the morning hours 
of 30 May 1958. Despite his declaration in Bozkurt that ‘I was never inclined 
towards the Left’ and ‘I state that I always obeyed and I will follow the path 
inscribed by our leaders’,®® on the same day Haikin Sesi reported his 
execution.®^ On the following day, a TMT leaflet announced that ‘another traitor 
[Ahmet Yahya], who is not a genuine Turk, has been eliminated by our killer 
teams’ and gave a last warning:
We have given the necessary instructions to our Killer Teams to suspend actions till 
the 10th June 1958. Aii persons whom we have listed as traitors should take the
Bozkurt, 25 May 1958, p. 4.
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necessary steps, during this ten-day respite, to convince the community that they have 
changed heart and are with ws.®®
in spite of its announcement, the murder campaign of TMT continued on 5 
June with the murder attempt against PEO member Hasan Aii, followed by the 
murder of Ahmet Ibrahim in Limassol on 30 June 1958 -  for having friendly 
relations with the Greeks -  and the murder attempt against Arif Hulusi Barudi 
on 3 July 1958, for continuing to work in a Greek-owned business after 
receiving a warning letter to abandon his occupation.®®
Rauf Denktash, defending the ‘dark days’ of his community, declares 
that ‘TMT or my group never acknowledged it as their thing. It is for us a 
question mark. Was VOLKAN still active, in spite of us, or people taken into 
TMT who did it?’^ ° Denktash’s effort to shift the responsibility to others, such as 
former VOLKAN members in or outside TMT, is understandable, particularly 
when he admits that ‘our complaint about [Turk] leftists was that they failed to 
understand that AKEL Cypriotism was based on the Hellenization of Cyprus’." 
Despite his effort to protect the organization, it is revealed that important TMT 
orders were passed from Denktash to the intermediary I.S. who was 
responsible for transferring the directives to the proper channels -  strong-men 
-  for the execution of the operations.^® A.A. remarks that ‘Denktash never 
touched the fire with his bare hands; he always touched the fire with tongs’^ ® 
TMT survivor, leftist Kamil Tuncel, later discovered that it was the men of TMT 
stong-man Topal Mahmut Colak that attempted to execute him.^"
By the end of May 1958 it was obvious that important events were 
accumulating under the summer Cypriot clouds. A leaflet by the TMT Youth
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Branch recovered in Nicosia on 27 May, invited the Turkish youth of Cyprus 
into duty ‘to save Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic’, and 
emphasized the need to prepare for conditions which ‘may be very 
unfavourable’/^ A TMT leaflet -  responding to the EOKA proclamation headed 
‘Boyd is pouring oil over the fire’ -  accused, on 28 May, the ‘Secretary of State 
for Slaveries’ and declared that EOKA was ‘in a ridiculous state of crisis’. In 
highly inflammatory language the Political Committee -  instead of Central 
Committee -  warned EOKA and the Greeks of Cyprus, ‘these mentally 
unbalanced people’, that they will be treated ‘as they were treated in Smyrna ... 
thrown out into the sea ... buried in the waters of the Mediterranean’. 
Reaffirming ‘the national fury and the determination’ of the Turkish nation and 
the Cypriot Turks, it gave a raw warning:
Today the Turks of Cyprus are a volcano. No one can play with it. The slightest action, 
whether on the part of their English masters or themselves ... will be enough to set this 
volcano ablaze. It would happen in a matter of seconds. In such an event the island 
will become the scene of a conflict never recorded in history before.^^
The TMT offensive against the Greek population: versus Enosis
Day after day, the content of TMT proclamations became more provocative and 
harsh; the stormy clouds were approaching the island, while the unsuspected 
Greeks and EOKA were blindly preoccupied in their anti-colonial struggle. The 
apocalyptic TMT leaflet of 7 June, distributed in Nicosia, informed the Turks of 
the island that ‘we are getting ready for our freedom which is expected to begin 
at any moment’ with the aim of Ya Taksim Ya Olum. The leaflet warned ‘the 
traitors who are out to exploit the situation and besmirch the name of the 
organization’ asking for money, that its ‘killer teams’ would take necessary 
action.Sim ilarly, another TMT leaflet distributed in Larnaca on the same day, 
reaffirmed that ‘our control of the market continues’ and warned those sending
TMT proclamation, 28 May 1958, 218/58, CO 926/952, TNA. 
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threatening letters, ‘making use of the organizations’s signature’, that they ‘will 
be shot at once’. Addressing the Turkish youth, the Central Committee declared 
that ‘the day is near when you will be called upon to sacrifice your life and 
blood in the Taksim struggle -  the struggle for freedom’.^ ^
The consistency of Turkish underground methodology was impressive. 
The excuse for the eruption of the Cypriot Turk ‘volcano’ against the Greek 
population appeared on the same night, when an obscure bomb explosion -  
similar to the one that exploded at Attaturk’s house in Salonica in September 
1955 -  at the information office of the Turkish Consulate in Nicosia, triggered 
an explosive wave of violence against Greek life and property, that lasted for 
sixty days. Denktash, without admitting any involvement to the incident, asserts 
that, years later, he learned that the provocation was orchestrated by two 
individuals -  TMT member Hazim Remzi and Turkish employee at the building 
Dundar Arcayurek -  without the knowledge of the organization.^® But former 
leading TMT cadre Hasan Demi rag reveals that the order for the provocation, 
came to Ismail Sadikolglu through Hazim Remzi; Sadigoglu had disclosed that 
the order was directly given by Rauf Denktash. The manufacturing of the device 
was undertaken by Sadikoglu and Demirag, who was working at the time in the 
dry-cleaning business of Sadikoglu, while the actual throwing of the bomb 
against its Turkish target, was carried out by Demirag and Alpay Mustapha.®® A 
few days later the colonial administration, in a secret report to the Governor, 
revealed that ‘evidence suggests ... that the bomb was exploded by Turkish 
Cypriots as a pretext for attacks on Greek property’.®^
The destruction that followed the explosion at the information office was 
devastating, causing, according to the official colonial list, the death of 107
’®TMT proclamation, Larnaca, 7 June 1958, 237/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
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civilians -  56 Greeks and 51 Turks -  as well as 8 Turkish policemen.®^ The 
colonial fatality list demonstrates the different means of death and the 
magnitude of violence employed by each community. Out of 59 Turks killed by 
EOKA, between 7 June and 5 August 1958, 47 (79.7%) were shot with a gun, 
while 12 (20.3%) died from other causes. The corresponding data for the Greek 
victims was terrifying. Out of 56 fatal casualties, only 16 (28.6%) were shot; the 
other 40 (71.4%) were fatally wounded after they had been stabbed, butchered, 
or beaten to death. Five of the Greek victims -  Theocharis Panagi, 64, 
Charidimos Antoniou, 77, Panayiota Aristodemou, 70, Christos Costa, 75 and 
his wife Panayiota Kosta, 75 -  were beheaded, while Eleni Costa, 64, was 
mutilated, because she refused to obey the TMT order to abandon her house in 
the Turkish quarter of Nicosia; her husband Kostas Elia, 76, obeyed the order 
and survived.®®
Although the summer inter-communal conflict was skillfully presented as 
the spontaneous response of the Turks against a Greek ‘provocation’, the 
eruption of the Taksim offensive was preceded by a series of co-incidents. On 
23 May, Dr Kutchuk and Denktash departed for Ankara, according to Reuters, 
after a Turkish Government invitation for talks on the Cyprus affair and the 
British proposals that were planned to be announced on 17 June.®'^  On 27 
June, Dr Kutchuk’s Haikin Sesi announced in a provocative article that the 
Greeks would attack the Turks on 1 June and that ‘an order was given to raise 
Greek flags outside their houses’. The newspaper concluded that ‘the Turks are 
fearless and each one is able to confront fifty Greeks', and prophetically 
warned that ‘we will respond with terrible reprisals against the Greeks if they 
attack us’.®® In a joint statement from Ankara, Dr Kutchuk and Denktash 
asserted that the two communities could not live together and that ‘in any
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moment one community may attack against the other’. Dr Kutchuk boasted that 
‘the Turkish community will demonstrate what may be done with arms or 
without arms. We will die but we will not become prisoners. Partition or 
Death’.®® A few weeks after the outbreak of the TMT offensive, the leading war 
historian Capt. Cyril Falls, accused Turkey of ‘incitement to violence’. Dr 
Kutchuk and Denktash, said Falls, had meetings with the Turkish President and 
the Foreign Minister (26 May), and held discussions with the Defence and 
Press Ministers (29 May) in Ankara. On 3 June, at the invitation of Prime 
Minister Menderes they arrived in Istanbul, and on that day the Turkish council 
of ministers had a Cyprus meeting that lasted for six hours; later the two 
Cypriot Turks were received by premier Menderes.®^ Eventually, on 6 June, 
Rauf Denktash returned to Cyprus; on the following day the Taksim offensive 
began.
The throwing of ‘the bomb’ by Demirag and Mustapha on the night of 7 
June, gave the signal for the eruption of a three-hour inferno of arson, bombing, 
shooting, stone-throwing, stubbing and beating. The invasion of furious Turkish 
crowds within Greek neighborhoods in Nicosia, caused the death of two 
innocent Greeks, the wounding of many others, and the destruction of 
extensive property, including the burning of Olympiakos Club.®® On the 
following day Turkish attacks in Larnaca caused the death of two more Greeks 
and the serious wounding of many others, while gradually the violent attacks 
spread on the whole island. The vandalism and destruction of Greek property in 
all towns, the looting of shops and the furious attacks against the Greeks 
continued uninhibited in the following days.®® TMT, unable to track down the 
Invisible underground EOKA network, turned its ferocity against innocent and 
unprotected civilians.
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On 12 June, the arrest, by the security forces, of a group of 35 villagers 
from Kontemenos, turned into a massacre, when, under obscure conditions, 
the Greek villagers intentionally released outside the Turkish village of Geunyeli 
were ordered to walk to their village which was 13.5 miles away. The 
suspicious interaction between the security forces and Turkish auxiliary 
policemen from Geunyeli, soon turned into a horrific attack of a crowd of Turks, 
lead by two motorcycles, that ended with the mutilation of eight Greeks -  shot 
and stubbed to death with multiple wounds -  and the serious wounding of 
many others. The Geunyeli Massacre '^^ shocked the Greek population. The 
vague official inquiry of the incident had found no responsibility to the security 
forces,®  ^ while the preliminary inquiry against twelve Turks -  including PC 
Yusuf Mevlet, Mobile Reserve PC Ozkan Hussein, and RAF APC Veli Ahmed 
Avdji -  identified by their victims, ended with the trial of nine of them, accused 
of the premeditated murder of the eight Greeks, and their eventual release; the 
case was considered closed, in what effectively amounted to a cover-up.®^
Uninhibited Turkish attacks continued during the whole month of June 
against anything that was Greek. Three Greek Orthodox churches -  Agios 
Lucas, Agios lakovos, and Agios Demetrianos -  in the Turkish quarter of 
Nicosia were no exception, all of which were broken into, looted, desecrated 
and finally burned.®® Hermes street, the most commercial road in Nicosia, was 
deserted because of the Turkish attacks, while the municipal market in the 
Turkish quarter of the town was forcefully occupied. Arson damaged the Pallas 
Cinema and the Ardath cigarette factory, in Nicosia, the Lanitis warehouses in 
Famagusta, while tens of Greek shops and houses were plundered and then 
burned. The fear exercised by TMT forced all Greeks and Armenians living in 
the Turkish quarter of Nicosia to abandon their houses which were immediately
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occupied by Turks. Violent attacks against the Greek neighborhoods of Agios 
Kassianos and Chrysaliniotissa and the suburb of Omorphita disrupted life and 
forced the Greek inhabitants to move away into safety.®'  ^ Despite the 
Governor's reassurances, many of the Greek houses were forcefully occupied 
by Turkish families. This human catastrophe unfolded in a Grown colony, the 
security forces of which remained indifferent, causing the strong reaction of the 
Greek population who accused the colonial administration of pro-Turk 
discrimination and demanded the immediate disbandment of the Mobile 
Reserve and the Auxiliary Police.®®
Grivas admited that EOKA was taken by surprise since it did not expect 
the Turkish attacks, and that was the reason that the special anti-Turkish 
groups of the Plan T-P in Nicosia were very late in their mobilization during the 
first days of the Taksim offensive.®® Despite his previous directives for the 
preparation of a self-defence mechanism, the TMT offensive found the Greek 
population completely unprepared. Immediately after the outbreak of violence, 
the Greek population -  in all towns and villages -  alerted by the danger of the 
Turkish attacks, started to organize community meetings in the village churches 
and the town halls, to elect special committees that were assigned the duty of 
organizing a local Poiitofyiaki[OW\\ guard].®  ^ Indicative of the complete absence 
of any self-defence mechanism is the fact that the community meetings were 
held publicly -  not in secrecy -  and the names of the committee members were 
often announced in the Greek press, which was reporting, day after day, the 
rapid spread of the civil guard teams. The committees included representatives 
from the leftist trade union PEO, the rightist trade union SEK, EAEM, and other 
public organizations. The Omades Aftoamynis [Self-defence groups] were
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composed of volunteers, Greek men aged eighteen to fifty, armed with wooden 
sticks and other improvised defensive weapons, that were assigned night guard 
duties in areas of danger such as the Archbishopric palace in Nicosia, Greek 
schools and churches near the Turkish quarters or neighborhoods, other 
important buildings, as well as Greek houses and shops
According to Grivas the Turkish attacks aimed at®® demonstrating that 
the co-existence between the Greeks and the Turks was impossible, at 
breaking the morale of the Greek population in order to enforce the 
unacceptable -  to the Cypriot Greeks -  MacMillan P/a/?,®® and at compelling 
EOKA to fight a two-fronted struggle against both the British and the Turks. 
Digenis acknowledging the grave danger of the Turkish offensive, was not 
carried away by the violence of events, causing the complaint of Archbishop 
Makarios that EOKA had not given a lesson to the T u r k s . I n  his 26 June 
austere reply to Makarios, Grivas indicated that ‘the British had set a trap so 
that I engage and reveal my forces, in order that they give me a fatal blow’.^ ®^ 
The inequality of the June fatal casualties -  sixteen Greek civilians (89%) 
against two Turk civilians (11%) and one Turkish policeman -  are indicative of 
Grivas's hesitation to enter hurriedly into counter-action.
The self-restraint of EOKA -  translated by TMT as a deficiency, an 
inability for reaction -  accompanied by the indifference of the security forces to 
restore order, strengthened TMT violence against the Greeks. A proclamation 
distributed in Nicosia two days after the outbreak of the offensive, threw 
provocatively the responsibility for the ‘most ferocious Greek acts of barbarism' 
to ‘these maddened Greek dogs’:
Boiling like a volcano ... to prevent the filthy Greek boot... have given to the perfidious 
Levantine English bastards ample proof of what the Turks are able of doing. We have 
avenged tenfold our few wounded brothers ... the number of Greeks shot and killed by
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 257. 
Cyprus Statement of Policy, Cmnd. 455.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 258.
Grivas letter to Makarios, 26 June 1958, in Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 259.
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our organization is very great ... our struggle for independence has commenced ... 
Partition or Death.
It was obvious that TMT, not only manipulated the pro-Turk tolerance of the 
colonial administration, but was completely indifferent to British objectives, 
pursuing its own strategy of provocation, violence, harassment, and death. On 
11 June, a TMT leaflet declared that ‘we, Turks, are resolved to die ... to defend 
to the last drop of our blood this heavenly fatherland, which our forefathers 
have left to us’. It concluded that ‘our decision is final. We shall convert Cyprus 
into a cemetary and the Mediterranean sea into a coffin for you and for your 
shameless English masters’.^®® Another leaflet circulated in Larnaca, advised 
the Turks to ‘keep in your houses such defensive objects as knives, axes, 
sledge hammers, pointed tools, large stones, boiling water, especially petrol’.
While, in its short life, TMT copied various of its operational and 
ideological conceptions from EOKA -  such as the passive resistance 
campaign, the anti-communist hatred, the imposition of its directives on the 
community, and the execution of alleged traitors -  there were also important 
cultural differences between them: EOKA never used in its proclamations such 
obscene language, against either the British or the Turks; until June 1958, 
EOKA never targeted Turkish civilians in its operations, the only exception were 
the Turkish members of the security forces, the strikes against whom were not 
racially motivated; the EOKA means of inflicting death against its opponents -  
British, Greek or Turk -  was always the handgun, the military rifle or the 
hunting gun. EOKA never used axes, butcher knives, and other improvised 
sharp instruments to impose death, and there are no recorded cases of 
barbarous acts such as the stabbing, butchering, or decapitation of its victims.
The offensive caused also unpredictable problems within the Turkish 
community, and the TMT leadership tried hard to control the internal situation 
by issuing strict directives. The Central Committee ‘ordered that no Turk shall
TMT proclamation, 9 June 1958, 240/58, CO 926/952, TNA. 
TMT proclamation, 11 June 1958, 249/58, CO 926/952, TNA. 
TMT proclamation, 14 June 1958, 257/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
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leave Cyprus under any pretext whatsoever’, and threatened severe 
punishment to those seeking to escape abroad/®® Exploiting ‘these dark days’, 
some unknown individuals, particularly in Ktlma, circulated unauthorized 
leaflets with the signature of TMT asking their fellow Turks for a generous 
financial aid to the organization/®® This caused great concern to the Central 
Committee which issued a strict warning against those sending threatening 
letters or those exploiting the organization’s signature/®^ On 30 June, TMT 
published a ‘Black List’ of Cypriot Turks that were either supporting British 
interests or acted against the community, such as ‘the family of Sir Munir, who 
for years served the English’, the Commissioner of Famagusta Faik Muftizade 
who ‘is doing his best to destroy Turkish nationalism’, the pro-British Kemal 
Bey who was dismissed from EFKAV for misappropriating 10,000 Pounds, the 
Police Superintendent M. Niazi, and many others/®®
The Turkish offensive for Taksim, not only caused great fear to the 
Greek population of the island, but also endangered the national strategic 
objective for Enosis. The silence of EOKA during June, and the passivity of the 
colonial administration and its security forces, made TMT action uninhibited. 
The continual TMT attacks against unprotected Greeks, injured and 
indiscriminately killed every day on the island, started to make EOKA patience 
run out. On 30 June, the injury of a Greek on the Nicosia-Famagusta road 
brought the retaliation of EOKA, members of which shot and killed a Turk in 
Limassol; ®^® the first intentional fatal casualty of an innocent Turkish civilian 
since the beginning of the EOKA campaign. It became apparent that Grivas 
would eventually have to face a two-fronted situation, where the temporary 
primary objective would focus on the as-soon-as possible elimination of Turkish 
underground action, to clear the ground for the continuation of the anti-colonial
TMT proclamation, 29 June 1958, 283/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
'°*^TMT proclamations, 15 June 1958, 262/58, GO 926/952, and 24 June 1958, 274/58, CO 
926/941, TNA.
‘°^TMT proclamation, 5 July 1958, 300/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
TMT proclamation, 30 June 1958, 299/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 264.
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objective. The growing Turkish attacks against Greeks forced Grivas, on 3 July, 
to issue a special order regarding self-defence that included the possibility of 
counter-attack. The horrifying butchering of two 60-year old shepherds in 
Tymbou on 8 July,^ ^® brought, the following day, the immediate reaction of 
Digenis who issued a very important order. He authorized the attacks against 
police stations -  the Turkish policemen being the main targets -  and lifted all 
existing restrictions regarding the execution of Turks. The nucleus of his plan 
was to undertake limited counter-attacks against the Turks, without wearing 
down his underground forces, in order to demolish their morale through 
violence, and raise, through successful acts, the morale of the Greek 
p o p u la t i o n .O n  10 July, the mutilation of 10-year shepherd Christakis 
Vyzakos and the cold-blood murder of Nun Agathoniki and Monk Nektarios by 
the Turks ,caused the immediate retaliation of EOKA. In an ambush of a bus 
near Sinda, EOKA killed five Turks and injured many others.^^® The Greek 
ambush brought the immediate retaliation of TMT, which continued its attacks 
against Greek life and property. On 18 July, Grivas lifted all restriction against 
Turkish targets, and authorized his sector commanders to undertake counter­
attack operations against the T u r k s . T h e  colonial casualty list for July, clearly 
demonstrated the prevailing equilibrium after the reaction of EOKA: Beyond the 
execution of four Turkish policemen, out of 72 civilian deaths, 28 were Greek 
(39%) and 44 were Turk (61%).^ ^®
The decisive anti-Turk operations of EOKA, dramatically changed the 
content of TMT proclamations. On 11 July, the Central Committee announced, 
for the first time since the beginning of its Taksim offensive, the need for ‘the 
adoption by us of urgent and effective measures and the maintenance of 
constant vigilance in the towns and the villages’. TMT warned that ‘if the EOKA-
Xaravgi, 9 July 1958, p. 1.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 268.
Times of Cyprus, 11 July 1958, p. 1.
Times of Cyprus, 13 July 1958, p. 1.
Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 269.
Official casualty list in Orashaw, The Cyprus Revolt, p. 408.
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sponsored armed Greek attacks on innocent and unarmed Turks continue, we 
will retaliate not with a blow for a blow, but with double force'/^® Two days later 
the Central Committee, referring to the Sinda ambush by EOKA, praised in a 
mourning mood ‘the death of our five martyrs' and assured that it ‘will definitely 
be avenged'. The proclamation, ordered the community to ‘hold ourselves in a 
state of readiness’. ‘The effect of our blow will be so terrific that it will be 
impossible for them to recover. We have an account to settle with Lyssi. It will 
be our bounden duty to wipe off this village from the Cyprus map’.^ ^^  Another 
proclamation complaining about EOKA action against the Turks, turned into an 
anti-British condemnation:
Our community has no more faith in either the British Government or Foot’s 
administration. Foot... has been helping the EOKA criminals secretly. We do not want 
such a Governor. Damn him !... Enough with British oppression!
The Central Committee also warned the ‘profit-seekers and opportunists’ and 
the merchants that sold goods in black market prices, that will be severely 
punished.
The situation turned critical since it unfolded uncontrollable into a civil 
war. By 14 July, the Governor, alarmed by the magnitude of the disorder, was 
‘urgently considering’ the imposition of measures, including the proscription of 
TMT and the arrest of some of its me mbe rs .Bu t  the affair was not so simple 
for the British Government which had been ‘repeatedly warned from Ankara 
that any such action will provoke a sharp reaction from the Turkish 
Government’.^®® The alternative -  revealing of colonial manipulations -  plans 
prepared by Foot’s Director of Operations involved the arrest of 3000 EOKA 
members and 70 members of TMT."*®^  On the following day, the Colonial Office
“ ^TMT proclamation, 11 July 1958, 318/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
"^TMT proclamation, 13 July 1958, 326/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
"®TMT proclamation, 20 July 1958, 337/58, CO 926/952, TNA.
Governor Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1100, 14 July 1958, Secret, CO 926/940, TNA. 
Ross, Colonial Office, 14 July 1958, Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.
Governor Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1106, 14 July 1958, Secret, CO 926/940, TNA.
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stated its raw hesitation for Foot’s desperation for action against TMT/®® ‘the 
principal object’ of which, according to the Governor, was ‘to bring about 
partition by communal disturbances’/®® Eventually the massive arrest of 1500 
Greeks on 22 July was followed, during the same night, by the arrest of 59 
Turks,^ ®^  ^ the vast majority of whom neither belonged to the hard-core nucleus 
of TMT nor had any relation to the organization. According to A.A., leading TMT 
member Kemal Shemi revealed to him that the list for the arrest of alleged TMT 
members was prepared by Rauf Denktash and himself in cooperation with 
British officers of the security forces/®® TMT was finally proscribed as an 
unlawful association on 23 July,^ ®® after the formal consent of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies.^®  ^ Indicative of the colonial success against TMT is 
Turkish Cypriot reaction. In a meeting with the colonial authorities, Turkish 
leaders Denktash and Orek ‘appeared to be relaxed and cheerful’ and 
Denktash even remarked that ‘it was a great pity it [the Government] had 
delayed this action until the Turks had put their foot in it but he hoped it was not 
too late for them to pull it out’.^®®
On 27 July, a new TMT proclamation described in an apologetic 
language ‘the hardest days of our struggle’ and indicated, for the very first time, 
traces for a unilateral compromise:
Our organization is wiiiing to assume a spectator’s roie, provided that the Greeks do 
not attack the Turks, and provided that they do not force us to retaiiate. Our action of 
tomorrow wiii depend on what happens to us today... We wiii not touch them if they do
Colonial Office to Foot, No. 1005, 15 July 1958, Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA.
Governor Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1128, 17 July 1958, Secret, FO 371/136281, TNA. 
Haikin Sesi, 16 August 1997, p. 4.
Personal interview with A.A., 16 May 2007.
Order In Council No. 3024 of 22 July 1958, The Cyprus Gazette, No. 4162, 23 July 1958, p. 
579.
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Foot, No. 1061, 22 July 1958, Top Secret, 
FO 371/136281, TNA.
Foot to Colonial Office, No. 1192, 23 July 1958, Secret, FO 371 /136281, TNA.
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not touch us. We shall be patiently waiting for the end of the Foot-Grivas fight. AH our 
armed groups have been given the necessary orders.^^^
In the meantime, the secret arrival of Turkish Army Lieutenant Colonel Riza 
Vurushkan, at the end of July 1958, was accompanied by a TMT showdown, -  
fifteen Greeks were killed during the first five days of August -  probably 
intended to impress the new commander. The appeals of the Greek and British 
Prime Ministers and of Archbishop Makarios for a ceasefire, as well as the 
severe Greek fatalities from TMT attacks, led Grivas, on the night of 4 August 
1958, to issue an order for the temporary cease-fire against the British and the 
Turks until 10 August.^ ®®
On the following day TMT issued her own order for the termination of 
action,^ ®^  thus putting a temporary end to inter-communal bloodshed. The rapid 
progression of diplomatic manoeuvres in the secret negotiations between the 
Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers might have led into a political settlement 
in Zurich and London, but the deep scars, the hatred and the fear of the Cypriot 
people could not easily be erased.
TMT proclamation, 27 July 1958, CO 926/952, TNA.
Pastrika, [Clear Message], EOKA proclamation, 4 August 1958, MAE.
131 TMT proclamation, 5 August 1958, 359/58, CO 926/952, TNA
Chapter V
The ideological chasm in the post-EOKA era 
and the formation of Greek underground 
paramilitary organizations
The effort to control the fighters
The desperation of the Greek Government -  since October 1956 -  for the 
indefinite shelving of self-determination/ ‘to get the Cyprus issue out of the 
way’® -  even with partition,® accompanied by the aggressive, nothing-to-lose 
policy of the Menderes Government over Cyprus, the shocking fatalities of 
TMT’s Taksim offensive, as well as the acute threat from the ‘Adventure in 
Partnership’'^  -  the MacMilian Plan, prescribed the abandonment of almost all 
Greek political inhibitions towards the achievement of a settlement. The secret 
negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Governments,® initiated by Fatin 
Zorlu on 6 December 1958, ended up -  in record time for such a perplexed 
issue -  into the signing of the controversial Zurich and London Agreements.^
‘ Averof quoted in Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 828, 12 October 1956, Secret, CO 926/277, 
TNA.
 ^Averof quoted in Athens to Foreign Office, No. 696, 11 October 1956, Top Secret, FO 
371/123930, TNA.
® According to documentary indications the concept of partition originated from Averof: Ankara 
to Foreign Office, No. 829, 12 October 1956, Secret, FO 371/123930, TNA; internal Colonial 
Office memo of W.A. Morris to E. Melville, 16 October 1956, CO 926/277, TNA.
19 December 1958, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates {Hansaxd), Vol. 589 
(London: HMSO, 1959), cols. 1315-1320.
 ^Averof, istoria Hamenon Efkerion, vol. 2, pp. 133-191.
® Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initiaiied at Lancaster House on February 19 
1959, Cmnd. 679 (London: HMSO, 1959).
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A vague parameter that would have severe repercussions on the post­
colonial stability of Greek Cypriot^ politics, revolved around the role of 
Archbishop Makarios in the signing of the agreements and the complete 
disregard of EOKA. Despite the rather theatrical opposition of Makarios against 
the fait accompli manipulations of the Karamanlis government, the Archbishop 
-  who finally gave his consent and signed the agreement -  had intentionally left 
his military commander Digenis uninformed. Afraid of the strong reaction of 
Grivas over the complete derailment of Greek Cypriot objectives, Makarios 
invited various political personalities from Cyprus -  including five communists 
from AKEL -  as his political advisers, but awkwardly avoided to inform EOKA 
or invite its representatives to the London Conference.
The signing of the agreements on 19 February 1959 was followed by 
eighteen days of cold EOKA silence; Digenis, in his last proclamation to his 
men wrote:
From the announcement of the Zurich Agreement until today I have passed through 
grave moments of agony and weighted my responsibilities towards you, towards 
Cyprus, towards Panhellenism; if it was right to accept an agreement that was not 
completely satisfying our aspirations or if it was proper to reject it and continue the 
struggle.^
Fearing that ‘a fratricidal discord’® would bring ‘the destruction of Cyprus’ and 
realizing that he ‘was obliged to accept the agreements’,^ ® Grivas ordered, on 9 
March 1959, the termination of the armed struggle and advised his men that 
‘egoism and personal ambitions should be subjugated by the wishes of the 
Ethnarch [Archbishop Makarios], to whom you owe absolute obedience’.
’  The agreements developed into a constitutional partnership where the Greeks and Turks of 
Cyprus (Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks) had to transform themselves into Cypriots (Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots).
® ‘Pros tous Agonistas tis EOKA’ [To the EOKA fighters], EOKA proclamation, 9 March 1959, 
MAE.
 ^‘Diatagi’ [Order], EOKA proclamation, March 1959, MAE.
‘Pros tous Agonistas tis EOKA’, MAE.
“  ‘Genneoi Maxitai tis EOKA’ [Brave fighters of EOKA], EOKA proclamation, March 1959, 
MAE.
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Caring deeply about the ‘future of the organization’, Grivas stressed the 
importance of the integration of EOKA members under a national organization 
and proposed the establishment of Eiriniko Metopo Anademiourgias (EMA) 
[Peaceful reconstruction front], under a central five-member committee in 
Nicosia and three-member committees In all former EOKA sectors/®
A critical question arising after four years of dynamic and violent 
underground action, was the rehabilitation -  and consequently the political 
control -  of former EOKA fighters. After the compulsory departure of military 
leader Digenis for Athens, Makarios, despite his acclaimed political prestige, 
realized that he was unable, to exercise on his own full control over the hard­
line fighters. Thus, an ambitious former EOKA sector commander, Polykarpos 
Giorkadjis-K/Zre/'o/?, found the golden opportunity to infiltrate in this gap, 
enforcing himself as the closest associate of Makarios/® The Archbishop’s 
dependence on former EOKA men, for his ascent to the presidency of the 
Republic and the implementation of his political agenda, led silently into the rise 
of Giorkadjis into the No. 2 position of Greek Cypriot internal affairs, and 
consequently into the tolerance -  on behalf of Makarios -  of innumerable 
political, financial, administrative, and personal misappropriations.
The first attempt of EOKA sector commanders -  under the invisible 
guidance of Giorkadjis -  for the organization of all former members under one 
political Identity appeared on 1 April 1959, when the formation of Eniaion 
Democratikon Metopon Anadymiourgias (EDMA) [Unified democratic 
reconstruction front] was announced, carrying the blessings of both Makarios
‘Diatagi’, MAE.
The fate of Giorkadjis (Minister of Interiors, 16 August 1960-1 November 1968) was tragic, 
since his alleged involvement in a murder attempt against Makarios on 8 March 1970, ended 
into his own murder on 15 March 1970; Panayiotis Papademitris and Andreas Neophytou, 
Polykarpos Giorkadjis: Teleftees tou Stigmes [Polykarpos Giorkadjis: His last moments] 
(Nicosia: [n. pub.], 1994), pp. 11-30, 228-358.
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and Grivas/'* In an anonymous proclamation addressed to all members, signed 
by The Sector Commander’, Giorkadjis ordered all former EOKA, PEKA and 
ANE members to follow the directions of the EDMA District Committee, and 
ironically indicated that virtues such as ‘love, peace, unselfishness, self- 
sacrifice, unity and iron discipline’ would guide towards ‘the peaceful struggle 
for re-establishment and reconstruction'/® The theoretical principles -  morality, 
freedom, equality before the law, and social justice -  the patriotic ideology, and 
the progressive political program of the new movement,*® brought almost 
hysterical enthusiasm -  among former EOKA members and ordinary Greek 
Cypriots alike -  for the post-EOKA prospects of the new state, and initiated its 
massive expansion in the following weeks.
But its life was destined to be short. The first ideological disagreement 
about the meaning of the ‘achieved liberty’ appeared on the day of the First 
EDMA Convention from former sector commander Photis Papaphotis.*'' In the 
meantime, rumors about the alleged mishandling of funds -  nobody knew 
exactly where the funds were coming from, but it was believed that EDMA was 
funded by Archbishop Makarios*® -  the appointment of unsuitable former 
members into key positions, and the forceful imposition of the pro-Makarios 
EDMA directives on anybody opposing or disagreeing with them -  Praxitelis 
Vogazianos, a former member of the elite execution groups was attacked and 
beaten, when he publicly asked Giorkadjis the whereabouts of an alleged 
secret EOKA sum, intended for the purchase of arms, in the hands of the
Grivas to Makarios, 12 April 1959, in Krisima Ntokoumenta tou Kypriakou [Critical documents 
of the Cyprus issue], ed. by Spyros Papageorgiou, 3 vois, 2nd edn (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2000), 
vol. 1, p. 181.
‘Geniki Diatagi’ [General order], proclamation signed by The Sector Commander [Giorkadjis], 
April 1959, in Krisima Ntokoumenta, ed.by Papageorgiou, vol. 1, pp.180-181.
Political program of EDMA approved in the First EDMA Convention of 30 May 1959, Times of 
Cyprus, 49, 15 June 1959, pp. 13-15, 62.
Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
Personal interview with Mikis Michailides, 14 January 2006.
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Nicosia sector commander*® -  led rapidly to its decline/® By October 1959, six 
months after its establishment, Makarios referred to the need ‘for the re­
organization of EDMA on another basis'/*
Immediately after the dissolution of EOKA, Kikeron ~ the Nicosia sector 
commander who became known for his miraculous escapes (as EOKA’s 
Houdini, since under obscure conditions he managed to escape from British 
custody three times)^® and his controversial involvement in the disappearance 
(execution) of former Nicosia sector commander Giannakis Stephanides- 
Aineias,^^ rather than his combat underground action -  started to form an 
underground nucleus around him composed of former EOKA members. In 
pursuit of his disguised political ambitions, he began -  as Minister of Labour 
and Social Services in the provisional government -  organizing a personal 
intelligence network, for the collection of information about the post-EOKA 
internal affairs; for this purpose he covertly recruited Cyprus Police officer 
Georgios Lagodontis, who developed in 1959 and 1960, on behalf of Kikeron, 
an extensive information gathering network. In 1960 he also arranged for the 
training of Lagodontis and Cyprus Police officer Philippos lordanous in Athens, 
by the Greek secret information service.®'* Former EOKA members were 
secretly recruited for the formation of his personal underground armed groups, 
which undertook the mission of enforcing the political line of Makarios and the 
invisible ambitions of Giorkadjis, by terrorizing their opponents. One such 
armed group terrorized the monks of Machairas Monastery,®® while similar
Personal interview with Praxitelis Vogazianos, 23 May 2006.
Ibid.
Makarios to Grivas, 18 October 1959, in Krisima Ntokoumenta, ed.by Papageorgiou, vol. 1, 
p. 192.
Panayiotis Papademitris and Andreas Neophytou, Polykarpos Giorkadjis: O Houdini tis 
EOKA [Polykarpos Giorkadjis: The Houdini of EOKA] (Nicosia: [n. pub.], [n.d.]), pp. 55-108, 
167-179.
Makarios Drousiotis, EOKA, pp. 133-147.
Georgios Lagodontis, Lagodontis Report to Grivas, In To Vathi Kratos, ed. by Ahmet An and 
others, pp. 185-222 (186-187).
Personal interview with Praxitelis Vogazianos, 23 May 2006.
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attacks were carried out against K. Kyrou, the director of daily Estia in Athens/® 
and against the director of opposition paper Ethniki, Loizos Kythreotis, who was 
seriously wounded/*"
The post-EOKA ideological chasm: The conspiracy of KEM and the 
underground anti-Zurich manipulations of PSA
The abandonment of Enosis and the de facto imposition of the Zurich and 
London Agreements on Grivas and EOKA -  by the Greek government and 
indirectly by Archbishop Makarios®® -  caused disappointment and bitterness to 
many former members, who refused to accept that the national aspiration was 
forever lost. The depressing atmosphere was further aggravated by the rather 
monopoiistic manipulation of Greek Cypriot internal, social, and economic 
affairs, by Makarios and the EOKA men who attached themselves around him 
under Giorkadjis. The political aspirations of Grivas for the next parliamentary 
elections in Greece and the manipulative role of former members who traveled 
to Athens to inform Digenis about post-EOKA affairs,®® made things worse. By 
the end of July 1959, the rumours appearing in the press about the differences 
between the two leaders were substantiated. On 26 July, Makarios in a 
provocatively austere speech warned those who criticize the agreements and 
particularly ‘the circles in Athens’ [Grivas] that their personal ambitions, their 
opportunist attitude and egoism, were endangering the division of the Cypriot 
people.®® Grivas, in reply, publicly renounced the agreements and declared that 
‘I will not hesitate to restart the struggle, and die if needed, to crush the dark
Phileieftheros, 8 July 1959, pp. 1/6. 
Eleftheria, 6 September 1959, p. 1.
Statement of Grivas, 31 July 1959, In Phiieleftheros, 01 August 1959, p. 6.
Personal Interview with Mikis Michailides, 14 January 2006.
Speech of Makarios at Agios Nikolaos Stegis, 26 July 1959, in Apanda Archiepiskopou 
Makariou III [The works of Archbishop Makarios III], ed. by Nearchos Nearchou (Nicosia; 
Archbishop Makarios III Foundation, 1993), vol. IV, pp. 55-56.
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powers here [in Athens] and in Cyprus, that are seeking the enslavement of the 
island'/*
On 11 August 1959, the disagreement between the two former EOKA 
leaders became critical and hazardous, when a new underground organization 
under the name Kypriakon Ethinkon Metopon (KEM) [Cypriot national front] 
made its appearance, circulating leaflets against Archbishop Makarios. The 
organization -  that caused the reaction of the Turkish Cypriot leadership®® -  
announced in its leaflets that ‘it will fight by all available peaceful means, if 
needed even by force, towards the fulfilment of our national aspirations and 
rights'.®® According to press reports, the new organization was affiliated to the 
supporters of Grivas and its objective was the achievement of Enosis.^^ A letter 
that fell into the hands of Makarios, exchanged between the supporters of 
Grivas in Athens and Nicosia, criticising the ‘stupid' Archbishop and 
encouraging the support of pro-Enosist bishop of Kyrenia,®® accompanied by 
press reports regarding the secret importation of arms from Athens,®® and an 
anonymous threat letter against Giorkadjis,®*" complicated the situation. Despite 
Grivas's denial of any connection to KEM, the new underground organization 
sent a threat letter to Averof warning that ‘unless you are not careful, you 
should know that we do not punish only with words. After our glorious struggle, 
our hands do not tremble when they hold the pistol’.®® A new proclamation 
circulated by KEM on 30 August, threatened that the organization would
** Eleftheria, 28 July 1959, p. 1, and 30 July 1959, p. 1.
Bozkurt, 13 August 1959, p. 1.
Phiieieftheros, 13 August 1959, p. 6.
Phileieftheros, 16 August 1959, p. 1.
Renos Kyriakides to Photis Papaphotis, Athens, 7 July 1959, In Papageorgiou, Krisima 
Ntokoumenta, vol. 1, pp. 190-191.
Eleftheria, 15 August 1959, p. 1.
** Eleftheria, 19 August 1959, p. 1.
Reported in newspaper Proinos Logos (27 August 1959), in Papageorgiou, Apo tin Zyrichi e\s
ton Attllan [From Zurich to Attilas] 3 vois (Nicosia: Epiphaniou. [n. d.]), vol. 1, p. 115.
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execute Karamanlis and Averof if they ever thought of coming to Cyprus; ‘As 
they have buried the Cyprus issue, we will bury them here as well'/®
The conspiracy against Makarios and the agreements, under the alleged 
leadership of former sector commander and close associate of Grivas, Photis 
Papaphotis -  who publicly denounced any involvement -  culminated in the 
middle of September 1959, when press reports disclosed a secret plan 
according to which Archbishop Makarios, ministers Giorkadjis, Papadopoulos, 
and Paschalides, members of the EDMA Central Committee and others from a 
proscription list of 60 individuals, would be arrested and executed on 14 August
1959. The objective of the plan was to assign the archbishopric throne to the 
pro-Enosist bishop of Kyrenia, to cause the derailment of the implementation of 
the agreements, and to continue the struggle for Enosis.^^ Although the KEM 
plan is denied today as a fabrication,'** some subsequent activities of the 
individuals allegedly involved in the conspiracy, denote that the plan might have 
not been a remote impossibility.'*® A few months later, at the end of January
1960, three pro-Grivas Cypriot students -  Renos Kyriakides, Michael 
Christodoulou, Andreas Andoniou -  were arrested in Athens in possession of 
automatic weapons, handguns and ammunition.'*®
In the meantime, despite the absence of any visible reasons, EDMA 
gradually disappeared (Diagram 4), failing to accomplish the idealist and 
patriotic promises it offered a few months earlier. While publicly declared the 
importance of creating a Republic, founded on social justice, morality and
Phileieftheros, 1 September 1959, p. 6.
Phiieleftheros, 17 September 1959, p. 1.
'** Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
'*^  In September 1971 Grivas returned secretly to Cyprus and established an underground 
paramilitary organization under the name EOKA B. Among its members were the individuals 
that were allegedly involved in the KEM conspiracy and later became members of PSA; their 
objective was to overthrow by force the government of Archbishop Makarios and declare 
Enosis. The underground operation of EOKA B included attempts against the life of Makarios, 
executions of pro-Makarios supporters, as well as bomb attacks and raids against police 
stations.
*^^ Ethniki, 29 January 1960, p. 6.
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respect, in reality, Makarios silently acknowledged the underground domination 
of the political life by Giorkadjis, that invisibly served the Archbishop's own 
personal ambitions and political plans as well. Papaphotis observes that ‘when 
Makarios had the need of somebody, he was willing to give him anything in 
order to have him by his side'.'*'* Numerous unqualified former EOKA members, 
loyal to Giorkadjis and subsequently to Makarios, were appointed to key 
positions in the police force, the government, and other public services, offered 
substantial salaries, material privileges, and social status. A. Efstathiou, N. 
loannou, L. Stephanides, A. Nikolaides were only a few of those who, without 
any specialized qualification or training other than their former EOKA 
membership, undertook key positions in the police force; feeling indebted to 
Giorkadjis for their appointment, they would not hesitate to become the 
executioners of his underground ambitions.
On 15 July 1960, ninety three former members -  pro-Grivas supporters 
-  opposing the agreements decided to establish Pangyprios Syndesmos 
Agoniston (PSA) [Pancyprian fighters’ association],'*® with the objective of 
pursuing ‘the continuation of the 1 April 1955 fighting spirit’.'*® The formation of 
the new association caused the immediate reaction of Denktash who declared 
that there were many Turks willing to die in order to defend the rights earned by 
the agreements.'**' The failure of the association’s four candidates in the 
parliamentary elections of 31 July 1960, was followed by a revelation in pro- 
Makarios daily Phiieleftheros that ‘a group of extremists conspires against the 
Cyprus Republic’. According to the report, former EOKA members opposing the 
agreements, in a secret meeting held in Nicosia, were planning to place bombs 
in various parts of Nicosia in order to create inter-communal incidents on 16 
August 1960, the Independence Day.'*®
'*'* Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006. 
'*^  Eleftheria, 17 July 1960, p. 6.
Eleftheria, 20 July 1960, p. 1.
'*^  Phiieleftheros, 21 July 1960, p. 6.
Phiieleftheros, 7 August 1960, p. 1.
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PSA, composed solely of pro-Grivas supporters, gradually developed 
into a strong anti-Makarios opposition. The aggressive background history of 
some of its hard-line members and the monolithic administration of Makarios- 
Giorkadjis were not foreshadowing a tranquil life for PSA. The first serious 
incidents between PSA and the underground groups of Giorkadjis unfolded on 
15 January 1961, the eleventh anniversary of the Enosis plebiscite, when PSA 
announced its intention to hold a peaceful parade in the streets of Nicosia. 
During the previous night armed men of Ehniki Pnevmatiki Estia (EPE)'*® 
[National spiritual hearth] -  established with the encouragement of Archbishop 
Makarios, under the control of Giorkadjis and his associate Lagodontis -  were 
preparing to break into the premises of PSA and forcefully destroy the placards 
intended for the parade.®® The tension was deflated temporarily when the 
police, which had full knowledge of the ERE intentions, finally visited the 
premises and confiscated the placards. On the following day, armed masked 
men of ERE stopped, in the Nicosia-Mia Milia road, vehicles carrying PSA 
supporters from Trikomo and Akanthou and forced them to return to their 
villages. Police officer Theophanis Demetriou revealed that the armed groups 
of ERE were operating under government orders and that their arms were 
provided by the Archbishopric Palace. ®* During the same day, the parade of 
PSA ended in violence, when members of ERE attacked and wounded many 
pro-Grivas members.®®
On 19 January 1960, Soteris Pedkios, a PSA member, was attacked by 
four masked men armed with clubs and handguns.®® In August 1961 a wave of 
violence against anybody opposing the Makarios regime, had serious 
repercussions. On 2 August, I. lerides, one of Giorkadjis’s police bodyguards, 
and D. Malas, a relative of Archbishop Makarios, attacked and injured Loukis
‘‘^Theophanis Demetriou, Politika Eglimata: Agnostes Ptiches 1960-1978 [PoWtlcal crimes: 
Unknown perspectives 1960-1978] (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 2007), p. 35.
Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (204-207).
Demetriou, Politika Eglimata, p. 40.
Ethniki, 17 January 1960, p. 1/3.
Ethniki, 20 January 1961, p. 1.
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Papaphilippou, a member of PSA’s Central Committee. On the following day, 
the vice president of DEK (Demokratiki Enosis Kyprou) [Democratic union of 
Cyprus], Dr loannis Polydorides was attacked by an armed man in his clinic, 
causing his severe wounding.®'* In a written protest, DEK accused the 
government ‘of abandoning the people of Cyprus into the mercy of the law of 
the jungle’.®® A few days later, on 14 August, two armed men attacked and 
seriously injured lawyer and DEK member, Kostas Shiakallis.®® The anti-PSA 
violence culminated on 16 August 1961, when police sergeants L.S., V.C. of 
the Information Service and policeman A. of the Strovolos Police School, under 
direct orders from the Minister of Interiors Polykarpos Giorkadjis executed, 
using a Sterling gun of the Service,®*" two PSA members, Neoklis Panagiotou 
and Evripides Nouros.®® Giorkadjis, seeking to create confusion about the 
identity of the murderers, prepared a deceptive leaflet dated 15 August, that 
shifted the responsibility to a vendetta between members of the Limassol 
underworld.®® The reaction of PSA was immediate; it issued a leaflet stating that 
PSA did not trust the police and that its members, from that moment, were 
undertaking the responsibility for their self-protection. Papaphotis states that 
‘simultaneously with the circulation of the leaflets, we have thrown grenades 
and placed bombs in different villages, a reaction that earned our security; they 
realized that we were determined. They stopped and did not try to murder other 
fighters’.®®
The Pangyprios Syndesmos Agoniston was a legally registered 
association directed by a Central Committee in Nicosia under the chairmanship 
of its general secretary, dentist Dr Andreas Lambrou. The political line of PSA 
was dictated by the Central Committee -  which issued frequent public
‘^* Machi, 4 August 1961, p. 1. 
Ethniki, 10 August 1961, p. 1. 
Ethniki, 16 August 1961, p. 1.
57 Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (211-222).
Phileieftheros, 17 August 1961, p. 1/6.
A photocopy of the leaflet was published in Phiieleftheros, 18 August 1961, p. 1, 
“  Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
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announcements that were reported in the opposition daily Ethniki -  members of 
which visited Grivas in Athens, where they exchanged views and received 
Digenis' directives/* The district committees were responsible for the support 
of its members and the co-ordination of PSA activities in the districts, the most 
active of which were Nicosia and Famagusta, where there were local 
strongholds in villages such as Trikomo, Agios Memnonas, Lapathos, Vokolida, 
Patriki, and Akanthou/® An affiliate association under the name 
Panspoudastikos Syndesmos Agoniston Kyprou (PSAK) [Cypriot student 
fighters’ association] was established in Athens on 25 March 1961 -  the 
anniversary of the 1821 Greek War of Independence -  with the objective of 
continuing the 1 April 1955 struggle for the achievement of the demand for 
E/7os/s/® PSAK had a structure similar to PSA, directed by a Central 
Committee, under its general secretary Giannakis Spanos.
Beyond its visible facade, PSA and PSAK had organized underground 
armed groups under the command of Renos Kyriakides and Photis Ch. 
Papaphotis in Cyprus and under Photis K. Papaphotis in Greece. In December 
1963 the British military intelligence estimated that the total underground 
manpower of PSA was 800 men, ‘the greater part of whom are armed’,®'* and 
another estimation indicated that ‘680 were well armed, dispersed throughout 
the island’.®® While PSA could mobilize up to one thousand men, at the end of 
1963 it was in possession of no more than one hundred military rifles, fifty of 
which were EOKA arms saved in the hands of Karpasia sector commander 
Papaphotis.®® Other arms were smuggled from Greece through connections 
with customs officers, while the most successful method was the throwing of 
sealed cases with arms, in the sea of Limassol, from passenger ships coming
Personal interview with Dr Andreas Lambrou, 17 May 2006.
Ethniki, 22 August 1961, p. 4.
Ethniki, 28 March 1961, pp. 1/4.
Annex to JIG (Cyprus) (63)-11, 20 December 1963, Top Secret, p. 2, CAB 191/6, TNA. 
Paragraph 5 of FSIR No. 35 (Part II) of 29 November 1963, referred in JIG (Cyprus), Security 
Intelligence Report No. 37, 23 January 1964, Secret, p. 2, WO 386/2, TNA.
Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
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from Athens; the cases which carried floating Indicators were secretly collected 
later by fishing boa ts .There  were armed groups of PSA in Nicosia and 
Limassol, but Papaphotis admits that its armed bastion was his former EOKA 
sector in Karpasia. In one of the night training activities of a Karpasia group, on 
17 August 1962, the gendarmerie, acting on information, set an ambush near 
Lithrangomi against the PSA group, that ended with an exchange of fire and the 
arrest of five of its members.®®
Kyriakides and Papaphotis, informed about the training activities of the 
underground paramilitary organization under Giorkadjis, decided to approach 
Colonel Kondylis, commander of Elliniki Dymanis Kyprou (ELDYK) [Greek 
Army Contingent in Cyprus], proposing the secret training of their men by 
Greek Army officers and the subordination of its armed groups under the 
command of ELDYK. Kyriakides had accepted the training of the PSA men on 
the condition of surrendering all its arsenal to ELDYK. The intervention of 
Papaphotis, who refused to surrender the PSA arms, eventually evaporated the 
hope for any co-operation with ELDYK.®®
Strangely, despite the assurances of its military leaders,^® that the 
underground elements of PSA were intended against the Turkish threat, when 
the inter-communal strife erupted on 21 December 1963, ‘there have been no 
indications that they have taken active part in the recent disturbances'.^^ 
Probably the truth lies in the words of Papaphotis towards Digenis: ‘The arms I 
possess will definitely protect us; actually they protected us from Makarios who 
was not democratic’.^ ®
Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
Ethniki, 19 August 1962, p. 1.
Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
™ Ibid.; Personal interview with Renos Kyriakides, Nicosia, 10 January 2006.
JIG (Cyprus), Security Intelligence Report No. 36, 17 January 1964, Secret, p. 2, WO 386/2, 
TNA.
Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
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The emergence of Nicos Samson and the manipulations of OPEK
The return of Nicos Samson Atrotos -  a hard-line EOKA member of the Nicosia 
execution team, ‘who now seems to be completely unbalanced’^ ® -  on 
Independence Day, signaled more complications for the post-EOKA stability. 
Makarios and his associates, gravely worried about his behavior, decided ‘to try 
to control him’ after his return to the island. "^  ^The beginning of the publication of 
weekly Machi [Battle] on 24 October 1960 initiated the unfolding of his 
ambiguous and naive political ambitions. Machi, under the editorship of 
Samson turned into a hyper-patriotic -  with a strong anti-Turkish character -  
newspaper, expressing, not coincidentally, the ideas of both Makarios and 
Grivas, that quite often manipulated irresponsibly the Cypriot public opinion 
with exaggerated articles and exclusive stories about TMT,^® the alleged 
appearance of suspicious lights or submarines [Turkish] in the northern coast of 
Cyprus,^® and fabricated inside information of Cypriot Turk affairs.
The former EOKA hard-liner with ‘the talent of having the most firm hand 
in Cyprus, with the pistol and the Sten gun,’^ ® began attracting around him a 
number of supporters that initially formed the ‘Nicos Samson Movement’. 
Among them, the Nicosia police director Michalakis Pandelides -  who felt 
disappointed for his non-appointment in the position of police chief by 
Giorkadjis, police officer Lagodontis, and many other policemen. Atrotos 
[invulnerable], frequently expressed complains that he was not offered any 
position in the young Republic; he felt that he was unfairly treated, since he
Governor Foot to Colonial Office, 5 August 1960, No. 562, Secret and Personal, CO 
926/1472, TNA.
Governor Foot to Colonial Office, 5 August 1960, No. 562, Secret and Personal, CO 
926/1472, TNA.
Machi, 11 February 1961, p. 1, and 28 August 1962, pp. 1/6.
Machi, 4 January 1961, p. 1,8 February 1961, p. 1, 22 February 1961, p. 1, and 21 March 
1961 p. 1.
Machi, 23 August 1962, pp. 1/6, 24 August 1962, pp. 1/6, and 18 September 1962, p. 1. 
Phileleffheros, 14 October 1959, pp. 1/6.
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was not appointed Minister of Interior, considering his contribution to EOKA as 
more Important than that of KikeronJ^
Samson, feeling Giorkadjis’ cold distance and the caution of Makarios 
towards him, blinded by his hunger for self-assertion and social reward for his 
contributions -  executions -  in the EOKA struggle, strove to force himself into 
the political scene, at any cost and by any means.®® On 25 April 1961, the 
appearance of a new underground organization under the name Organosis 
Prostasias Ellinon Kyprion (OPEK) [Organization for the protection of Greek 
Cypriots] made the already swampy waters more turbulent. The secret oath of 
OPEK, consisting of six articles, stated with clarity the objectives of the 
organization: ‘I swear to the holy bible that I will serve my distinct homeland 
Cyprus in order to complete the struggle that we started on 1 April 1955 under 
the leadership of Makarios-Digenis ... I will fight in all my power to abolish the 
joint sovereignty with the Turks and the British’.®^ According to its leaflets, 
signed by Chief Promitheas [Samson], the objective of OPEK was ‘the 
safeguard of the endangering interests of Hellenism in suffering Cyprus’. 
Promitheas asked the Cypriot Greek people to wake up and warned them not 
to sell even an inch of land to the Turks.®® Another OPEK leaflet circulated in 
Nicosia on 11 May 1961 warned that the violators of the organization’s order, 
not to sell Greek property to Turks, would be exemplary punished. ‘We will not 
allow Cyprus to become Turkish because some are indifferent to the interests 
of the whole.’®®
The following day, the cold-blooded execution of 36-year old British 
architect Peter Gray, in broad daylight, in front of his wife and two young 
children, left the Cypriot people speechless.®^  ^Acting on information, Giorkadjis,
Demetrlou, PoHtika Egfimata, pp. 36-37.
The director of Machi was awarded yesterday the goiden Medal of glorious Messolongi’; 
front page headline in Machi, 11 August 1961, p. 1.
OPEK oath, [n.d.], private collection SC, Nicosia.
82 OPEK proclamation, reported in Ethniki, 26 Aprii 1961, p. 4.
OPEK proclamation, reported in Phileleftheros, 12 May 1961, p. 6.
Phiieieftheros, 13 May 1961, p. 1.
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as Interior Minister, after receiving the approval of Archbishop Makarios, 
ordered the arrest of Samson and of his close associate Neoptolemos 
Georgiou Leftis;®® Makarios, shocked by the murder, offered a 20,000-Pound 
reward for information leading to the murderers. The two suspects -  Samson 
had his hair cut and Leftis his huge mustache trimmed during their custody®® -  
after their non-identification by the eyewitnesses, were eventually released. A 
month later, an exclusive report of Machi, in an effort to justify the execution, 
identified Gray as an agent of M16;®^  it was another of Machfs fabricated stories 
intended to manipulate Cypriot public opinion.
In another leaflet, OPEK condemned the ‘extremist elements’ of the ‘two 
factions [pro-Grivas PSA and pro-Makarios groups under Giorkadjis] that 
prepare the curse of brotherly bloodshed’ and warned the Greek Cypriots that 
the Turkish minority ‘will take advantage of our prepared killing one another’. 
OPEK, the leaflet assured, ‘is in a position to protect you against enemy 
intentions’.®® Addressing the 28 October 1940 anniversary, Promitheas 
declared that ‘we are friends of peace and of harmonious coexistence’ but ‘we 
are not determined to stand an insignificant minority, asking to impose its will 
on the overwhelming majority of the Cypriot people’. Samson affirmed that ‘we 
are dedicated to safeguard by any means and with any sacrifice the sacred 
symbols of our struggle’ until ‘we reach the happy end of our national 
aspirations; OPEK is the sleepless guard of the interests of Greek Cyprus’.®®
Neoptolemos Georgiou Leftis, the closest associate of Promitheas, 
reveals that he and Samson began forming the first armed groups in Aprll-May 
1961, when OPEK emerged, to ‘offer protection from the Turks’. In the initial 
stages, the groups consisted of about thirty loyal men, that, in case of need.
Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (191-194).
Lagodontis, in Drousiotis, EOKA, pp. 385-386.
Machi, 14 June 1961, p. 1
OPEK proclamation, [n.d.], private collection SC, Nicosia.
‘Menima pros ton Ellinikon Kypriakon Laon gia tin 28 Octovriou' [Message to the Greek 
Cypriot people for the 28 October anniversary], OPEK proclamation, [n.d.], private collection 
SC, Nicosia.
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would be armed with weapons secretly kept by Leftis; in 1962, the OPEK 
arsenal was further enriched with three Bren guns and six Aden guns stolen by 
Leftis from the British military installations at Nicosia airport.
Makarios, realizing the growing power of Giorkadjis and his underground 
domination in the young Republic, while he did not agree with the irresponsible 
and provocative acts of Samson -  his alleged involvement in the Peter Gray 
case, the anti-Turkish character of his newspaper Machi, the writing of OPEK 
siogans on walls near the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, and his racist hatred 
against the British and the Turks, among others -  tolerated his behaviour, as a 
means of counter-balancing the power of his Interior Minister. Similarly, in 
1963, he allowed the formation of another underground group under his political 
adviser, Dr Vasos Lyssarides, that became known as Omades Lyssaridi 
[Lyssarides groups]. Fearing the unpredictable and hard-line reaction of 
Samson, Giorkadjis did not hesitate to approach Promitheas' strong-man Leftis; 
‘the Organosis of Giorkadjis did not have good intentions. Giorkadjis wanted 
other things from us, but we did not accept to chase EOKA comrades. He even 
asked me to ieave Samson and join his armed groups'.®  ^ Despite the loyalty of 
Samson’s inner circle of men and its immense influence in mobilizing the young 
students of Nicosia, the failure of OPEK’s reactionary and superficial activities, 
the naive thinking of Promitheas, as well as the dangerous rivalry between 
Giorkadjis and Samson, led by 1962 to its decline.
As early as 1961, Giorkadjis, fearing that Samson was preparing his 
murder, decided to plan his execution.®^ The friction between the two men 
emerged when the Interior Minister realized that the ‘familiar and irresponsible 
trouble-maker’, ‘boasting of himself as a gang leader’, quite often used his pro- 
Makarios artificial loyalty to promote his personal business [Machi\, presenting 
himself as a superhero.®® The competition and hatred between the two men
Personal interview with Neoptolemos Georgiou Leftis, 29 August 2007.
Ibid..
Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (196-201).
‘Epagrypnite Kata ton Diaspaston' [Be vigilant against those who seek to disrupt], EOK 
internal leaflet, in Krisima Ntokoumenta, ed. by Papageorgiou, vol. 1, pp. 223-225.
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culminated on 20 May 1963, when former EOKA member and close friend and 
associate of Samson, Andreas Kikas was murdered in Famagusta.®'  ^Giorkadjis, 
issuing an internal leaflet to his men, tried to hide the fact that the murder was 
politically motivated and asserted that ‘the murdered and the arrested for 
interrogation ... were distinguished EOKA members, and both were members of 
our O rg a n o s is 'Samson, fearing his execution, wrote a letter on 26 August 
1963, which he kept in a sealed envelop:
Brothers, when this envelop is opened I will not exist. / will be dead, murdered from 
guns hold by murderous hands. I accuse towards Justice and our people that the 
murderers of Interior Minister Giorkadjis, A.S. [full names mentioned], P.P. and the rest 
of the murder gang studied and planned my murder. They are the same men that killed 
Kikas and the Limassol fighters Nouros and Neokiis. The murder of Neoklis was 
committed by V., A.S. and LS. [policemen]. The decision for my murder was revealed 
to me by fighter E.P., friend of A.S. and P.P.; they asked him to help them in my 
murder. Good Bye, Nicos Samson. ®®
In spite of the Atrotos-Kikeron clash, the fear of a sudden Turkish attack 
-  Samson allegedly received private information about Turkish preparations 
from paid informers -  alarmed Samson and Leftis, who applied to ELDYK for 
military guidance. The training of Leftis men was carried out during the night in 
the remote area of Archangelos in Nicosia, by Greek Army captain Marios 
Gasparis, and NCO's Giorgos Dragoumas and Theodoros. The need for 
military arms was internally solved by Leftis and his men that began to produce 
hand-made 0.45 caliber Thomson sub-machine guns. By 1963 they managed 
to produce thirty guns, while in 1964 they produced an improved version of 
another seventy.®^ When the inter-communal conflict erupted on 21 December
Machi, 21 May 1963, pp. 1/8, and 22 May 1963, pp. 1/6.
‘Pros Apanda ta Mali’ [To all the members], EOK internal leaflet, personal collection D.V., 
Limassol.
‘Pros tin dikalosinin kai ton Ellinikon Kypriakon laon: Na anoixthi kai na dothei opou prepei 
ean mou simvei kako ean me skotosoun’ [To Justice and the Greek Cypriot people: To be 
opened if something bad happens to me, if they kill me], 2-page letter, 26 August 1963, private 
collection SC, Nicosia. The letter is revealed for the first time.
Personal interview with Neoptolemos Georgiou Leftis, 29 August 2007.
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1963, Giorkadjis, seeing his military plans failing, did not hesitate to ask for 
Samson’s help for the confinement of the crisis. A group of eight men under 
Leftis undertook a hazardous mission to defend the Severis Flourmill,®® while 
another forty one, under Praxitelis Vogazianos, Kostas Nikitas and Pambos 
Kakoulis, operated successfully in the endangered suburb of Omorphita.®®
EOK
Giorkadjis -  initially as Minister of Labour and Social Services in the transitional 
period and later as Minister of Interior -  controlled, with the indirect blessings of 
President Makarios, almost all Greek appointments in the public service. The 
Greek candidates, mostly former EOKA members, to the newly established 
Cyprus Army were personally invited by Giorkadjis,^®® while many former 
members, loyal to him, were appointed in key positions in the police force, the 
gendarmerie, and the newly established, in April 1961, Information Service.^®  ^
Beyond his absolute control of the security forces of the young Republic, the 
operation, since 1959, of his personal intelligence mechanism and armed 
groups, as well as his ambivalent role as the protegee-^xoXecXox of Archbishop 
Makarios, metamorphosed Giorkadjis into kratos en krati [a state within a 
state]. ^ ®^
The countdown for the establishment of a Greek Cypriot underground 
movement began in March 1959 when EOKA surrendered most of its arsenal;
‘H Machi ton Millon’ [The Flourmill battle], series of four articles narrated by Neoptolemos 
Georgiou Leftis, in Machi, 13 January 1965, pp. 1/3, 14 January 1965, pp. 1/3,
15 January 1965, pp. 1/3, and 16 January 1965, pp. 1/3.
‘Pragmatlkotis gia tin Omorphita’ [The truth about Omorphita], series of eleven articles 
narrated by Nicos Samson, in Machi, 22 December 1964, pp. 1/3, 23 December 1964, pp. 1/3, 
24 December 1964, pp. 1/3, 25 December 1964, pp. 1/3, 27 December 1964, pp. 1/3,
29 December 1964, pp. 1/3, 30 December 1964, pp. 1/3, 31 December 1964, pp. 1/3,
1 January 1965, pp. 1/3, 3 January 1965, pp. 1/3, and 5 January 1965, pp. 1/3.
Personal interview with Eftichios Salatas, 12 August 2004, Petros Savvides collection (PSC).
Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (187-189).
Personal interview with Praxitelis Vogazianos, 23 May 2006.
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the only exception was a small quantity of arms kept by each sector 
commander, after an order from Digenis?^^ The Police Chief Superintendent 
assessed that ‘over 60% of all EOKA arms have been brought in’.^ ®'^  Rauf 
Denktash describing the surrender of arms by TMT remarks that ‘we piled all 
those homemade guns in Dr Kutchuck’s residence and we called Sir Hugh 
Foot. He looked at them and said, “ thank you very much, if this is what you are 
going to give us, then we do not want them” . They were almost useless. EOKA 
did the same’.^®® Beyond Governor Foot’s worry that Turkish arms were not 
surrendered,^®® persistent information^®^ revealed that the Turks of Cyprus, 
during the transitional period, intensified their efforts to strengthen their arsenal. 
Boasting that ‘money is plentiful', they tried to buy arms and ammunition from 
British soldiers,^ ®® while in another case, Cypriot Turk Ali Hussein Mohammed 
and his wife were arrested in Lebanon, in July 1959, smuggling twenty 6mm 
Accra revolvers from Damascus.^®® The strong complaints of the Greek Cypriot 
leadership to Foot and the Greek Government, reinstated the colonial 
supervision measures of the coasts,^^® and caused intense Greek 
representations to the Turkish Government.^^^ On the early hours of 18 October 
1959, the self-sinking of Izmir-registered motor boat Deniz -  loaded with an 
estimated 150,000 rounds of 0.303 ammunition^^^ -  during its chase by HMS 
Burmaston, and the arrest of its three-member crew, two of whom were 
members of the Turkish armed forces,created a severe shock to the Greek
Personal Interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
Foot to Colonial Office, No. 468, 15 March 1959, Secret, FO 371/144691, TNA. 
Personal Interview with Rauf Denktash, 22 August 2006.
Letter of Foot to Colonial Office, 21 May 1959, Secret, FO 371/144691, TNA.
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Letter of British Embassy Beirut to POMEF Cyprus, 14 August 1959, Confidential, CO 
926/1035, TNA.
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Eieftheria, 21 July 1959, p. 1, and 30 August 1959, p. 1.
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Cypriots, who justifiably began to question the Turkish sincerity and willingness 
for a peaceful settlement. In the following months, the continuous arrests of 
Cypriot Turks carrying weapons, caused even greater anxiety about Turkish 
intentions.
Alarmed by the seriousness of Turkish underground preparations, the 
Cypriot Greeks, by May 1960, began thinking more carefully about organizing 
defensive measures;
with the knowledge of, or probably at the initiative of. Archbishop Makarios, a detaiied 
scheme is being worked out for the protection of the Greek Cypriot community against 
attack by Turkish Cypriots. Well known EOKA leaders have been placed in charge of 
the detailed planning of this scheme in the several districts. It seems dear that these 
measures are intended for defence only.^^^
Acting under the directives of Makarios and Giorkadjis, Nicos Koshis, 
undertook the responsibility to organize an underground intelligence office -  
totally independent of the Information Office of the police that was staffed with 
Turkish Cypriots -  with the mission of collecting information about the 
underground preparations of TMT. The office recruited agents from the Turkish 
community,^^® while its activities included the tapping of Turkish telephone lines 
under the control of police inspector Nikos loannou Psomas.^^^ ‘The amount of 
information coming to us was alarming' says Koshis. Giorkadjis sent a multi­
page report to Averof, providing full details about the Turkish underground 
preparations, asking for the support of the Greek Government, without ever 
receiving a reply.^ ^®
Ethniki, 19 February 1960, p. 6; Phiieieftheros, 24 February 1960, p. 6; Phiieieftheros, 11 
March 1960, p. 1 ; Phiieieftheros, 6 May 1960, p. 6; Phiieieftheros, 26 October 1960, p. 6;
Machi, 21 December 1960, p. 1 ; Phiieieftheros, 29 March 1961, p. 6; Ethniki, 15 September 
1961, p. 4; Phiieieftheros, 25 October 1961, p. 6; Machi, 7 November 1961, p. 8; Phiieieftheros, 
21 November 1961, pp. 1/6, Ethniki, 4 March 1962, p. 1, Ethniki, 18 November 1962, p. 1, and 
Machi, 12 February 1963, p. 1.
Foot to Colonial Office, No. 406, 29 May 1960, Secret, CO 926/1443, TNA.
Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
Lagodontis Report, pp. 185-222 (188).
Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
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In the meantime, the refusal of Turkish members of the House to vote for 
the renewal of the customs tax legislation -  in retaliation to the delay for the 
implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the civil service -  had given the first sign 
that the Turks were determined to use their constitutional privileges to 
blackmail the Cyprus Government/^® On 7 April 1961, in a letter to Averof, 
Giorkadjis -  addressing the issue of ‘the arming and the conspiratorial 
organization of the Turks’ and ‘the threat of butchering the Cypriot Greeks’ -  
asked for the supply of arms by the Greek Government for ‘the defence of 
Cypriot Hellenism In case of danger from the Turkish side', so as ‘the Greek 
Cypriot leadership ... speak from a position of power'.^^® Giorkadjis, Impudently 
threatened Averof that if his demands were not met, he would seek arms and 
support from a foreign country, he would interrupt his communication with the 
Greek embassy in Nicosia, and he would make negative comments to the 
p r e s s . T h e  Greek Foreign Minister, criticising the threatening tone of 
Giorkadjis’ letter, stated that ‘the Greek Government considers, for many 
reasons, unjustifiable and dangerous the supply of arms ... to the Greek 
community of Cyprus'.
It was during this period that Archbishop Makarios -  worrying about 
Turkish underground moves and the refusal of the Greek Government -  asked 
Giorkadjis and Koshis to organize ‘a few groups in case the Turks create any 
troubles’.^ ®^ The first unarmed groups began forming urgently, from former 
EOKA members, in the towns, initially with the mission of shadowing the 
Turkish underground activities. The gradual spread of the underground groups 
on the whole island led in 1961 to the formation of Ethini Organosis Kyprion 
(EOK) [National organization of Cypriots] -  later called Organosis -  under the
Phiieieftheros, 2 April 1961, pp. 1/8.
Letter of Giorkadjis to Averof, Athens 7 April 1961, Confidential, Evangelos Averof 
Collection, File 98/3, Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation (IKK).
Phiieieftheros, 14 April 1961, pp. 1/6.
Averof to Royal Greek Embassy Nicosia, 9 April 1961, Top Secret, Evangelos Averof 
Collection, File 98/3, IKK.
Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
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leadeship of Archegos [Chief] Akritas [Giorkadjis]. Two elements of the new 
underground movement were perhaps not so coincidental. The name of the 
organization was a derivative of EOKA, while the code-name Akritas -  deriving 
from the medieval Greek hero Digenis Akritas -  was the second part of the 
code-name used by Grivas; it seems that there was a need -  either in the mind 
of its leadership or to attract the massive loyalty of its members -  to emphasise 
that EOK was a continuation of EOKA and that Digenis was succeeded by 
Akritas.
The formation of pro-Makarios former fighters’ associations in major 
towns -  under the absolute control of Giorkadjis -  after the dissolution of EDMA 
and the establishment of pro-Grivas PSA, turned into the most important pole 
for the recruitment of EOK members and for the management of the 
underground affairs of the new organization. A leading association that played 
a vital role in the formation and training of EOK underground groups in 
LimassoP^"  ^ was Syndesmos Agoniston Poieos kai Eparchias Lemesou 
(SAPEL) [Fighters’ association of Limassol town and district], established on 4 
December 1960.^ ^® Another important association, that contributed in the 
defence of the capital during the December 1963 c r i s i s , w a s  Enosis 
Agoniston Lefkosias (EAL) [Nicosia fighters’ union], established on 23 July 
1961,^^  ^ after long behind-the-scene preparations which began as early as 
January 1961.^ ^® Similar associations were established in other towns, such as 
Enosis Agoniston Poieos kai Eparchias Larnacas (EAPEL) [Fighters’ union of 
Larnaca town and district], and Enosis Agoniston Paphou (EAP) [Paphos 
fighters’ union], established on 1 April 1962.^ ^®
Personal interview with Takis Varavas, 31 August 2001, PSC.
Phiieieftheros, 6 December 1960, p. 6; Eieftheria, 18 December 1960, p. 4.
Personal interview with Andreas Coûtas, 22 May 2001, PSC.
Eieftheria, 25 July 1961, p. 5.
Phiieieftheros, 14 January 1961, p. 1, and 21 January 1961, p. 6; Eieftheria, 11 February 
1961, p. 1; Phiieieftheros, 18 April 1961, p. 1, and 6 May 1961, p. 6.
Phiieieftheros, 3 April 1962, p. 6.
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The former EOKA cadres that undertook the responsibility to form EOK, 
might have had deep knowledge on guerilla warfare and sabotage, as well as 
immense patriotic enthusiasm, but did not possess the knowledge of military 
tactics, street warfare and paramilitary organization. The effort to fill this critical 
gap was undertaken by the Greek Army officers serving in ELDYK and the 
Tripartite Headquarters.^®® Strangely, while the Greek Government strongly 
refused to provide arms to EOK, it allowed the training of its men by her military 
officers. The attempt to offer an explanation to this peculiarity leads to the 
presumption that the Greek Government, while it acknowledged the rationality 
behind Greek Cypriot fears, It did not trust its leadership to be armed; Athens 
believed that -  despite the operation of a strong Turkish underground 
movement on the island -  the possession of serious quantities of arms in 
Greek Cypriot hands, increased the possibility of an armed conflict, and the 
odds for a Greek-Turkish War.
The covert contribution of Greek Army officers to the formation of EOK 
was critical. Loizos Karamichalis, remembers that in a secret meeting between 
the SAPEL leadership and the Commander of ELDYK, Colonel Condylis, 
referring to the threat arising from the Turkish paramilitary movement, stressed 
the necessity for the underground organization of the Greek population and 
explained the operational mechanism for the formation of defensive forces in 
Limassol and the countryside.^®^ Similarly [in 1961], Greek officers undertook 
the covert training of a group of EOK cadres in Lanition Gymnasium in 
Limassol; the month-long night program included theoretical training in military 
tactics and various types of arms. The trained men became the nucleus for the 
recruitment and training of more men, and the formation of the first paramilitary 
groups in LimassoU®® In another occasion [probably in 1963] EOK cadres from
Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006; personal interview with Spyros 
Drousiotis, 18 January 2006.
Averof to Royal Greek Embassy Nicosia, 9 April 1961, Top Secret, Evangelos Averof 
Collection, File 98/3, IKK.
Personal Interview with Loizos Karamichalis, 7 September 2001, PSC.
Personal interview with Stavros Michaelides, 6 September 2001, PSC.
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Limassol were trained by Greek officers -  among them Captain Spyros 
Xylogiannakis and Captain Menaides -  during night sessions in the Nicosia 
Technical School, in military tactics and heavy weapons such as bazookas, 
machine guns, and mortars; the EOK trainees, dressed in military uniforms in 
ELDYK camp, were transported by military vehicles to a shooting range where 
they carried out exercises with heavy weapons/®'^ Similarly, Greek Colonel 
Frangiskos of the Tripartite Headquarters, after studying the local military 
situation and the threat arising from TMT in Limassol, pointed out the defensive 
measures, the observation posts and the sensitive areas of EOK’s defensive 
perimeter around the Turkish quarter of town/®® Greek Army officers, that 
served as military advisers to the Cypriot underground leaders -  Major 
Demetrios loannides of ELDYK, later the dictator of Greece, was the adviser of 
EOK Chief of Staff Koshis^ ®® -  undertook also the task of preparing the 
defensive plans of the organization in case of a TMT attack/®^
By the end of 1963, the underground paramilitary structure of EOK 
(Diagram 5) consisted of the brain of the organization -  the Headquarters in 
Nicosia, and seven district Sub-Headquarters in all major towns. The 
Headquarters, consisted of the Chief, Interior Minister Polykarpos Giorkadjis- 
Akritas, the Deputy Chief, Labour and Social Insurance Minister Tassos 
Papadopoulos, and the Chief of Staff, House of Representatives member Nicos 
Koshis, under whom operated five Staff Offices; Personnel, Intelligence -  under 
police officer Andros Nikolaides, Operations -  under the President of the House 
of Representatives Glafcos Clerides, Support -  under Foreign Minister Spyros 
Kyprianou, and Political Enlightenment -  under deputy schoolmaster Frixos 
Petrides (Diagram 5). The operational echelons of EOK spread in all major 
towns -  as Sub-Headquarters (SHQ) -  under the command of men, strictly 
loyal to Giorkadjis: Nikos loannou Psomas (Nicosia), Stelios Katsellis (Kyrenia),
Personal interview with Demetris Voskarides, 20 June 2001, PSC.
Personal interview with Spyros Drousiotis, 18 January 2006;
Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
Glafkos Clerides, 31 January 1967 meeting, (20), House of Representatives Minutes, 
Session VII, HRL.
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Pavlos Pavlakis (Famagusta), Giorgos Tzirkotis (Larnaca), Aristos 
Chrysostomou (Limassol). Theoretically, Akritas was fully responsible to 
Archbishop Makarios, the President of the Cyprus Republic, that was 
supposedly kept informed about the underground operation of EOK, although 
there are indications that he was not fully aware about all its aspects. When he 
realized the real dimension of EOK, expressing privately his mistrust for 
Giorkadjis, he complained to the Chief of Staff that ‘I have told you to organize 
a few groups and you have formed a whole army'.^ ®®
The underground structure of EOK, theoretically was impressive, 
reaching at the end of 1963 a manpower of 12,000, that received various levels 
of secret training through the use of 200-300 military arms island-wide.^®® 
Voskarides, the arms-keeper of the Limassol Town Command reveals that its 
training arms were ten military rifles and sub-machine guns of various types, 
five hunting guns and one revolver.^ "*® While EOK grew, in its thirty-month 
covert life, into a well-organized defensive paramilitary mechanism that 
consisted of volunteers, willing to receive secret night training in various 
h o u s e s , t o  man night observation posts around the Turkish quarters and 
mixed v i l l ag es , t o  perform night patrols,^ "^ ® and return in the following morning 
to their daily occupations, something extremely vital was missing; arms. 
Clerides revealed that he went to Athens to discuss the issue of arms,^"’'^  where 
he was formally informed by Foreign Minister Averof that the Greek 
Government ‘was not willing to give us any arms because we would use them 
to overthrow the Zurich Agreements ... and because they did not believe that 
the Turks would ever use arms to overthrow their benefits. I have stayed in
Personal Interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
'39 Ibid..
Personal interview with Demetris Voskarides, 20 June 2001, PSC.
Handwritten orders, ‘Zountex to Glafkos’, 3 June 1963, 13 July 1963, 16 September 1963, 
18 October 1963, private collection of D.V., Limassol.
Personal interview with Gregoris Gregoras, 20 March 2006.
'''3 Personal diary, private collection of D.A., Limassol.
Statement of Glafkos Clerides, Phiieieftheros, 3 February 1967, pp. 1/6.
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Athens for three days, begging for arms and eventually I was turned away'/"^® 
The cold refusal of the Greek Government turned the desperate attention of 
EOK leaders towards other circumstantial solutions. With great difficulty, some 
WW II arms were collected through personal contacts from individuals in Crete 
and other parts of Greece, and two or three loads of arms offered by Egypt 
were carried by a small fishing boat,^ "^ ® while the use of hunting guns became a 
temporary solution.
The eruption of the crisis in 21 December 1963 had created a 
desperation that turned almost into panic. The shortage of arms was so acute, 
that almost caused the collapse of Organosis. The first shipload of WW II arms, 
carried by fishing boat Agia Eleni, came from Egypt and consisted of 54 Brens, 
Mauser rifles and 150 Lanchester sub-machine guns. '^'^ The Maid of Verdelia 
had also made two trips to Egypt^ "^ ® for arms and a m m u n i t i o n .A  Cyprus 
Government request for the urgent purchase of 100 Bren guns from Belgium 
was turned down,^ ®® while a similar request from an American firm was 
rejected.^®  ^ Parallel to the desperate efforts of the Cyprus Government, many 
individuals went abroad to Greece, Italy and other countries and managed to 
buy small quantities of arms; among them Nikos Samson for former OPEK,^®  ^
Photis Papaphotis for PSA,^ ®® Sofoulis Karletides,^®'  ^and many others.
‘‘'3 Statement of Glafkos Clerides at the House of Representatives, Phiieieftheros, 1 February 
1967, pp. 1/6.
'‘*‘3 Personal interview with Nicos Koshis, 24 May 2006.
Papademetris and Neophytou, EOKA’sHoudini, pp. 364-367.
U.A.R. Arms for Cyprus, Memo of A. M. Wood, 9 March 1964, Confidential, FO 371/174761, 
TNA.
JIC (Cyprus), Intelligence Report No. 51, Secret, 9 April 1964, WO 386/2, TNA.
'39 Foreign Office to United Kingdom Delegation to Nato Paris, No. 552, 28 January 1964, 
Confidential, FO 371/174761, TNA.
'3' Memo of A. M. Wood, 14 February 1964, Secret, FO 371/174761, TNA.
'3^  JIG (Cyprus), Joint Intelligence Report No. 44,19 February 1964, Secret, WO 386/2, TNA, 
'33 Personal interview with Photis Papaphotis, 26 September 2006.
'3'’ Personal interview with Sofoulis Karlettides, 5 October 2001, PSC.
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The illusion of strength -  an Organosis of 12,000 men -  and the over­
confidence in the minds of its civilian paramilitary leaders that declared 
we are the sleepless guards of the interests and the security of Cypriot Hellenism in an 
effective manner, without screams, shows, and untimely bravados. Cyprus is well 
guarded and the real guards never scream^^^
collapsed on 21 December 1963. The patriotic calls of Akritas to the ‘real 
fighters’ of EOK that ‘will be preparing for the realization of the 1 April 1955 
aims [Enosis], the final implementation of which no force is able to retrain’/®® 
and that ‘EOK will govern Cyprus and will lead her to the completion of her 
national aspirations’ ®^^ were nothing more that superficial promises of a naive 
civilian leadership that erroneously believed it possess the military knowledge 
to command the fate of the Greek Cypriot population and the political future of 
the Republic of Cyprus.
'33 ‘Pros olas tas Omadas EOK and PD’ [To all EOK and PD groups], EOK internal leaflet 
signed by Chief Akritas, private collection of D.V., Limassol.
'33 'Pros Apanda ta Meloi mas’ [To all our members], EOK internal leaflet signed by Chief 
Akritas, private collection of D.V., Limassol.
'33^ ‘Pros Apanda ta Meloi’ [To all members], EOK internal leaflet signed by Chief Akritas, private 
collection of D.V., Limassol.
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Operational Structure of EOK in Dec. 1963
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Chapter VI
The underground military penetration of Turkey
into Cyprus
The preparation of Turkish infiitration
Despite Turkish efforts to protect itself -  through NATO and in cooperation with 
its neighbor Greece -  from the Soviet threat^ and stabilize its economy, the 
Cypriot Greek agitation for Enosis in the 1950’s, had definitely aroused Turkish 
military interest in Cyprus. At least on four occasions, Turkish Army officers, 
under a fake identity, arrived secretly on the island to collect Information about 
the situation. Between 1951-1953, Turkish Army officer Omer Faruk Kilinc, 
presenting himself as a calligraphist and painter, visited Cyprus and traveled 
extensively throughout the island.^ In autumn 1955 Turkish journalist Necati 
Zincirkiran had seen three Turkish Army officers, in civilian clothes, doing 
photography and mapping in Paphos.^ Mehmet Ali Tremeseli remembers that 
in 1957, a lieutenant colonel -  in charge of the Turkish military folkloric band 
that came to the island -  looking for information, asked and received from 
Tremeseli and his brother Ibrahim a ten-page report about EOKA and Greek 
underground activities; to express his appreciation he offered them his Kirikkale 
revolver as a present."^ According to information received by Grivas, another 
Turkish Army colonel of Cypriot origin, Hasan Tahsin Ogerlat, arrived in Cyprus
‘ Menderes to Major General Danis Karabelen, 6 September 1959, in Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 178- 
179.
 ^Ahmet An, Kibris Nereye, pp. 143-144; fstikfal, 13 April 1952, p. 4; Hursoz, 13 Aprii 1952, p. 1 ; 
Hursoz, 23 January 1953, p. 2.
 ^Article of Necati Zincirkiran in Gunaydin (20 July 1984), reported in Cyprus News Agency 
release, 7 February 1991, File 2674/1, PIO.
'* Mehmet Ali Tremeseli in Ortam, 27 April 1992, p. 7.
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after 8 February 1957, disguised as a photographer.^ In the following year, a 
military committee under Brigadier Cemal Tural prepared and presented to 
General Salih Goskun, a detailed three-option study for the partition of Cyprus.® 
The spark that Ignited Turkish military interest for Cyprus, on a strategic 
level, was the briefing of Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu -  about the formation of 
underground TMT -  during the Ankara visit of Dr Kutchuk and Denktash in 
January 1958. Zorlu, attracted by the strategic prospects of an underground 
movement in Cyprus, turned his attention to the Turkish armed forces, the 
deputy chief of which, General Salih Coskun, assigned the investigation of the 
matter to Lieutenant General Danis Karabelen,^ head of the invisible Seferberlik 
Tektik Kurulu (STK) [Mobilization supervision committee];® the Turkish ultra­
secret branch of the European underground Stay Behind network, established 
on 27 September 1952 immediately after the entrance of Turkey into NATO.® 
The secret Kibris Istirdat Projesi (KIP) [Project for the recapture of 
Cyprus] prepared by Major Ismail Tansu,code-named Dogan, provided for 
the establishment of an underground paramilitary organization in Cyprus -  
named Turk Mukavemet Teskilati -  under the control of Turkey. The objective 
of the plan was to train and arm five thousand Turkish Cypriots by the end of 
1959, creating by the end of 1960 a paramilitary force of ten thousand men.^  ^
Its primary mission was to safeguard the security of the Turkish Cypriots on the 
island and to support the Cyprus policy of the Turkish Government. In case of 
extensive EOKA operations for Enosis, TMT would act as an advanced party to
 ^Grivas, Apomnemonevmata, p. 211.
® Narration of Halil Fikret Alasya in Kibris Mektubu (January 1988), in An, Kibris Nereye, p. 152. 
’  Tansu in Haikin Sesi, 27 May 1997, p. 5.
® Associated Press report from Ankara, 4 December 1990, File 2674/1, PIO.
 ^Spyros Athanasiades, ‘To Grafeio Eidikou Polemou Einai o Aoratos Pilotos pou Kyverna tin 
Tourkia’ [The special warfare office is the invisible pilot governing Turkey] in Phiieieftheros, 12 
February 2006, pp. 18-19.
The archive of STK Is still considered top secret and is securely kept by the Command of the 
Turkish Armed Forces. The writings and interviews of retired Colonel Ismail Tansu, are the only 
primary sources about the covert preparations of STK for the establishment of TMT in 1958. 
Tansu, Aslinda, p. 46.
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prepare the ground for an invasion by the Turkish armed forces that would 
eventually occupy the whole island/^
In the meantime, Zorlu tried to soften the reservations of Prime Minister 
Menderes -  a personal friend of Karamaniis -  who believed in Greek-Turkish 
friendship and co-operation through NATO/® Eventually, in April 1958, 
Menderes, giving his written consent, authorized the implementation of the 
secret plan and assured the STK that all needs for arms, supplies, personnel 
and funds would be provided by the Turkish Govrnment/"^ By May 1958, the 
Ankara TMT Headquarters (HQ) were established in Yenisehir, Ankara, in a 
building offered by Kibris Turk Kuitur Dernegi, which served as an intermediary 
for the diversion of secret Foreign Ministry funds to TMT in Ankara and 
Nicosia/® The Ankara HQ were staffed by a small number of selected STK 
officers and was equipped with an AM radio for direct communication with 
Nicosia.
The TMT Ankara HQ -  that was trusted to operate completely 
independently under the command of Lieutenant General Danis Karabelen, 
codenamed Cankurt [Soul of the wolf] -  was supported by an invisible 
executive government network consisting of Foreign Minister Zorlu, the main 
supporter of the organization, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Defence 
Minister Ethem Menderes that arranged for the covert supply of arms and 
ammunition, as well as the confidential transfer of army officers, and the interior 
Minister that provided passports and fake identities to the officers intended for 
Cyprus.^® Two secret training centers were established in Zir Ankara and in 
Antalya, while three supply centres were formed in Mersina, Anamur, and 
Egridir Antalya. The June 1958 meeting in Modern Palas Hotei in Ankara, 
between Karabelen, Tansu, and the first TMT commander Lieutenant Colonel 
Ali Riza Vuxuskan-Bozkurt [Gray Wolf], with Dr Kutchuk-Agri, and Rauf
Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 32-33.
Tansu in Haikin Sesi, 28 May 1997, p. 5. 
Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 35-36.
Ibid., p. 42.
Ibid., pp. 40-42.
130
Denktash-Toros, laid the foundation for the absolutely necessary co-operation 
between the military leadership of TMT and the political leaders of the Turkish 
community/^
The metamorphosis of Turk Mukavemet Teskî/atî under Bozkurt
The arrival of fs Bankasihank inspector Ali Riza Vuruskan in Nicosia, under the 
name of Ali Conan, along with another four officers -  Major Necmettin Erce, 
Major Sefik Karakurt, Captain Mehmet Ozden, and Captain Rahmi Erg un -  
under fake names and occupations, in July 1958,^® initiated on 1 August the 
operational metamorphosis of Turk Mukavemet Teskilati. According to Bozkurt, 
the new organization -  in reality it was a continuation of Denktash’s TMT, re­
organized, staffed, armed and strengthened on a paramilitary structure -  was 
given the same name as the existing organization to conceal the formation of a 
new underground movement/® By November, the arrival of another twelve 
reserve officers,®® disguised as special learning teachers, primary school 
inspectors, and religious clergymen, strengthened the internal paramilitary 
skeleton of TMT, particularly in the viilages.
During the leadership of Vuruskan (August 1958 - September 1960), 
Toros became the poiiticai adviser of the Bozkurt and probably his most 
valuable assistant filtering all the information coming to Nicosia from the 
districts.®  ^ Turkish Cypriot leader Agri was kept informed of TMT activities, 
although he did not support armed action. Nalbantoglu had said that ‘we 
wanted to achieve our objective through guns. The doctor was afraid that the 
cost would be heavy, and tried to prevent it. Eventually he was proven right.’®® 
At some time, the powerful role of Denktash in TMT affairs and his dominant
Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 49-51.
Ismail Tansu in Kibris Mektubu, January 1997, vol. X (1), p. 34.
Riza Vuruskan’s diary in Manlzade, 65 Yil Boyunca Kibris, pp. 573-582. 
Tansu, Aslinda, p. 61.
Written directions of Karabelen to Vurushkan, Ibid., pp. 70-71.
Alpay Durduran in Ortam, 8 February 1996, p. 10.
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influence on Vuruskan, caused the concern of Dr Kutchuck who felt his political 
role in his community was diminishing; the misunderstanding even reached 
Menderes.®® Various other educated Turkish Cypriots such as lawyer Osman 
Grek (later Defence Minister), Dr Niyazi Manyera (later Health Minister), Dr 
Semsi Kazim, Dr Burhan Nalbantoglu, Dr Orhan Muderrisoglu, post office 
director Kemal Shemi, Nevzat Uzunoglu, Paphos mayor Halit Kazim, and 
teacher Necdet Husein, formed, in the initial stages, the inner circle of the 
organization.®"  ^ The assertion of Tansu that TMT was a completely new 
organization, not related to an existing one,®® justifiably caused the reaction of 
Denktash, who bitterly declared that Tansu ‘converted the resistance struggle 
of the Turkish Cypriots into a resistance of Turkey'.®®Tu/Vr Mukavemet Teskilati, 
in reality, was a continuation of Denktash’s TMT, most members of which had 
taken the oath®^  and formed the hard core nucleus of the re-established 
organization.
The fundamental operational element of the new TMT was the Hucre 
[the cell], consisting of 3-7 men that were initially called /ûyrf [wolves]. The strict 
secrecy and security measures imposed by the TMT leadership, did not allow 
its members to have knowledge of the activities or the members of other cells. 
The underground paramilitary structure of TMT (Diagram 6) consisted of six 
district formations codenamed Yayia [mountain plateau], that included a 
number of Otag [great tent]. Each Otag was composed of Oba [camp tent] 
which consisted of Cacy/r [tent].®®
Tansu, Aslinda, p. 71.
Tansu, in Haikin Sesi, 27 August 1997, p. 4.
25 Tansu in Haikin Sesi, 26 August 1997, p. 4.
Gurkan, Zirvedeki, pp. 118-119.
There are at least two known versions of the TMT oath: a) ‘Turk Mukavemet Taskilatina Girls 
Andi’ published in Machi, 17 August 1962, p. 1 ; b) ‘TMT Andi’ presented in Milli Mucadele 
Muzesi [National struggle museum], Nicosia.
Halil Sadrazam, ‘Turk Mukavemet Teskilati’, in Ikinci Uluslararasi Kibris Arastirmalari 
Kongresi [Second International Cyprus Research Congress], edited by Husein Atesin and 
others, (Famagusta: Kibris Arastirmalari Merkezl, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 57-94, (71).
132
A group consisting of eleven Turkish Cypriots -  eight students in Turkey 
and three sent from Cyprus -  began their training course in Ankara on 6 August 
1958, that was completed on 20 September. In the meantime, the secret 
training camp established in Zir Ankara, accommodated the second group, the 
training of which commenced on 22 September and was completed on 22 
October 1958. The selected men were sent by air, from Nicosia to Ankara, in 
groups of 20-25 men. The military training of the Kurt, who were wearing 
military uniforms during their stay in Turkey, had a duration of one month and 
included rifle training and shooting, guerilla warfare, sabotage, and secret 
operation techniques; the course was concluded with a military ceremony and 
the oath.®® The following year -  in September 1959 -  another secret training 
center was established in the forests of Antalya, providing training to Turkish 
Cypriots that traveled to Turkey by ship.®® According to Tansu, between 1958- 
1960 the TMT training centers in Turkey had trained almost one thousand men 
-  mostly in Zir -  that, on their return to Cyprus undertook the responsibiiity to 
train more men, under the supervision of TMT Turkish officers.®^
The primary objective of training and arming five thousand men led to 
the supply -  through the support of the Defence Minister and the Deputy 
Defence Minister -  of one thousand pistols, one thousand sub-machine guns, 
one hundred machine guns, three thousand rifles, twenty thousand hand 
grenades, and adequate ammunition, that were stored in Egridir Antalya, in 
Mersin, and in Anamur. ‘In July 1958' Tansu remarks, ‘we have concluded all 
our preparations and by August, we were ready for the shipping. The 
government and the armed forces had never refused our request for arms'.®® 
The arms smuggling mechanism between Turkey and Cyprus was initiated 
almost accidentally, when three Turkish Cypriots -  Vehbi Mahmut, Asaf Elmas, 
and Cevdet Remzi, in their desperation to purchase arms, arrived on 13 August
Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 103-109. 
Ibid., pp. 105-106.
Ibid., p. 109.
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1958 in Turkey, where they were initially arrested. Their interrogation proved 
that their motivation was purely patriotic, thus it was decided to trust them the 
first shipment of arms to the island. On 16 August 1958 the three men began 
their return trip to Kokkina carrying, in their small fishing boat Esther, eight sub­
machine guns, twenty pistols and six thousand cartridges of ammunition.®® 
Tansu wrote in his memoirs that ‘we were very excited; the road of shipping 
arms to Cyprus had opened in such a coincidental way’.®"^
From that day, the Bereket Hucresi [blessing cell] -  consisting of ten 
men under the leadership of Vehbi Mahmut ™ code-named Ah Ekibi [group of 
bees] undertook, through immense danger, the responsibility of smuggling, 
between 16 August 1958 and 1 January 1959, arms and ammunition for eight 
hundred men. During their nine trips between Anamur and Kokkina, Ari Ekibi 
succeeded in transfering to TMT, 270 pistois, 267 sub-machine guns, 6 Bren 
guns, 6 rifles, 350 hand grenades, 20 2.5 lbs plastic explosive, adequate 
ammunition and a radio set.®® Although the achievement of Ari Ekibi was of 
tremendous importance during the first stages of TMT formation, the cost of its 
missions was far from being minute. During rough sea, on 9 November 1958, 
the mission ended in tragedy, when Asaf Elmas and Hikmet Ridvan lost their 
lives after their loaded boat was sunk; Vehbi Mahmut, in the second fishing 
boat, was forced to throw the arms and ammunition into the sea to save his 
boat and iife.®® Strangeiy after the second mission (27 August 1958), Lutfu 
Celui, a member of Ari Ekibi, disappeared after his arrest by the Greeks.®^
The strong momentum behind TMT and the need to precipitate the 
covert effort of shipping arms to the island, led Tansu, in mid-December 1958, 
to Istanbul, in search of a boat, able to carry 10-15 tons of arms in each trip. 
The purchase of Kosai, a 25-ton motor boat, that was renamed Orhan Gazi, 
under the ownership of KTKD, and the recruitment of captain Resat Yavus,
Tansu in Kibris Mektubu, May 1997, vol. X (3), pp. 26-30. 
Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 117-124. 
ibid., pp. 126-128.
Tansu in Kibris Mektubu, May 1997, vol. X (3), pp. 26-30 (30). 
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134
mechanic Oguz Kotoglu, and Turkish navy signaller All Levent, brought 
inspiration to the TMT effort.^® The first three missions of Orhan Gazi] 
codenamed Efmas -  in memory of Asaf Elmas who was lost in the sea, in the 
beginning of March 1959, were not successful, since its crew failed to make the 
night contact with the local coast group.^® But during the fourth mission, on 24 
March 1959, fifteen tons of arms and ammunition were unloaded in a remote 
coast east of Kyrenia/° In the following months, the night missions of Elmas 
continued invisibly every ten to fifteen days, until the morning hours of 18 
October 1959, when in its trip between Tasucu in Silifke and Exi Mili east of 
Kyrenia, after treachery by a Turkish Cypriot informer -  he abandoned Cyprus 
for England, but on his return it is alleged that he was executed"*  ^ -  Elmas was 
intercepted by HMS Burmaston off the coast of Cape Plakoti/^ The crew of 
Deniz -  the alleged name of the ship -  carrying, according to Tansu, 100 
pistols, 200 sub-machine guns, 30 Bren guns, 154 rifles, 250 grenades, and 
serious quantities of ammunition, unable to avoid the interception, was given, 
through radio, the order to sink the boat/'^ All traces disappeared in deep 
waters, except two cases of 0.303 ammunition picked up, in the last moment, 
by the search group of HMS Burmaston, The suicide of Elmas exploded like a 
bomb in the mass media; the news shook the people’ says Tansu.' '^  ^The Deniz 
case went down in history very quickly; in spite of the conviction of its crew by a 
colonial court, the following day was deported to Turkey.'^^ In fourteen months 
(16 August 1958-18 October 1959), TMT had managed to send in absolute 
secrecy, serious quantities of arms and ammunition for five thousand men; 872
Tansu In Haikin Sesi, 23 September 1997, p. 4.
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Tokarev pistols, 747 sub-machine guns, 96 Bren guns, 2997 British rifles, 6800 
grenades, and 1,348,000 cartridges/^
The Vuruskan era under the domination of Toros
The mission of Lieutenant Colonel All Riza Vuruskan in Cyprus was delicate 
and complicated. Tansu remarks that ‘in spite of his multiple responsibilities, he 
never took advantage’ of his powerful position, and the assessment of Ankara 
indicated that he carried out his duties successfully."^^ Vuruskan never 
complained about the financial matters of the organization, and Tansu revealed 
that during the internal crisis of April-May 1960 in Turkey, Vuruskan had even 
sent to TMT Headquarters, 25.000 Turkish Lira."^ ® Later, Major Sefik Karakurt 
insinuated maliciously to Denktash -  who was the intermediary for the transfer 
of funds from the Foreign Ministry, through the president of KTKD, Mehmet 
Ertugruloglu, to Riza Vuruskan in Cyprus -  that the financial accounts of 
Vuruskan were not completely settled."^ ® An elite cadre with deep knowledge of 
TMT internal affairs believes that Vuruskan was an honest man, but questions 
his ability to control effectively the organization, under the dynamic influence of 
Denktash.®^
When the Bozkurt arrived in Nicosia, TMT, under the control of 
Denktash, had already enforced a passive resistance campaign that boycotted 
all financial transactions with the Greek Cypriots and prohibited any friendly 
relations with them.^^ The campaign, known as ‘From Turk to Turk’, continued 
during the leadership of Vuruskan, as a means of strengthening the economy 
of the community, since the Turkish leadership feared that the financially and 
culturally stronger Greeks would eventually absorb the minority, both financially
Ismail Tansu in Kibris Mektubu, May 1997, vol. X (3), p. 30.
Tansu, Aslinda, p. 73.
Ibid., p. 152.
Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kulesi, p. 134.
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and politically. Thus the protection of Turkish financial interests became a vital 
issue; daily Boz/rurf declared that ‘we will survive from destruction only through 
the strict implementation of the orders of our leaders, that have already taken 
important decisions about our prosperity '.W hile theoretically the campaign 
had a reasonable cause, the methods used by TMT for its implementation were 
oppressive and often inhuman. In March 1959, Ozdemir Ozgur had to pay a 
two-Pound fine for buying a pair of shoes from G reeks,w hile  a Turkish grocer 
in Paphos was forced to close his shop because he had financial transactions 
with Greeks.®"^  Journalist Sevgul Uludag remembers that the refusal of her 
father Niyazi, after receiving warnings from TMT to stop his relations with 
Greek Cypriots, ended with his imprisonment (1961). In jail he suffered a heart 
attack and was released, but he was unable to find a job since his employers 
were threatened by TMT. He eventually died of a heart attack at the age of 
f i f t y . T u r k i s h  Cypriot progressive leader, Dr Ihsan All wrote that ‘with the 
prohibition of commercial exchanges with the Greek cohabitants, the people 
suffered. Some cunning people [buying from Greeks] exploited the prohibition 
and created a black market ... Although this fact was known to the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership, the continuation of this disgusting situation was allowed. 
The worst was that the Turks who did not obey the prohibition were punished, 
either with fines and beating up or with imprisonment.’®® Writer Arif Hasan 
Tahsin remarked that ‘the Turks shopping from Greeks were beaten and their 
purchases were destroyed. There were no courts. If someone was making a 
mistake, he was beaten by TMT, even killed. There was neither freedom nor a
Bozkurt, 1 July 1959, p. 1.
Ozdemir A. Ozgur, Cyprus in My Life: Testimony of a Turkish Cypriot Diplomat, Peleus No. 7 
(Mannheim und Mohnesse; BIbliopolls, 2001), pp. 32, 168.
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All, My Memoirs, p. 46.
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normal life in a society that was commanded by an underground organization. 
The people were scared and were afraid to talk against them'.®^
TMT, copying the tactics of EOKA against alleged Greek traitors and 
collaborators of the British, begun, after the end of the Taksim offensive, to 
settle its own open accounts.®® TMT cadre A.A., reveals that he received an 
order from Vuruskan and Kemal Shemi -  a Turkish Cypriot that undertook a 
leading position in TMT hierarchy -  to execute Special Branch police sergeant 
Mehmet Suleyman Yildirim, who was allegedly a paid informer of the British, 
initially against EOKA -  which failed to execute him -  and later against TMT. 
He was eventually executed by A.A. on 2 August 1958 -  only a few days after 
Vurushkan’s arrival -  in Fellahar street in Nicosia.®® Bozkurt, expressing his 
satisfaction for the outcome of the operation, offered the executioner a 0.45 
Colt revolver as a present. Although it is not clear if this first TMT execution, 
under the leadership of Vuruskan, was cleared by TMT in Ankara, A.A. assures 
that all TMT executions were authorized by Ankara.®® In September, a new 
execution order by Shemi against three leading members of the Ayse Apla,^  ^
was given to A.A. who assigned the operation to three of his men; U., I., and 
M..®® On 29 September 1958, in broad daylight, the three men shot and 
seriously injured in the municipal market of Nicosia, Dervis Mustafa, Kemal 
Mustafa, and Mehmet Suleyman.®® A few days later, TMT referred to the 
persons ‘who were shot as traitors in Nicosia on 29 September’, indirectly 
taking full responsibility for the attempted murder.®"^
In the following year, an execution order against Special Branch police 
sergeant Selim Mustapha, an alleged Turkish Cypriot collaborator of the British
Personal interview with Arif Hasan Tahsin, 4 October 2006.
The details behind the executions are revealed for the first time.
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against TMT, assigned initially to the execution group of N.U., was re-assigned 
by Shemi to A.A. who ordered three of his men to carry out the operation. After 
three days of search, eventually M. and R. shot and killed®® their target outside 
a Sheil petrol station in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia on 27 August 1959.®® The 
inquest on the murder revealed that the victim was shot with two pistols, both of 
which were used in previous criminal incidents. One of the pistols was used in 
the murder of monk Nektarios and nun Agathoniki on 10 July 1958, while the 
other pistol was used in five attempted murders against Greeks and in eight 
murders against seven Greeks -  including monk Nektarios and nun Agathoniki, 
as well as the three young men murdered near Tremetousia on 2 August 1958 
during the Taksim offensive -  and against Ahmet Yahya, a leftist Turkish 
Cypriot that was executed by TMT on 30 May 1958.®^  A few days later, Ismail 
Arif Petasi, an alleged paid killer, was executed by TMT on 5 September 1959 
in Cumhuriyet street, in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, by two gunmen -  A. and 
E.®® -  that used a 0.45 inch and a 9 mm pistol.®® Kemal Shemi initially 
requested the undertaking of the operation by A.A., who avoided to carry out 
the execution, since the victim was an acquaintance of him.^ ® The inquiry of his 
death revealed that one of the guns was used in two murders -  including Fikret 
Osman on 18 September 1958 -  and four attempted murders against Sakir 
Mustafa on 18 September 1958 and the three members of the Ayse Hanoum 
on 29 September 1958.^^
The TMT network gradually spread to the six districts and the arms 
clandestinely imported to the island were covertly decentralized -  distributed to 
all TMT formations in the villages and the towns. The storage procedure utilized 
by the organization was almost immaculate. All the arms and ammunition
Personal interview with A.A., 1 July 2007.
The Times, 28 August 1959, p. 8; Phiieieftheros, 28 August 1959, p. 1. 
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cases were individually wrapped in cotton fabric and then were repeatedly 
submerged in hot bee wax, that upon its solidification it completely sealed, in 
an airtight enclosure the content, providing full -  as it was thought -  protection. 
The TMT leader in each village or area, would then authorize two of his men to 
hide the sealed weapons under the ground; for security reasons the leader did 
not know the location of the secret hideouts. The unearthing of the TMT arsenal 
was possible only after an order by the Bayraktar -  as the TMT leader in 
Cyprus was named when the internal structure of the organization was 
developed. In each TMT formation, a few arms were kept hidden for the 
training of the Ari [bees] -  the TMT members, according to the new 
nomenclature.^® The underground storage of the TMT arsenal offered two main 
advantages. It did not permit the unauthorized use of force by local TMT 
commanders, and drastically reduced the danger of discovery, initially by the 
security forces of the colonial administration and afterwards of the Cyprus 
Government. The main disadvantage was humidification and the corrosion of 
metal under the earth. Although the Ankara Headquarters had foreseen this 
possibility, and recommended the semi-annual maintenance of the arms and, if 
needed, the relocation of the underground hideouts,^® in reality the directive 
was not followed in Cyprus. As a result, when the Bayraktar, in a real situation, 
ordered in the morning hours of 22 December 1963 the unearthing of the TMT 
arsenal, it was discovered that a number of weapons were corroded, damaged 
by humidity, while a more serious problem arose with the cartridges, many of 
which could not be fired.^ "^
At some stage -  probably to exercise control on local (Turkish Cypriot) 
commanders -  it was decided to change and improve the internal underground 
structure of the organization; the former nomenclature founded on the tent 
system was later based on the bee structure. The Headquarters in Nicosia 
were organized as Bayraktarlik [flag-bearer duties] while the TMT leader was
Personal interviews with A.A., 16 May 2007, and Hasan Demi rag, 5 September 2006. 
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named the Bayraktar [flag-bearer]. The six TMT formations in the districts, 
equivalent to regiment commands, were organized as Sancactarlik [standard- 
bearer duties] and the Turkish Army officers that undertook their command 
became the Sancactar [standard-bearer] while their Turkish Cypriot deputies 
became the Serdar [commander]. Each Sancactarlik consisted of Kovan 
[beehive] -  equivalent to battalion -  that was composed of a number of Petek 
[honeycomb] -  equivalent to company. Each Petek consisted of platoons, Ogui 
[swarm of bees], while the TMT members, former Kurt, were named Ari 
[bees].^®
Contrary to the previous TMT habit of issuing proclamations by the 
Central Committee, Karabelen and Tansu, in the determination of the principles 
dictating the establishment and operation of TMT in Cyprus, considered that 
‘the organization would avoid making its presence visible, would not organize 
meetings or marches, and would not circulate leaflets with announcements'.^® 
The directive of Ankara was devoutly obeyed in the following years, with the 
exception of the first months. The cease fire proclamation of 5 August 1958, 
signed by the TMT Central Committee, contrary to the previous inflammatory 
leaflets, was short and precise, consisting of five military-style directives, that 
included wording such as, ‘all armed groups should stop all kind of activity until 
further orders. Necessary instructions will be given to group leaders', as well as 
‘send to the Headquarters through proper channels’.^  ^ Three days later, a 
second proclamation titled ‘A Second Order’, consisting of four directives, 
advised the Turks to avoid shopping from ‘money-seeking’ grocers Mesut 
Pasha and Heseyin Shishman ‘who think of nothing else but filling their purses’. 
The leaflet also warned ‘a fearful English spy’ named Sellas that if he did not 
withdraw ‘a second order will be given as to your end and you will not be able 
to read this order’. Finally it warned the Turkish Cypriot police ‘spies’ -  that
Sadrazam, Turk Mukavemet Teskilati’, in Ikinci Uluslararasi, pp. 57-94, (71).
The twenty operational principles agreed between Karabelen and Tansu are mentioned in 
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were sent to Turkey by the colonial security forces to find out about TMT -  that 
‘will be entered on the traitor’s list’. The leaflet ended with familiar language; 
‘We do not fear death. We are the children of a nation which smiles at death. 
How happy is he who is a Turk’.^ ® On 22 August 1958, the Central Committee, 
announcing that the truce was continuing, declared that ‘if EOKA does not 
attack Turks, TMT will make no reprisals and will not act’.^ ® A few days later, 
another leaflet informed the ‘esteemed Turkish Community’ that some 
‘dishonourable, disloyal persons’ visiting villages, supposedly collecting money 
for TMT, were not from the organization; the Central Committee warned the 
traitors that ‘your names are recorded in the black list of TMT ... your 
punishment will be death’.®®
Four other leaflets -  circulated between August and October by TMT in 
various parts of the island (Famagusta, Larnaca, and Lefka) presumably from 
local TMT leaders -  warned those Turks ‘trying for their benefit ... to fill their 
pockets’ and those shopping from Greek establishments that they will be 
punished. TMT warned Kel Eyyup, Salih Kiremitci, Yilmaz Zeki, and Sergeant 
Faik Kavus who ‘spy against our organization’ that it will ‘crush the heads of all 
these persons amongst us like you’, and threatened that ‘if Ahmet Teyfik does 
not shut his mouth, his mouth will be torn’.®^ Another proclamation warned 
Hasan Dervish for cooperating with the police, and declared that ‘as from today 
the right of playing cards from the clubs and coffee shops is removed’. It 
warned that those who continue gambling, including women, would be 
punished.®® Another announcement addressed to the Turkish ladies asked; ‘Are 
you not embarrassed to gather in houses for gambling while the country is
‘A Second Order’, TMT proclamation, 8 August 1958, 368/58, CO 926/941, TNA.
The Truce is Continuing’, TMT proclamation, 22 August 1958, 401/58, CO 926/952, TNA; 
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crying for blood?’. The leaflet warned that ‘as from now, it is warned that bombs 
will be thrown at houses where gambling is seen’.®®
On 19 October 1958, a proclamation signed, for the very first time, by 
the ‘Head-leader’ [Vuruskan] announced that the attempt of some Turkish 
intellectuals in Larnaca to establish another secret organization was not 
necessary since ‘TMT exists in Larnaca as well as in all parts of our green 
island’.®"^ On the following day the Head-leader austerely warned Kara Cete 
members ‘issuing and distributing notices under the forged name of TMT’ and 
the opportunists ‘profiteering with dishonesty and merciless actions’, ‘who have 
not yet been condemned to death’ to immediately ‘stop and follow the national 
route’.®® In November, ‘the Chief Leader of TMT’ under the name Zafex -  
Vuruskan did not used his real code-name Bozkurt -  issued two more
proclamations. The language used by Vuruskan -  either as Head-leader or as
Zafer -  although precise in military style, was completely different from the 
usual harsh and aggressive TMT wording. Addressed ‘to the brothers who do 
not belong to TMT’ Zafer, stressing the importance of the cooperation and 
support of the Turkish community, gave advice to those who were ‘anxious to 
serve the TMT’ and encouraged the people not to disclose what they know or 
see about the organization. He also invited ‘cultured personalities, idealist 
teachers and all sensible people’ for service.®®Za/e/', in another leaflet, asserted 
that the Turkish Resistance Organization is not based on imperialistic ideas 
and is not an adventurous terrorist organization like EOKA, but it is a
completely legal organization and which is the guardian of its house’. Zafer
confidently declared that ‘today is the day that Turks realized that they cannot 
live together with the Greeks’.®^ The last known public proclamation of TMT, 
signed by the ‘TMT Leader’, was addressed to the students that participated in 
the 20 February 1959 march, and disapproved ‘the sentiments on some of the
TMT proclamation, distributed in Lefka (8 September 1958), 428/58, CO 926/952, TNA. 
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placards you carried’. Vuruskan assured the youths that ‘the bullets of TMT 
only pierce the breasts of enemies and traitors’ and that ‘there is no reason to 
feel any worry about the next political developments concerning your future’. 
‘TMT is one of the institutions struggling to assure an honourable and 
prosperous future for the Cypriot Turks’.®® From that moment, and for the 
following years, until the eruption of inter-communal strife on 21 December 
1963, TMT submerged to invisibility.
The operation of TPR/IT in the Cyprus Poiice and Gendarmerie
The Turkish Cypriot policemen had played a critical role during the Cyprus 
Emergency, both for their underground action against Greek Cypriots and their 
controversial participation in the security forces of the colonial administration 
that, at the end, became depended on their cooperation, in its struggle for the 
extermination of EOKA. In 1959, TMT members serving in the Cyprus Police 
were photocopying the secret security reports prepared for Governor Foot, that 
were also sent to Whitehall. The leaders of the underground TMT groups in the 
colonial security forces delivered the photocopies to the Bozkurt, and were then 
redirected weekly to the Ankara TMT Headquarters.®®
By 1960, parallel to the invisible operation of TMT, an underground 
network was established among Turkish members of the security forces -  
initially in the colonial police force and later in the police and the gendarmerie of 
the Republic of Cyprus -  under the initials TPMT,®® that possibly stand for Turk 
PoHs Mukavemet Teski/ati [Turkish police resistance organization]. The TPMT 
leader was in Nicosia, and branches of the organization were operating in all 
six districts. The organization, for security reasons, used in its internal written 
communication a code. TPMT was the Fabrikatorluk [Factory] and its leader
TMT proclamation signed by TMT Leader, (20 February 1959), 48/59, CO 926/942, TNA. 
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was the Fabrikator [Factory owner], while ‘agencies’ were the district branches 
of the organization, the code-names of which derived from provinces in Turkey; 
Sivas, Kars, Malatya, Mersin (Limassol), Mugla (Paphos). Each district was 
under the command of the ‘agency director’. The members of TPMT were 
known as ‘the workers’ and the Turkish members of the security forces were 
the ‘white whips’, while the Greek members were the ‘black whips’. Each 
district branch organized an intelligence section, a recruiting and training 
section, an arms production and storage section, and an operational groups 
section.®^
The earliest document, dated 10 May 1960, was addressed to the 
district ‘agency directors’ and ordered the preparation of catalogues of Turkish 
policemen serving in the colonial police, where each name would be 
accompanied by a code representing the ideological beliefs of each member; 
OM was for the average nationalist, AM for the passionate nationalist, KM for 
the superficial nationalist that presented himself as a real nationalist, L was for 
the indifferent who was not interested in the national cause, and KU was for the 
anti-nationalist, who was acting against nationalists through insinuation and 
treachery. On the following day, a new order was sent to the districts for the 
preparation of similar catalogues regarding Greek members of the colonial 
security forces; CA would designate former EOKA members in the force, while 
FCA was for the ultra-active former members of EOKA.®® An 11 June 1960 
directive to the districts, ordered the investigation of information according to 
which the ‘black grapes’ [Greek members of underground groups] were sent to 
‘Heir [Greece]. Another directive informed the district intelligence sections of 
TPMT that ‘a Simca car, W569, is used by a black grape for the transportation 
of fruits [arms and explosives]’, and requested the surveillance of the vehicle.®® 
In another directive to the ‘agency director’ in Mersin, the Fabrikator remsxkeb 
that ‘the dimensions of the fruit [explosives and ammunition] warehouse that
Agon, 20 March 1965, p. 1. 
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you are building for the agency [Limassol district branch] does not need to 
exceed two meters’;®"^ he was obviously referring to an underground facility.
On 22 September 1960 the Fabrikator sent the following letter to the 
agency in Mersin.
Please establish in groups, the workers of the factory in your agency, in the form of a 
camping. In every tent there will be six workers, one of whom will be responsible, while 
in every three tents there will be a director. You are requested to carry out the order 
within one week and report back.®®
It is obvious that TPMT was following an underground structure, based on the 
camping/tent code, similar to the one used by TMT. On 16 November 1960, the 
Fabrikator ordered the Mersin ‘agency director’ to arrange, ‘away from the 
agents of the enemy’ a secret meeting with Zia Rizki and the Bas Yayia [the 
TMT district commander], in order to establish a contact between the two 
underground organizations.®®
By January 1961 the Fabrikator informed the ‘agency’ in Mersin, that 
‘according to existing information the sailing boats Agios Georgios and ieris in 
the Mersin port’ were covertly used for arms smuggling. The boxes were 
unloaded during the night by ‘rat herds’ and were secretly taken away. ‘During 
that night, they had not assigned any duties to the emerald birds, in order to 
carry out their work smoothly’.®^ On 8 August 1961, the Fabrikator Moxmeô the 
Mersin agency that ‘it is expected that as of 10-20 August 1961 the political 
situation will be full of undesirable surprises’. The directive stated that the 
Bozkurt [Major Sefik Karakurt] of TMT requested the collection of information 
about the movements and acts of the cadres and supporters of the Makarios 
government, about the anti-Makarios party of Demokratiki Enosis, the 
supporters of the Kyrenia Bishop, the former EOKA fighters in Limassol, as well 
as the acts of individuals with close contacts to EOKA.®® TPMT, gradually
Agon, 18 March 1965, p. 1. 
Agon, 17 March 1965, pp. 1/5. 
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developed into a well organized underground network within the security forces 
of the Republic, that not only collected valuable information, about the 
underground activities of the Greek Cypriots, that were forwarded to the 
Bayraktarlik, but organized its own underground armed groups, that in case of 
need, would support the operations of TMT.
The coup d’etat and the end of Turkish Cypriot domination over TMT
The infant TMT of Denktash (November 1957-July 1958), adopted by the 
Government of Menderes and Zorlu, had progressively grown in the military 
hands of Vuruskan, a mature officer with war experience in Korea and an 
honest patriot.®® In spite of his military expertise, the Bozkurt -  dependant on 
local support since he was completely unfamiliar with Cypriot affairs -  allowed 
the infiltration, around him, of a circle of Turkish Cypriot cadres. Although this 
support was vital for the establishment and growth of TMT, there were times 
where internal intrigues and extremist attitudes among his local advisers, led to 
many outrages. In one occasion, the Bozkurt, Influenced by a local leader -  
probably Nalbantogiu -  ordered the execution of progressive Turkish Cypriot 
leader Dr Ihsan All, who was in favour of the coexistence of the two 
communities, and against extremist acts. The execution, accidentally revealed 
to Denktash, was eventually cancelled.^®®
While TMT was considered, within the minority, as an important move 
towards the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights, the competition between the 
local leaders -  Kutchuk, fearing the decline of his political influence, was 
skeptical about the political ambitions of Denktash; Nalbantogiu was hated by 
Kutchuk and mistrusted by Denktash, particularly after the death of his son 
Munir during a surgical operation by Nalbantogiu; Denktash, an intelligent and
Vuruskan did not hesitate to return covertly to Cyprus in 1964 where he undertook the 
command of the endangered Kokkina enclave; a position that was inferior to his military 
experience and his former position as Bozkurt
Denktash in Gurkan, Zirvedeki Yalnizlik Kuiesi, pp. 127-129.
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manipulative individual, disregarded the political leadership of Kutchuk and 
invisibly imposed his hard-line, nationalist agenda -  and the oppression within 
the community for the defence of the national causes, did not allow the 
progressive development of the already under-privileged and poor minority/®^
By 1959, Nalbantogiu, Denktash’s sole political opponent in the control 
of TMT, was expelled from the organization,^®® allowing the absolute domination 
of Denktash and his trusted circle over Bozkurt and TMT affairs. Toros, 
collected and analyzed information from the whole island, which he then 
presented in a report to Bozkurt, Denktash reveals that he had meetings with 
Vuruskan about TMT affairs once or twice every week.^ ®® But Denktash’s role 
extended far beyond his duties as a political adviser to Bozkurt. In reality he 
dominated not only the internal affairs of the Turkish Community, but to a great 
extent, with the blessings of Menderes and Zorlu, the internal affairs of TMT as 
well. Elite TMT cadre A.A. remarks that ‘in reality Denktash held Vuruskan in 
his palm’.^®"^ This monopoly of power justifiably caused great concern to Dr 
Kutchuk, that ‘the excessive power of the organization would induce 
undesirable acts’. These fears eventually reached Menderes. In a meeting 
requested by the Turkish Prime Minister, on 6 September 1959, Cankurt, 
Dogan and Bozkurt WsXeneô carefully to the rumours: ‘I have been informed that 
Rauf Denktash, with the help and support of Lieutenant Colonel Vuruskan, will 
remove Kutchuk from the leadership of the Turkish community and succeed 
him’.^®®
But suddenly, this sense of Turkish Cypriot power over TMT crashed. 
The overthrow of the corrupt Menderes regime, during the military coup of 27 
May 1960, signaled not only the decline of Denktash’s domination over TMT 
affairs, but also the beginning of an internal crisis within the organization, both
Letter by the first Turkish Ambassador in Nicosia, Emin Dirvana, published in M////yef (15 
May 1964) and republished in Phiieieftheros, 23 May 1964, pp. 1/6.
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in Ankara and Nicosia, as well as the alienation of Turkey from Cypriot affairs. 
The military officers involved in the coup d’etat were deeply doubtful about 
TMT, and believed that the Seferberlik Tektik Kurulu and its officers, whom they 
called ‘Menderes’ Gestapo’, were involved in a pro-Menderes underground 
organization.^®® Tansu’s explanations about the role of TMT to the powerful 
man of the military regime, Cypriot-born Colonel Alparslan Turkes, had 
temporarily reduced the ambiguity about the organization. Tansu asserts that, 
until his forced removal by the military regime (13 November 1960), Turkes 
fulfilled all TMT needs, including the continuation of arms transfer to the island, 
the posting of ten officers to Cyprus, as well as the provision of more funds 
from the Foreign Ministry.^®  ^ ‘The protagonists of the revolution [coup d’etat]’ 
remarks Tansu, ‘had the mistaken conviction that with the establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Cyprus issue was solved’.^®® The KIP ‘was shelved’, 
Lieutenant General Danis Karabelen was discharged, Lieutenant Colonel Riza 
Vuruskan, under controversial circumstances, was transferred to irrelevant 
duties, while Major Ismail Tansu, accused for being a pro-Menderes/Zorlu man, 
eventually resigned, before been discharged, on 2 September 1960.
The arrival, on Independence Day, of the first Turkish Ambassador, 
Emin Dirvana, a Cypriot-born retired Turkish Army Colonel, produced 
excitement to the Turkish Cypriot leadership that lasted less than twenty four 
hours. On the following day, Denktash’s comment, ‘I hope that, having come to 
Cyprus as an ambassador, when Makarios destroys the agreements, you will 
leave as a governor’, caused the furious reaction of Dirvana who declared:
I came as an am bassador and  / will leave as an ambassador. Anyone who dares to 
destroy the agreements, under which Turkey had signed their guarantee, will be 
punished.
‘It was a very bad start with Dirvana’ Denktash remarks, ‘that never improved’. 
The military regime in Turkey, unable to handle the serious internal and political
Ibid., p. 232.
Ibid., pp. 233-234.
Ibid., p. 258.
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problems as well as the economic crisis plaguing the country, considered -  at 
least in theory -  that the establishment of the new Republic had solved the 
Cyprus question. Dirvana representing this policy, begun realizing that the 
nationalist character of the local Turkish leadership -  that was fond of the 
previous (Menderes) regime for its critical military infiltration in Cyprus -  
expressed aggressively by Denktash, tended to disrupt the political tranquility 
on the island, pursued by the motherland.
The abrupt removal of Vuruskan from Cyprus was not due to a normal 
reassignment, but the outcome of the manipulative and corrosive action of one 
of Vuruskan’s TMT officers. Major Safik Karakurt codenamed Dagli, came to 
Cyprus in July 1958 under the name Mustapha Kaya, and was assigned, by the 
Bozkurt, duties as the Sancactar of Famagusta. Dagli, as was eventually 
proven, was an ambitious -  arrogant, according to Denktash -  officer that 
developed an antipathy for his commanding officer Vuruskan. Tansu says that 
‘Karakurt did not appreciate the trust shown to him by Vuruskan’. In his May 
1960 visit to Cyprus, Tansu was surprised when he realized that Karakurt had 
kept in a warehouse five hundred TMT arms, without delivering them to the 
appropriate cells for underground storage. During their meeting, Dagli criticised 
the way Bozkurtexercisedi his command duties in TMT, and tried to manipulate 
Tansu’s opinion for Vuruskan. On his return to Nicosia, Tansu’s suspicions 
were verified by Vuruskan, who did not wish to report him to Ankara, since he 
was the one who selected him in 1958.^ ^® Eventually, the connections of 
Karakurt with the military regime in Ankara, enforced the ostracism of Vuruskan 
and his self-imposition as the Bayraktar.^^^
From the very beginning, Karakurt, realizing the close relationship 
between the local leadership, particularly of Denktash, and the former 
Bayraktar, tried to diminish the influence of the Turkish Cypriot leadership on 
TMT. Karakurt, acknowledging the friction between Dirvana and Denktash, 
immediately sided himself with Dirvana, and begun exercising pressure on
“ “ Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 237-239.
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Denktash regarding his TMT role. For some weeks the reports prepared by 
Denktash, contrary to the previous procedure followed by Vuruskan, were not 
collected by TMT. The visit of Denktash to Karakurt, requested by the new 
Bayraktar, turned hostile between the two men when Karakurt ironically asked 
if Denktash belonged ‘to Riza Vuruskan or the organization’. The Bayraktar 
questioned whether, by not sending the weekly reports, Denktash was not 
recognizing his authority and left unfounded insinuations about the financial 
dealings of TMT between Denktash and Vuruskan.
It seems that Karakurt was determined to take TMT under his full 
control, by any means; even murder. In 1962, Nalbantogiu, under the directions 
of Karakurt, was isolated in a room and was beaten up by TMT members and 
threatened with death. Tansu and Vuruskan, hearing the rumours about his 
maltreatment, arranged for the arrival of Nalbantogiu to Ankara. He was scared 
and shocked; he believed that the reason for the threats against his life was his 
close relation with former TMT leader Vuruskan. Nalbantogiu eventually saw 
through Mehmet Ertugruloglu -  the Ambassador of Cyprus in Ankara -  the 
Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Cevdet Sunay, that assured him 
that he would solve the problem.Aydin Samiogrlu asserted that an execution 
ordered was issued for seven individuals, including Rauf Denktash, Burhan 
Nalbantogiu, Orhan Muderrisoglu and Aydin Sami. The planning came into the 
knowledge of Ertugruloglu and General Memduh Tarmac in Ankara, and was 
a b o r t e d . T h e  friction between Karakurt and Denktash continued, when 
Denktash decided to make three copies of his weekly reports, one delivered to 
the Bayraktar, and the other two to the Turkish Embassy and the Kibris Turk 
Aiay Komutaniigi (KTAK) [Cyprus Turkish regiment command]. Karakurt 
became furious with Denktash and the disagreement ended with a quarrel."®
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On 1 February 1961 former PC 321 Kemal Dervis disappeared from 
Nicosia; although the incident spread in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, 
strangely the Turkish press did not report the disappearance."® He was 
executed by TMT for being a traitor."^ A few days later, the disappearance of 
an elite TMT member, Unal Raif, ended with another execution. The 
complicated incident begun with a dispute between the local TMT leader, Jemal 
Hamza, and Remzi, both of Mari. Hamza offered one thousand Pounds to Unal 
Raif to murder Remzi; Raif not only refused the assignment but reacted against 
Hamza, who, scared, arranged for the execution of Raif (27 Januaru 1961), the 
body of whom was found on 15 February in a well."® The revenge for the 
murder of Raif came from his TMT comrades on the following day, 16 
February,"® when two men -  M. and M. -  of the three-member execution team, 
shot and killed him instantly in his Nicosia office. The incident did not end, since 
both Unal Raif and Jemal Hamza were TMT cadres. An army officer was sent 
from Turkey to investigate the incident. Under investigation was A.A. -  he went 
to the meeting visibly armed -  who admitted that ‘I ordered the execution of 
Hamza, but I will not tell you who shot him. If it is a TMT order to kill me, I 
prefer to shoot myself on my own’. The case from that moment was considered 
closed.''®®
Various mysterious incidents against Greek Cypriots during the period, 
were intended -  according to police officer-investigator Theophanis Demetriou 
-  to ‘create tension, confusion, instability, and suspicion among the Greeks, as 
well as disturb the economy and the society’.^ ®^ In January 1962, Giangos 
Andrea and his girlfriend were shot at, without being injured, during the night, 
near the Turkish village of Kanli. According to a Turkish informer, the three 
young Turks involved in the incident were TMT members and had orders to
Machi, 8 February 1961, p. 1, and 11 February 1961 p. 1.
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check and harass Greeks that were entering the Turkish quarters. In the 
beginning of February, a Greek couple, threatened with guns, was robbed and 
raped in a remote road near the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, by four young 
Turks. On 7 April 1961, police sergeant Petros Solomou and sixteen-year 
Andreas Giannouris were shot and killed during the night.^ ®® On 17 December 
1961, Giangos Eracleous was murdered with a pistol that was used in the 
murder of Solomou and Giannouris. A few days later, on 26 December 1961 
Sadi Zigia, the headmaster of the Kornokepos Turkish elementary school and a 
supporter of progressive Turkish Cypriot leader Dr Ihsan All, was shot by a 
masked-man that was recognized by Zigia. The pistol used against the Turkish 
schoolmaster was also used in the murders of Solomou, and Giannouris.^®"' On 
22 December 1962, Pola Poleou was murdered and Andonis Nikolaides was 
left paralyzed, after a night attack against them in the Athalassa Park. The 
pistols used, were also used in the murders of Solomou, Giannouris, Eracieous 
and the attempted murder of schoolmaster Zigia.^ ®® Karakurt remained 
Bayraktar for sixteens months until February 1962 when he was reassigned 
back to the motherland. Tansu thinks that ‘their representations to General 
Sunay’ about the Nalbantogiu case may have contributed, towards the removal 
of Karakurt from TMT leadership.^®®
The Cypriot mutiny within TMT and the countdown to armed 
confrontation
The officer assigned to substitute the Bayraktar was Captain Ahmet Gocmez, 
who arrived secretly on the island in August 1960 -  under the name of Mehmet 
Yilmaz Pars -  with another five officers, and undertook command duties in the 
six Yayla districts of TMT. Between 1958-1969, Gocmez served as assistant
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coordinator to Ismal Tansu, responsible for training, in the TMT Ankara 
Headquarters/®^ Indicative of the internal crisis within TMT, arising from the 
reservations and hesitation -  about TMT and its mission -  of the military regime 
of Cemal Gursel (30 May 1960-27 October 1961) and the new Republican 
People’s Party government of Ismet Inonu (from 20 November 1961), is the raw 
fact that a new Bayraktar was send to Cyprus in October 1962, almost seven 
months after the removal of Karakurt.
Denktash found the golden opportunity to regain TMT control. Kemal 
Shemi, the Nicosia Serdar, -  who was deeply against the control of TMT by 
Turkish army officers^ ®® -  acting under the directions of Denktash, cailed a 
secret meeting of the Nicosia sector commanders, with the intention of 
removing Gomez from the leadership of TMT, ‘in order not to receive orders 
from him’. The Turkish Cypriot mutiny led to a petition, signed by all the 
participants except two, for the removal of Gocmez and the enforcement of 
Turkish Cypriot controi over TMT. A few weeks later. General Shapan Karakurt 
arrived from Ankara to handle the situation. He held a meeting with all those 
who signed the petition and furiously talked to them in disparaging vocabulary; 
‘we should have executed you a ll... this is the first and last time’.^®® The Nicosia 
Serdar, Kemal Shemi, was strongly against the presence of Turkish army 
officers in Cyprus. ‘What is the business of Turkey here?’ he asked Arif Hasan 
Tahsin. ‘The problem of a Cypriot, only a Cypriot can understand. These are 
dogs [Turkish officers]. A dog does not bite the other dog.’ ®^° After the 1964 
crisis he was removed from TMT.
Captain Gocmez was an honest, mature officer -  had served in Korea -  
that worked very hard, ‘sometimes even until morning hours’, traveling in the 
remote Turkish villages all over the island, to organize TMT. It was during his 
leadership that he assigned to Mehmet Ali Tremeseli the formation of an elite
Tansu, Aslinda, pp. 61-62.
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Oze! Grup [special group] which would operate as a reserve force under the 
command of the Bayraktar. Its men were armed -  the equipment was stored, 
according to TMT procedures, in underground hideouts -  with Thomson and 
Sterling sub-machine guns, as well as grenades/®^
During the period, two critical incidents aggravated the already burdened 
inter-communal environment. In the early hours of 25 March 1962 -  the 
anniversary of the 1821 Greek revolution -  a number of time bombs exploded 
in the Omerte and Bayraktar mosques, in the Greek quarters of Nicosia, 
causing severe damages to the interior of the sacred buildings and the tomb of 
the Bayraktar, the unknown Ottoman flag-bearer who fell during the besiege of 
Nicosia in 1571. Dr Kutchuk and Denktash immediately assigned the 
responsibility to Greek elements, while Interior Minister Akritas declared that 
the bombs were placed by Turks .Un t i l  today, the motives and the individuals 
-  Greeks or Turks -  behind the provocation, that intended to encourage 
suspicion and hatred between the two communities, have not been revealed. 
Following are some peculiarities about the incident: a) In the Turkish 
community rumours threw the responsibility to T u r k s b )  The saboteurs knew 
quite well the interior of both mosques. In Omerie, where there was no 
electrical supply, they used batteries to cause the explosions, while in the 
Bayraktar they used the electrical circuit of the building. Experts established 
that the perpetrators, must have known quite well the interior electrical circuits 
of the building, and spent no less that two-three hours for the installation of the 
bombs. The Turkish mosque keeper stated that there were no Greek visitors 
during the last months.^®'' c) The internal damages in both mosques, and 
particularly in the tomb of the Bayraktar, were extensive and catastrophic. If the 
perpetrators were Turkish, it would have been more logical to use explosive 
devises -  similar to the 6 September 1955 incident in Salonica and the 7 June
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1958 in Nicosia -  that would create noise rather than severe destruction, d) 
Cadres of the Greek underground paramilitary life avoided or even refused to 
express their opinion about the incidents, indirectly implying that any reference 
to the matter would be manipulated by the Turks today.
On 29 March 1962, a fire that burned a few pieces of furniture in a 
classroom that was used as a warehouse in the Agios Kassianos branch of the 
(Greek) Pancyprian Gymnasium, near the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, created 
more agitation, when hundreds of Greek students, incited by the men of 
Samson -  that were ordered from the previous night to arouse the students^ ®® -  
to march towards the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, were eventually diverted to the 
offices of Samson’s Machi, where Promitheas delivered a self-praising patriotic 
speech/®^
The second incident that caused speculation and friction between the 
two communities, was the murder of lawyers -  editors of the weekly 
Cumhuriyet [Democracy] -  Muzafer Gurkan and Ayhan Hikmet on the night of 
23/24 April 1962.^ ®® The execution order did not come from Turkey; some 
indications allegedly turned the finger towards Denktash.^®® Tahsin remarks that 
when some elite TMT members complained about the murders to the Serdar, 
Kemal Shemi told them to close their mouth and leave; ‘he must have known’ 
says Tahsin. Later the Sancactar to\6 Tahsin that ‘it is from this dog [Denktash] 
that everything happened, he planned them’."® Hasan Demirag, reassures that 
the execution order did not come from the TMT leadership in Ankara or Nicosia, 
but men from two TMT cells were used during that night for the executions. 
‘The order was given by the individual who was responsible for those two cells; 
the end of the cord touches Denktash’"^ Toros on the other hand declares that
The matter was discussed privately thus it is not possibie to reveai the sources. 
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‘the journalists were killed by Giorkadjis’ who had -  according to Denktash -  
three reasons to kill them: ‘they were his agents and he was paying them 
uselessly because they were not effective; they were also hand in hand with 
AKEL that Giorkadjis was against; they have implied who has done it [the 
bombs], then I would be accused, and I was accused’."® The situation was 
further perplexed when Giorkadjis presented to the investigation committee an 
audio tape where Gurkan was heard revealing information to Giorkadjis about 
TMT, Denktash, and the explosion of the bombs at the mosques."®
The new Bayraktar, Lieutenant Colonel Kenan Coygun, arrived in 
Nicosia on 3 October 1962 under the name of Kemal Goskun, disguised as a 
Turkish Embassy attache -  Diplomatic Identity Card No. 405.""' He remained in 
Cyprus until 25 July 1967, when he was removed from the island after allegedly 
executing, in the Nicosia police station, TMT member AI pay Mustapha; the 
tragedy begun when Alpay, in a quarrel with two other TMT members, shot and 
injured them."® Between 1962 and 1963 he travelled five times to Turkey; his 
last trip was on 6 October 1963."® The relations between the new Bayraktar 
and Denktash were not smooth. According to Tahsin, one night Coygun 
kidnapped lawyer Mentesh Aziz and took him to Agios llarionas mountain 
range, where he forced him to dig his own grave. Aziz was left free when he 
admitted that he transferred information to Giorkadjis about the Bayraktar, on 
the advice of Denktash."^ In the meantime, the command structure of TMT was 
further strengthened by five Lieutenant Colonels -  Orhan Ozatay as a tabacco 
expert, Remzi Guven as a charity organization official, as well as Eftal Akca, 
Turgut Sokmen, and Turgut Giray Budak as school inspectors -  that arrived 
between November 1962 and October 1963, in the critical period before the
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eruption of conflict, and undertook the district command of the SancaktarUk?'^^ It 
seems that gradually the two-year freeze of TMT begun to melt.
1963 turned out to be a critical year. On 31 December 1962, the 1962 
(Amendment No. 9) Law for the Extension of the Effect of the Municipalities 
Laws -  after the continuous rejections of Greek Cypriot proposals by the 
Turkish side -  was eventually rejected by the Greek members of the House,"® 
causing the collapse of the municipalities, that ceased to exist.^®°A meeting 
between the Turkish leadership and Prime Minister Inonu in Ankara, in the 
beginning of January 1963, turned into a shock for Denktash, when he found 
out that his detailed reports about Greek Cypriot preparations, had never 
reached the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister. The Turkish Government 
was completely unaware of the Cyprus situation and advised the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership to take the municipality issue to the Higher Constitutional 
Court. Their advice’ says Denktash was ‘no drastic action, no counter-move’, 
‘Turkey’s position was restrain, do not do something which will involve 
Turkey’/®^  On 25 January 1963, a new provocation poured more oil into the fire 
that was invisibly burning. Peculiarly, a new bomb explosion in the Bayraktar 
mosque and the arrest of three Turks -  one of whom was armed -  in the 
area,^ ®® had passed almost unnoticed. The reaction of both communities was 
frozen, as if the people subconsciously felt that the inter-communal friction 
mechanism was set into the confrontational mode.
The underground leaderships of the two communities begun preparing 
their strategic plans of action. Akritas prepared a four-stage Top Secret plan 
that envisaged: the amendment of the negative aspects of the agreements and 
the diminish of the actual value of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance; the 
deactivation of the Treaty of Guarantee and particularly of the right of unilateral
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action by the guarantor powers (Turkey); the exercise of the right of self- 
determination -  implying Enosis] the ‘lawful confrontation’ of any internal [by 
the Turkish Cypriots] or external [by Turkey] intervention by the forces of the 
state/®® Similarly Kutchuk and Denktash prepared an eight-point plan that 
envisaged that the Turkish community would ‘take its destinies in its own hands 
and establish a [Turkish] Cyprus Republic outside the Zurich Agreements’. Vice 
President Dr Kutchuk would form a Turkish Cypriot government that would be 
immediately recognized by motherland Turkey which would intervene [militarily] 
on the island. Cypriots in Turkey would be infiltrated into the island and the 
Turkish members of the House and the Communal Chamber would form a 
purely Turkish parliament. Point six clearly stated that ‘a struggle will start 
between the two communities which will determine the outcome’. ‘When the 
struggle begins’ point seven stated, ‘the Turkish community, dispersed 
throughout the Island, should be forcibly concentrated in an area and be 
compelled to defend it’; the civil servants would be reassigned to the new 
Turkish Cypriot ‘administrative machinery’.^ ®''
The proposals of Makarios for the amendment of the constitution^®® 
turned into a coup de grace. Despite the fact that the underground forces of the 
two communities were not ready for a violent confrontation, their political 
leaderships failed completely to assess the excessive hazard behind their 
political manoeuvres. A noise bomb against the statue of EOKA hero Markos
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A cursory giance on the générai poiicy of the Turkish community as regards the future of the 
Repubiic on the occasion of the compietion of three years since the estabiishment of the 
Repubiic, 14 September 1963, signed by Dr Fazil Kutchuk and Rauf Denktash; published in 
Clerides, My Deposition, vol. 1, pp. 203-207.
Suggested Measures for Faciiitating the Smooth Functioning of the State and for the 
Removai of Certain Causes of Inter-communai Friction, 30 November 1963.
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Drakos, on 3 December 1963/®® did not matter any more. The situation was so 
explosive that the slightest spark would detonate the inflammable fuel that had 
been accumulating underground during the previous years. The morning hours 
of 21 December 1963 signalled the beginning of the end of the Republic of 
Cyprus.
Phileleftheros, 4 December 1963, pp. 1/6.
DIAGRAM 6
The Underground Structure of TMT In Turkey and Cyprus in 1958-1959
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Conclusion
The de facto imposition of military division on the island of Cyprus today -  a 
bitter consequence of the crude 1963-64 inter-communal conflict and the 
catastrophic 1974 Turkish invasion -  has its roots in the last years of colonial 
rule and the first years of the young Republic. The three thousand-year old 
Hellenic population of the island, traumatized by the slaughters of Ottoman 
occupation, perceived the formation of an independent Greek state as a sheet 
anchor for its salvation, for the fulfillment of its national aspiration for Enosis. 
The exhaustive Cypriot Greek appeals to London were continually rejected, and 
were indifferently undermined by Greece, the geopolitical priorities of which did 
not touch Cyprus. The ambiguous relationship between Cypriot Hellenism and 
the motherland was shaken when, young and ambitious, Archbishop Makarios 
III imposed, on Greece, the internationalization of the Cyprus question. Greek 
appeal to the United Nations -  after Hopkinson's traumatic ‘never’ -  turned 
eventually into a diplomatic blunder for Greece and a strategic disaster for 
Cypriot Greeks, when the embarrassed colonial power revived innate Turkish 
interest for Cyprus.
The dubious relations between Makarios, Grivas and the Greek 
Government, during the long preparatory period, were rather prophetic for the 
eventual outcome of the underground campaign that, even before its outbreak, 
was burdened with four strategic factors: firstly, the naive insensitivity of 
Makarios towards the geopolitical realities in the region, and secondly, the 
manipulation by Makarios of the fragile post-war Greek political stability and the 
de facto imposition of Cypriot ambitions on Greece; thirdly, the failure of the 
Greek Government to resist effectively Cypriot Greek pressure, as well as the 
erroneous assumption of Grivas that the underground campaign would be a 
local confrontation between the Cypriot guerillas and the colonial 
administration. Neither of the three parties involved -  Makarios, Grivas, Greek 
Government -  ever envisaged the possible repercussions of their political-
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underground maneuvers; the colonial reaction, the involvement of Turkey -  
presumed pacified under the Treaty of Lausanne, and the interference of 
Cypriot Turks -  considered the temporary minority remains of the Ottoman 
invasion.
The underground campaign -  despite a few controversial elements 
relating to the political murders of leftists and the occasional abuse of the 
organization’s power for the settlement of personal accounts -  under the 
charismatic military leadership of Digenis, that utilized imaginative guerilla 
techniques and advanced unorthodox warfare tactics -  founded on the 
dedication and self-sacrifice of some of its members for the ideal of Enosis, and 
the almost catholic participation of the population -  turned into a tactical 
triumph that brought deep embarrassment to the British Army and the colonial 
security forces, which failed to inflict the destruction of EOKA.
But strategically the campaign failed since -  beyond the four strategic 
mistakes of the preparatory period -  the complete lack of proper understanding 
between the military and political leadership, and the dramatic deviation of 
Greek and Cypriot Greek strategic objectives, determined the terminal outcome 
of the struggle. Additionally, the Cypriot audacity to challenge the colonial rule 
and the EOKA ‘prickle’, deeply injured British pride. The inability of the local 
colonial administration to face the crisis, obliged Whitehall to resort to its 
doctrine of divide et impera. The re-emergence -  with British encouragement -  
of Turkish interest for Cyprus, accompanied by the rise of acute Pan-Turkism, 
led the Turkish Government from its initial pro-British, continuation-of-colonial- 
rule position to the aggressive Kibris Turktur, and eventually to the Averof- 
inspired, Lenox Boyd-imposed, Menderes-aggravated Taksim.
The anti-colonial passion of Digenis against the British, and his absolute 
underestimation of the Cypriot Turk element, led on one hand to strict orders 
forbidding any action against the minority, but on the other, to a full scale 
terrorizing campaign against the police, that, in the meantime, was flooded with 
huge numbers of mostly unqualified Turkish policemen, that served as a buffer 
between the colonial forces and EOKA, absorbing part of the fatal blows. The
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minority, alarmed by the dynamic action of EOKA, began its underground 
organization, initially with KITEMB and later with VOLK AN -  the counter-action 
of which was limited to arson, bomb explosions, destruction of Greek property 
and attacks against innocent Greeks. The indiscriminate strikes of EOKA 
against the police and the cause of Turkish fatalities encouraged the first 
racially motivated attacks against Greek property, and later against Greek soft 
targets. The death pattern in the following two years remained unaltered: EOKA 
continued the murders of Turkish policemen while VOLKAN, through the 
Turkish policemen, carried on the murders of innocent Greeks. The 
ineffectiveness -  softness -  of VOLKAN to counter-balance EOKA, initiated an 
effort of establishing a new organization named 9 Eyiul Cephesi, the operation 
of which was tragically disrupted during its formation.
The establishment of Turk Mukavemet Teskifati, under the hard-line 
leadership of Rauf Denktash, despite its short life, succeeded to attract the 
attention of motherland Turkey, as well as to enforce the derailment of Enosis 
under the threat of Taksim. The heavy Greek casualties suffered during the first 
weeks of the sixty-day Taksim offensive, under the competent, aggressive, and 
nothing-to-lose leadership of Denktash, shocked the Greek community. The 
initial silence of EOKA aggravated Turkish aggression against innocent Greeks, 
forcing Digenis to enter the conflict. The underground confrontation of TMT and 
EOKA that followed -  in the colonial shadow of pro-Turk discrimination -  was 
devastating, both in the number of victims and the violence used against Greek 
victims, most of who were stabbed and butchered to death.
The signing of the controversial Zurich and London Agreements brought 
a temporary suspension of inter-communal strife, but it did not succeed in 
erasing the deep scars of fear and aversion engraved during the Taksim 
offensive. The Greek side, completely disappointed for the abandonment of the 
strategic objective of Enosis, saw the luxuriant Turkish privileges offered by the 
Constitution, and the transformation of a minority into an equal political partner 
of the Greek majority, as a raw provocation. The Turkish side, realizing the vast 
potentials offered for the financial and political growth of the minority, insisted
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on the detailed and full implementation of the agreements. In the meantime, the 
covert military infiltration of Turkey into Cyprus through the re-establishment of 
TMT by Turkish Army officers -  under the Kibris istirdat Projesi secretly 
prepared by the Seferberiik Tektik Kuruiu ~ and the secret training of men in 
Turkey, as well as the covert importation of serious quantities of arms and 
ammunition, dramatically undermined the chances of a peaceful 
implementation of such complicated and perplexed agreements.
The distribution of post-colonial power among former EOKA members, 
accompanied by the failure to organize them under a unified political identity 
(EDMA) -  under the invisible control of Makarios and his protector
Giorkadjis, turned out as a serious destabilizing element in internal Greek 
Cypriot affairs that eventually developed into a hazardous ideological chasm. 
The pro-Grivas supporters, opposing independence in favor of Enosis, were 
socially and politically marginalized, while pro-Makarios supporters, in favor of 
the Zurich-London Agreements, were offered influential government positions 
and were rewarded with social recognition. While the Turkish motherland and 
the minority worked silently to strengthen their underground paramilitary 
organization, the former members of EOKA turned into predators of social and 
political power, where personal rivalries, frequently led into abuse of power and 
occasionally to murder. The multipolar internal Greek Cypriot armed 
antagonism -  between pro-Makarios Giorkadjis (personal armed and intelligent 
groups), pro-Grivas Papaphotis-Kyriakides (initially KEM and later PSA), as 
well as pro-Makarios/Grivas Samson (OPEK) -  during the first Independence 
years, did not serve the best interests of the Cypriots (Greeks and Turks). 
Similarly the continuation of underground preparations by TMT and the 
establishment of EOK to counter-balance the Turkish underground movement, 
dramatically reduced the chances for a peaceful future. The accumulation of 
inflammable fuel (underground movements) in both communities would only 
need a single spark to cause an explosive combustion. The continual friction 
arising from the perplexed nature of the Constitution, re-enforced by growing 
suspicion between the two communities, as well as the year-after-year
165
deterioration of the inter-communal environment, evaporated the opportunity for 
a prosperous common future. The countdown, which begun with the 
internationalization of 1954, was hazardously leading towards an inter­
communal armed confrontation with indeterminate implications. The peculiar 
attitudes of the two motherlands -  political hesitation but underground support 
of the paramilitary forces of the two communities -  accompanied by strange 
provocations such as the Omerie-Bayraktar bomb explosions, the Agios 
Kassianos arson attempt, the Gurkan-Hikmet murders, the second Bayraktar 
bomb explosion, and the Markos Drakos noise bomb, created a suffocating 
environment, where the critical question was not if an inter-communal 
confrontation would erupt, but when. The accidental incident in the early hours 
of 21 December 1963, between Greek policemen and Turkish Cypriots, that 
almost caused the collapse of the cripple Republic -  initiated the geographical 
separation of the two communities and the beginning of the end of Cypriot trust 
and co-existence.
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